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The current thesis investigated the effects of a variety of spatial and 
temporal factors on visual recognition memory in human adults. Continuous 
recognition experiments investigated the effect of lag (the number of items 
intervening between study and test) on recognition of a variety of stimulus sets 
(common objects, face-like stimuli, fractals, trigrams), and determined that 
recognition of common objects was superior to that of other stimulus types. This 
advantage was largely eradicated when common objects of only one class (birds) 
were tested.  
Continuous recognition confounds the number of intervening items with 
the time elapsed between study and test presentations of stimuli. These factors 
were separated in an experiment comparing recognition performance at different 
rates of presentation. D-prime scores were affected solely by the number of 
intervening items, suggesting an interference-based explanation for the effect of 
lag. The role of interference was investigated further in a subsequent experiment 
examining the effect of interitem similarity on recognition. A higher level of global 
similarity amongst stimuli was associated with a lower sensitivity of recognition.  
Spatial separation between study and test was studied using 
same/different recognition of face-like stimuli, and spatial shifts between study 
and test locations. An initial study found a recognition advantage for stimuli that 
were studied and tested in the same peripheral location. However, the 
introduction of eye-tracking apparatus to verify fixation resulted in the eradication 
of this effect, suggesting that it was an artefact of uncontrolled fixation. 
Translation of both face-like and fractal stimuli between areas of different 
eccentricity, with different spatial acuities, did decrease recognition sensitivity, 
suggesting a partial positional specificity of visual memory. These phenomena 
ii 
were unaffected by 180° rotation. When interfering stimuli were introduced 
between study and test trials, translation invariance at a constant eccentricity 
broke down.  
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1.1 Recognition memory 
The word “memory” is used in psychology to describe “an enduring 
change in behaviour, or in the behavioural potential, that results from the 
individual’s behavioural experience” and also encompassing “the retention over 
time of learned information” (Dudai, 2002, p. 157, p.157). It is a broad term that 
has been proposed to encompass a wide range of different stores and 
processes, which may or may not be closely related to each other. Memory likely 
consists of a number of different entities relying on different brain systems. 
Generally memory may be divided into two subcategories, explicit and implicit 
memory. Explicit tasks require conscious awareness of the material being 
retrieved, i.e. recollection of facts and events, known as declarative memory, 
whilst implicit tasks involve a priming stimulus and no conscious recall of 
experience (Squire & Zola, 1996). Declarative memory can be defined as the 
acquisition, retention and retrieval of knowledge that has been consciously and 
intentionally remembered (N. J. Cohen & Squire, 1980). 
In addition to this subcategorisation, memory has been divided according 
to the nature of the material memorised. Episodic memory is the name given to 
the storage and recall of information about specific experiences, or episodes, e.g. 
that you had a letter in the post this morning. It is distinguishable from semantic 
memory, which consists of generalisable facts (Tulving, 1983), e.g. that the post 
arrives between 9 and 10 o’clock, and procedural memory, the memory for 
specific motor plans and actions. Episodic memory is memory for experienced 
events and usually involves the retrieval of perceptual information in specific 
spatiotemporal settings. This type of memory is commonly assayed by one of 
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three methods: free recall, cued recall and recognition. Free recall involves the 
learning and subsequent uncued retrieval of lists of stimuli. Cued recall is similar, 
however retrieval is primed with cues, e.g. the first three letters of a word. 
Recognition tests involve simply identifying whether a stimulus has been 
perceived before or not. 
Recognition literally means to know again. To recognise is to perceive 
something as previously known (Mandler, 1980), although psychological usage of 
recognition is usually restricted to judgements about the prior occurrence of 
events and, therefore, episodic memory. Psychological research into recognition 
memory aims to ascertain how people come to make judgements that an item or 
event has previously been encountered. Rather than simply being an individual’s 
ability to identify an item as belonging to a particular semantic category (e.g. ‘that 
is a cat’), recognition memory refers to an individual’s ability to identify previous 
experience of that specific item (e.g. ‘that is my cat’). 
Recognition memory can be divided further into two components: 
familiarity and episodic recognition. To give an example of this separation, 
imagine that you pass someone on your way to work, that you recognise that 
person as someone you have previously met, but cannot recall who they are or 
where you met them. This is the perceptual identification component of 
recognition memory, a judgement based on a feeling of familiarity. You “know” 
you have seen the person before but cannot remember the specific details about 
the event. Alternatively, imagine that you recognised the person’s identity and the 
event during which you met them previously. In addition to the familiarity 
component, this type of recognition involves recollective matching, or 
“remembering” (M. W. Brown & Aggleton, 2001; Tulving, 1983). This is an 
example of episodic recognition, because the specific episode of the first 
encounter is recalled.  
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The first functional theory of two such processes was proposed by Kintsch 
(1970) but this view has largely been revised since then (see Clarys, 2001 for a 
review). Mandler’s (1980) theory of activation proposes that memory is made up 
of representational units and proposes that there are two methods of retrieval: 
feelings of familiarity and conscious memory search. Sensory integration of 
stimulus features, or intra-event integration, gives rise to feelings of familiarity, 
the automatic reactivation of the stimulus representation. This is contrasted with 
the elaboration upon the event within a context or within another event that 
initiates a conscious search. This is proposed to be a controlled process requiring 
cognitive effort. The two processes are theorised to work in tandem in the 
recognition of a stimulus, but familiarity is assumed to be faster. 
Jacoby and Dallas (1981) proposed a similar theory, but suggested that 
previous exposure to a stimulus led to perceptual facilitation, enhancing 
subsequent recognition (familiarity). Memory is assumed to make use of a 
combination of attention-demanding conscious processes with automatic 
processes. The balance would depend on the nature of the task with explicit 
tasks demanding greater use of conscious processes and implicit tasks making 
greater use of automatic processes. 
Tulving (1985) studied the relationship between specific states of 
consciousness and different types of memory. He suggested that semantic, 
procedural and episodic memories could be characterised with different states of 
consciousness. Amongst these are autonoetic (self-aware) consciousness, in 
which a ‘mental journey’ is made by a person until an event may be recalled in its 
context (Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997). Noetic consciousness denotes a state 
in which a person is aware of information but not its origin. Explicit episodic recall 
may thus be associated with autonoetic consciousness, whilst the experience of 
feelings of familiarity can be thought of as a noetic state of consciousness 
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(Gardiner & Java, 1993; Gardiner, Ramponi, & Richardson-Klavehn, 1999; 
Gardiner & Richardson-Klavehn, 2000). 
Recognition memory, including both the capacity for perceptual 
identification of events, and the judgement of their prior occurrence (Aggleton & 
Brown, 1999; Mandler, 1980), is an essential component in memory as a whole. 
However, whilst the proposed subdivisions of memory are theoretically useful, 
there is no doubt that the systems are semidiscrete, with frequent interactions. 
Semantic memory, for example, presumably develops from individual episodes 
from episodic memory, which become generalised. For example, your knowledge 
that postboxes are red might come from the combination of many episodes in 
which you saw red postboxes, or perhaps an episode in which you were told that 
postboxes are red. Also, whilst it is often useful to view familiarity and episodic 
recognition within recognition memory as separate, they have been described as 
shallower and deeper levels of recognition memory. Some authors, basing their 
work on signal detection theory, suggest that there is just one memory system, 
and that supposed differences between familiarity and recollection are 
quantitative (Donaldson, 1996; Hirshman & Master, 1997; Inoue & Bellezza, 
1998). Decisions are made according to the strength of the memory trace, the 
putative neural change that represents a memory, and the criterion set by the 
participant. However, neuroimaging studies (e.g. Duzel, Yonelinas, Mangun, 
Heinze, & Tulving, 1997; Yonelinas, Otten, Shaw, & Rugg, 2005) suggest that 
familiarity and episodic recollection are served by discrete brain regions. 
Yonelinas (1994) studied the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve, 
produced with hit and false alarm rates from signal detection theory analyses of 
memory experiments (see Green & Swets, 1966), and proposed that conscious 
recall is an ‘all or nothing’ process which could either successfully recall the 
context of encoding or not. The hit rate is the proportion of responses to 
previously seen stimuli that are correctly recognised, and the false alarm rate is 
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the proportion of novel stimuli that are incorrectly assumed to be old. Responses 
based on familiarity were assumed to be more variable and to depend on the 
criterion for decision adopted by the participant.  
To summarise, recognition is a component of episodic, declarative 
memory that allows the discrimination of familiar and novel experiences. Whilst, 
historically, there has been some debate over whether recognition memory may 
be further subdivided into separate familiarity-based and episodic recall 
components or not, recent evidence from neuroimaging supports the notion of 
two separate processes. 
1.2 The continuous recognition paradigm 
Human and animal experiments aiming to test recognition memory have 
used a large number of different tasks, with a corresponding variety of strengths 
and limitations. The most common basic design involves the presentation of a list 
of items for memorisation, and a subsequent test of the participant’s ability to 
discriminate between items that have been seen before and those that are 
entirely novel. This may take the form of a single long study list, followed by a 
single long list from which items are recognised (e.g. Strong, 1912), or a series of 
short lists interspersed by repeated or novel probe stimuli requiring “old” 
(recognised) vs. “new” (not recognised) discriminations (e.g. Zhou, Kahana, & 
Sekuler, 2004). An inevitable factor to be taken account of when examining the 
results obtained from such memory tasks is serial position. An item’s position 
within a list has a significant effect on subsequent recognition, in addition to any 
other manipulated factors, resulting in primacy (the tendency for items at the start 
of a list to be remembered better than others) and recency (the tendency for 
items studied most recently to be remembered better than others). These 
produce a characteristic U-shaped curve when accuracy is plotted against serial 
position, an effect that is especially pronounced in long lists, but is observed even 
6 
when there are as few as 4 items in the list (Korsnes, Magnussen, & Reinvang, 
1996; see Figure 1.1 for an example; Wright, Santiago, Sands, Kendrick, & Cook, 
1985). Serial position must, therefore, be accounted for before the inference of 
further effects of manipulations of the stimuli. 
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Figure 1.1: An example of a 'U-shaped' serial position curve. When a probe for 
recognition matched the first (1) or last (4) item in a list it was recognised more accurately 
than for recognition at either of the middle list positions. Figure adapted from Korsnes et 
al. (1996). 
An alternative method of assessing recognition memory that avoids the 
serial position effect is the continuous recognition paradigm, introduced by 
Shepard and Teghtsoonian (1961). Their aim was to circumvent some of the 
limitations discussed above, and to provide a method for measuring recognition 
under “conditions approaching a steady state” (Shepard & Teghtsoonian, 1961). 
Whereas previous methods involved learning an isolated block of information, 
e.g. a word list, and subsequently retrieving as much of the information as 
possible, the continuous recognition task presented participants with a continuing 
sequence of information, and required their retention of that information 
throughout the course of the experiment by interleaving study and test trials. This 
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procedure aimed to minimise the possibility of rehearsal of the material for 
retention, and maximise interference from previous material.  
In Shepard and Teghtsoonian’s experiment, participants were required to 
turn over cards in a specially prepared pack one at a time. Each of the 200 cards 
had a three-digit number printed on it, and each number occurred twice in the 
pack. The participant was required to respond to each card as it was presented, 
indicating whether they thought the number had not been seen before (“new”), or 
that it had been seen previously (“old”). The lag, or number of intervening cards 
between repeats, was manipulated by the experimenter. The ability to manipulate 
the lag as an independent variable is an important aspect of the procedure, and 
allows the comparison of recognition after different study-test intervals and 
different levels of interference, without the confounding influence of the primacy 
and recency effects observed in list learning. 
Shepard and Teghtsoonian made several important findings in their initial 
experimentation. In a finding that has been much replicated since, they 
discovered that probability of recognition of items was dependent on lag. 
Recognition accuracy dropped rapidly from almost 100% from lag 0 (no 
intervening stimuli) to lag 6, before assuming a much more gradual decay, 
regardless of position within the task. The experimenters also discovered that, in 
spite of their hopes of studying recognition under a steady state, this was never 
totally achieved during their experiments. The probability of participants making 
false alarms was still increasing gradually after 200 trials, although after a certain 
point the rate of increase was marginal (after 40 trials the increase in probability 
occurred at a rate of 0.0007 per card). The curves obtained by plotting 
recognition accuracy against lag suggested that memory traces decayed over 
time, and became decreasingly stimulus-specific. 
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Figure 1.2: Theoretical distribution of familiarity values for old and new items predicted by 
signal detection theory. Figure reproduced from Swets (1964). 
One of the advantages of the continuous recognition memory test is that 
the results are interpretable using signal detection theory, allowing d’, a measure 
of sensitivity, to be calculated in addition to the more traditional measure of 
proportion of correct responses. Noise, sensory input that is not part of the signal, 
is assumed to vary randomly over time and have a normal distribution. Signals (in 
the case of continuous recognition, old stimuli) add a fixed amount of sensory 
input to the noise present in a trial so signal plus noise is also normally distributed 
(Figure 1.2). Sometimes the signal is indistinguishable from noise because the 
two distributions overlap. In this case, the participant must adopt a criterion for 
making an old/new decision, based on the level of sensory input. This will 
inevitably result in errors in the form of false alarms (mistakenly registering a new 
stimulus as old) and misses (mistakenly registering an old stimulus as new). By 
calculating the Z-scores for hit and false alarm rates it is possible to obtain d’ 
scores, a measure of discriminative ability independent of bias, for participants. 
The d’ score is the difference between the noise mean and the signal + noise 
mean in standard deviation (Z-score) units. 
The advantages of the continuous recognition paradigm have been put to 
extensive use since 1961, in all manner of memory studies. A number of 
continuous recognition-derived tests are used in neuropsychological assessment 
9 
of human memory including the Continuous Recognition Memory Test (CRM; 
Hannay & Levin, 1988) and Continuous Visual Memory Test (CVMT; Trahan & 
Larrabee, 1988). These tests both employ a blocked design in which certain 
items from the first block recur in each of the remaining 6 blocks, and must be 
discriminated from categorically or perceptually similar items. Whilst both tests 
employ drawings as stimuli they differ in that the CRM uses drawings of living 
things whereas the CVMT uses abstract drawings. The CRM was first developed 
as a means to assess memory deficits in patients with closed-head injuries, as it 
is possible to administer to patients who are incapable of making written or 
multiword verbal responses. Performance is not related to age, sex or 
educational level (Hannay & Levin, 1989; Hannay, Levin, & Grossman, 1979), 
and the test has the advantage of being interpretable in terms of the theory of 
signal detection (Drake & Hannay, 1992). Factor analysis of the results of the 
CRM, administered as part of a battery of neuropsychological tests, found that 
correct recognition (hits) had a significant loading on a “learning and memory 
factor”, whereas CRM false alarms loaded on an “attention to visual detail” factor 
(Fuchs, Hannay, Huckeba, & Espy, 1999). A similar analysis of the CVMT found 
that d’ scores were associated with “verbal“ and “visual/nonverbal” intellectual 
factors as well as attentional ability (Larrabee, Trahan, & Curtiss, 1992). 
Research has demonstrated the usefulness of continuous recognition memory 
tests in the study of closed-head injury (Brooks, 1972; , 1974a; , 1974b; , 1989; 
Hannay, Levin, & Grossman, 1979), dementia (Cutting, 1978; E. Miller & Lewis, 
1977), alcoholic Korsakoff’s disease (Cutting, 1978; W. Riege, 1977), aphasia 
(W. H. Riege, Klane, Metter, & Hanson, 1982), and unilateral temporal-lobe 
lesions (Cutting, 1978; De Renzi, 1968; Kimura, 1963; Trahan & Larrabee, 1988).  
Studies using continuous recognition in non-human primates have been 
informative in elucidating the neural circuits and brain regions underlying 
recognition memory (Gaffan, 1977), and have identified “lag-sensitive” neuronal 
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populations (Brozinsky, Yonelinas, Kroll, & Ranganath, 2005; Xiang & Brown, 
1998). The task is also being used to good effect in combination with 
neuroimaging to understand various neurological and psychiatric disorders, 
including obsessive-compulsive disorder (M. S. Kim et al., 2005), Alzheimer’s 
disease (Joray, Herrmann, Mulligan, & Schnider, 2004), schizophrenia (M. S. 
Kim, Kwon, Kang, Youn, & Kang, 2004) and epilepsy (Guillem, N'Kaoua, 
Rougier, & Claverie, 1998). Most commonly, however, studies have investigated 
recognition in normal participants using standard English words as stimuli, and a 
wide range of factors and phenomena have been investigated. The influence of 
lags of various sizes, repetition (Hintzman, 1969; Hockley, 1982; Jessen et al., 
2001; Okada, 1971; Van Strien, Hagenbeek, Stam, Rombouts, & Barkhof, 2005), 
feedback and base rates (Estes & Maddox, 1995a), and different types of stimuli 
(Doty & Savakis, 1997; Estes & Maddox, 1995b; Lehmann & Murray, 2005; 
Nickerson, 1965) have been investigated. Attempts have been made to 
investigate the neural mechanisms underlying recognition in combination with 
neuroimaging (Coney & MacDonald, 1988; Jessen et al., 2001; Van Strien, 
Hagenbeek, Stam, Rombouts, & Barkhof, 2005), in attempts to develop cognitive 
models of recognition separating familiarity and explicit recollection (Hockley, 
1992; Jones & Atchley, 2002; B. B. J. Murdock & Hockley, 1989; Reder et al., 
2000). Continuous recognition has also been used recently in order to attempt to 
very precisely model retention (Rubin, Hinton, & Wenzel, 1999). The findings of 
studies using continuous recognition with normal human participants are 
reviewed in the following sections. 
1.2.1 Repetition 
In the 20 or so years following the introduction of the continuous 
recognition paradigm, a number of researchers used continuous recognition to 
explore proposed theories and models of memory. By manipulating the lags used 
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and modifying the paradigm to include stimuli occurring more than twice, resulting 
in more than one test trial, investigators hoped to describe the nature of 
recognition memory more precisely and thus determine whether previous models 
could be applied to this type of memory. In three highly similar studies, first 
Hintzman (1969), then Okada (1971), and then Hockley (1982), employed 
variations of the continuous recognition paradigm in which stimuli recurred two 
times (3 presentations in total) and, therefore, two lags could be manipulated. 
Naming the presentations P1, P2, and P3, one lag occurred between P1 and P2 
(lag i), and one occurred between P2 and P3 (lag j). By including more than one 
repetition of items these studies revealed information about the effects of memory 
trace strength on recognition.  
Hintzman (1969) employed high-frequency words (those with a frequency 
greater than 30 per million according to Thorndike and Lorge (1944) in a 
continuous recognition task where accuracy was near perfect (average 96%). 
Reaction time was measured as the dependent variable, and the effects of 
latency, frequency and spacing of repetitions on this variable were determined. 
All of the experimental words used in the experiment occurred three times with a 
fixed lag j of 16, and a variable lag i (1, 2, 4, 8, or 16). The major findings of this 
study were that error latencies were consistently longer than those for correct 
responses at each of the three presentations, that P2 recognition times increased 
with increasing length of lag, and that recognition times for the second repeat 
(P3) were shorter than those for the first (P2). P3 recognition times were also 
increased by increasing lag i. These findings made it clear that reaction times 
were dependent on lag even in the absence of significant variation in accuracy, 
and that repetitions of items facilitated the speed of recognition, as might be 
expected. 
Okada (1971) was interested in what processes were involved in 
continuous recognition, and whether they were comparable to the serial 
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comparison processes theorised to be involved in other memory tasks 
(Sternberg, 1966). Sternberg’s theory explains recognition as a process of 
comparing the current stimulus with each of the previous stimuli one at a time. 
Okada’s first experiment used a similar paradigm to Shepard and Teghtsoonian 
(1961) with only one repetition of stimuli, and lags of 0-7. Stimuli were common 
English words. Mean response latencies were found to increase exponentially 
with increasing lag. This appeared to suggest that continuous recognition relies 
on neither an exhaustive nor a self-terminating serial comparison process, as 
these would predict reaction times to be independent of lag or have a linear 
relationship with lag, respectively. Okada theorised that, instead of serial 
comparison, the trace strength of items was critical in determining the reaction 
time for recognition responses, since trace is hypothesised to decay 
exponentially with increasing lag. In a second experiment where words appeared 
once, twice or three times, reaction times were faster for P3 presentations than 
P2. Okada saw this as further support for the trace strength hypothesis as more 
repetitions would be expected to increase the strength of the memory trace.  
Hockley’s (1982) study utilised much longer lags than those investigated 
by either Hintzman or Okada, up to a maximum of 40 intervening items. Hockley 
used a noun/non-noun manipulation with the word stimuli employed, both 
between- and within-lists. Lists were made up of either nouns or non-nouns 
(between-list manipulation) or were made up of a mixture (within-list), to 
determine whether the two classes of word would affect reaction times. The effect 
of both manipulations was to produce a difference in the slope of the reaction 
time versus lag curve, without affecting the intercept. This suggested that 
retrieval time in this experiment was largely independent of the composition of 
word lists, as both pure- and mixed-lists gave rise to comparable measures of 
recognition. Hockley concluded that the effect of item repetition is more than a 
simple accumulation of memory strength, and suggested two models – multiple-
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observations (Pike, Dalgleish, & Wright, 1977) and diffusion process models 
(Ratcliff, 1978) – derived from signal detection theory, that were better able to 
account for the data.  
Ratcliff’s model proposes that each stimulus is simultaneously compared 
with all items in the memory search set, and a decision is made on the basis of 
‘relatedness’ – the degree of similarity between an item in the memory and the 
probe item in the experiment. Relatedness is presumed to decrease over time, 
and correctly predicts the decreases in reaction time at longer lags, although the 
form of this relationship is not predicted. In the multiple-observations model, 
items are encoded as a set of features summed as a whole. The strength of the 
correlation between the probe item and the memory trace of previously observed 
items forms the basis of any recognition decision. The output of the correlation 
varies giving normal distributions for both members and non-members of the 
memory list. The difference between the means of the two distributions is 
assumed to be d’.  
More recently, Jessen et al. (2001) used event-related functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine the encoding and retrieval 
processes involved in continuous recognition with two repetitions of stimuli. They 
found evidence of spatial differentiation of responses to encoding (study stimuli) 
and recognition (test stimuli) across a number of brain regions. In addition, frontal 
cortex activity was greater for the first repetition of a stimulus than for the second, 
and was ascribed to retrieval effort. This is evidence that the greater ease of 
recognising items a second time is related to altered neural processes in brain 
regions associated with memory.  
A study measuring the event-related potentials (ERPs) of participants 
carrying out a continuous recognition task, involving 10 exposures to word 
stimuli, similarly found evidence of differences between activity for repeated and 
novel stimuli, and between stimuli repeated once and several times (Van Strien, 
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Hagenbeek, Stam, Rombouts, & Barkhof, 2005). Increased positivity of the 
electroencephalogram (EEG) trace during the period 300-500ms after the 
stimulus was shown was found during correct recognition of an “old” word, in 
contrast to the trace for correct identification of a “new” word. In addition, correct 
recognition after increasing repetitions of stimuli correlated with increasing 
positivity in the 500-800ms period. This was accompanied by a linearly 
decreasing magnitude of induced delta power in the 375-750ms time window, 
correlated with greater speed and accuracy of behavioural responses. The 
authors cited these effects as evidence for a dual-processing model of 
recognition, suggesting that the “graded recollection state” could be dissociated 
from familiarity.  
1.2.2 Stimulus attributes, base rates and feedback 
Estes and Maddox (1995a) investigated the effects of several novel 
methodological adaptations of the continuous recognition procedure, giving some 
insight into how participants performed the task. They discovered that, when 
accurate feedback relating to the correctness of responses was given, the false 
alarm rate tended towards the old-new stimulus base rate of the experiment, 
suggesting that participants were manipulating the ratio of old:new responses 
according to the actual ratio of old:new trials. Without feedback false alarm rates 
remained independent of base rate. Estes and Maddox also used three different 
types of stimuli, with different levels of interitem similarity. Random digit triads 
(such as those used by Shepard & Teghtsoonian, 1961) were used for their high 
interitem similarity, random consonant trigrams had intermediate similarity, and 
common English words were used as examples of items with low similarity. Two 
experiments were carried out in which base rates were either 33% or 67% old 
stimuli, and informative feedback was either given or not given.  
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The most robust finding was that all of the response measures were 
dependent on the type of stimulus used, with the false alarm rate increasing from 
words to letters to digits, and therefore with increasing interitem similarity. An 
inverse effect was observed for hit rates, which decreased with increasing 
similarity. This would appear to demonstrate that increasing interitem similarity 
makes stimuli less memorable, and harder to discriminate from one another. 
Stimuli that are highly similar are less distinctive and there is higher global 
similarity between them. In addition, increased similarity of stimuli is likely to 
result in increased interference from stimuli intervening between study and test 
presentations. The false alarm rate for digit and letter stimuli, but not words, was 
dependent on the base rate when informative feedback was given. It could be 
suggested, therefore, that participants recognising more similar stimuli rely on 
feedback, at some level, to set the ratio of old:new responses that they make. 
This was not observed in the much easier word recognition task, perhaps as a 
result of the participants’ greater confidence in their decisions. 
These findings provide clear evidence that words are a very different 
class of stimuli to meaningless letter and number strings. Old-new decisions 
appear to be made with much greater accuracy when using word stimuli, 
although it is not clear from Estes and Maddox’s study whether these findings are 
due to a lower interitem similarity, and subsequently greater discriminability, or 
whether participants’ greater familiarity with these stimuli is responsible. 
Interitem similarity was also studied by Raser (1972) who used words that 
were similar, either orthographically or acoustically, to study items as lures. The 
number of intervening stimuli between the study and the lure was manipulated in 
a manner similar to the lag in a classic continuous recognition experiment. The 
study determined that both types of similarity were responsible for increasing the 
false alarm rate, and that the effects were additive. The lag functions for the 
different conditions were similarly shaped, with false alarm rates rising rapidly at 
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short lags and then reaching asymptote. A greater overall effect of orthographic 
similarity was noted than acoustic similarity, as many participants did not make 
any false alarms for acoustically similar stimulus pairs at all. For those who did, 
the effect was comparable to that of orthographic similarity.  
1.2.3 Familiarity and explicit retrieval 
An ongoing debate in recognition memory centres on the issue of whether 
there is more than one process involved. A large amount of evidence has 
accumulated in support of a dual process model of recognition (Jacoby & Dallas, 
1981; Kintsch, 1970; Mandler, 1980; Tulving, 1985; Yonelinas, 1994), in which 
recognition may be based either on explicit recall of the encoding episode, or on 
feelings of familiarity.  
One manner of conceptualising the dual process theory, is by assuming 
that familiarity can be equated with memory for items, whereas episodic 
recollection requires associative memory connecting events (Hockley, 1982). 
Mandler (1980) suggested that immediate recognition is based on item familiarity, 
and that as this information is lost through decay or interference, recognition 
becomes increasingly dependent on associative information. Murdock and 
Hockley (1989) found no diminution of forgetting rates for continuous recognition 
of associated pairs of items, even up to test lags of 26. This is surprising when 
compared with the results of studies examining forgetting for single items in a 
similar procedure (e.g. Hintzman, 1969; Hockley, 1982), which have determined 
a clear reduction in memory performance as lag increases. Hockley (1992) 
compared forgetting rates for item and associative information, by comparing 
continuous recognition for single words with that for associations between 
random word pairs (e.g. forest-singing), using both yes/no and 2-alternative 
forced choice procedures. The forgetting rates for word pairs were lower than 
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those for single items, suggesting a distinction between these two types of 
memory.  
Hockley explained the findings by assuming that the encoded information 
for associations between items is more distinctive than that for the items 
themselves. Mandler’s (1980) dual-process theory assumes that recognition of 
associative information involves a recall process, a controversial assumption with 
some evidential support (Humphreys, 1978; Humphreys & Bain, 1983; Mandler, 
1980), but also with evidence against it (Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984; Gronlund & 
Ratcliff, 1989). The global matching models preferred by Hockley (Hintzman, 
1984; B. B. Murdock, 1982; Pike, 1984; Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1981) do not 
incorporate this controversial recall process into recognition, preferring a 
matching of the test probe with memory representations and comparison of the 
resultant strengths of matches. The models can differentially emphasise item and 
associative information at encoding and recall, but the results of Hockley (1992) 
pose a problem for these models, as none has a mechanism that could 
differentially interfere with item and associative information resulting in the 
forgetting rates observed. However, item recognition involves more than just the 
discrimination of old events from new events as the items studied (words) have 
pre-experimental levels of familiarity. Their recognition, then, must be achieved in 
a context-dependent manner, excluding previous exposure to the words. 
Associations between words in word pairs are usually completely novel with no 
such pre-experimental familiarity. The MINERVA 2 global matching model 
(Hintzman, 1988) partitions item vectors into content and context elements. Item 
information thus consists of content and context features, whereas association 
information could consist primarily of content features. As the context changes 
between study and test one would expect a greater detriment to encoding based 
on both content and context compared with that based on content alone.  
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Reder et al. (2000) investigated familiarity and episodic recall in a 
continuous recognition-type procedure, in which participants had to classify 
whether their recognition judgements were based on specifically remembering 
the item (‘remember’) or whether they just knew that the item was familiar 
(‘know’). In one experiment this discrimination was made instead of an ‘old’ 
response, and in another it was made following the ‘old’ response. Word stimuli 
occurred 1, 3, 5 or 10 times and were of either high frequency (normative mean 
frequency of 142) or low frequency (normative mean frequency of 1.6). Reder 
and colleagues were investigating the word frequency effect; the finding that high 
and low frequency word stimuli have different effects on both the hit rate (greater 
for high than low frequency words) and false alarm rate (also greater for high 
frequency words). The researchers found a significant main effect of word 
frequency (p<0.01), with low frequency words ‘remembered’ much more often 
than high frequency words. Fewer false ‘remember’ responses were encountered 
for low than high frequency words, but there were more ‘know’ responses for high 
frequency words.  
 
Figure 1.3: Schematic illustration of the differences between representations of high- and 
low-frequency words in recognition experiments. Figure reproduced from Reder et al. 
(2000). 
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Reder and colleagues explained these effects with their Source of 
Activational Confusion (SAC) model. This model assumes one memorial node to 
represent each word, and another to represent the encoded memory event for 
the word. Memory strength is represented by the level of activation of the word 
node, and the base level of activation is determined by previous experiences of 
the word, their frequency and recency. The base level of activation affects the 
general familiarity of a word, and explains why words of high frequency are more 
familiar to participants. The model also explains why the false alarm rate is higher 
for this class of words. For low frequency words there is a smaller ‘fan’ of 
contextual nodes associated to the word node making the experimental encoding 
event easier to retrieve, and contributing to the greater accuracy of ‘remember’ 
responses for these words (Figure 1.3). The explanation of the word frequency 
effect offered is certainly a satisfactory one, seeming to provide a mechanism for 
Mandler’s (1980) idea of a “counter” for familiarity, and a manner of combining 
item and context information in the manner suggested by Hockley (1992). 
Whether neural correlates of the proposed word and contextual nodes exist is an 
interesting question for future research.  
Jones and Atchley’s (2002) examination of feature and conjunction error 
rates in continuous recognition did not find strong evidence for a dual-process 
account of recognition. The study used compound parent words (e.g. blackmail, 
jailbird) and conjunction lures (blackbird), presented at set lags after the parent, 
predicting that, according to the dual process model, familiarity and recollection 
should be placed in opposition to one another. Feelings of familiarity with 
components of the parent words would lead participants to make conjunction 
errors (false alarms for the novel conjunction lures) whereas explicit recollection 
of parent words would lead participants to correctly reject the novel conjunctions. 
The authors, drawing on the previous work of Hockley (1992) and Raser (1972), 
made the prediction that, under a dual process approach, recent information 
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should be highly familiar but accessible by recollection. As such, they expected 
low conjunction error rates for short lags where conscious recollection was likely 
to succeed, but that the rate of conjunction errors would rise at longer lags. In 
fact, the opposite effect was observed in their first experiment, where conjunction 
error rate was highest at a lag of 1 and then decreased slightly as lag increased 
to 5. This pattern of results could be explained with reference to a simple one 
process familiarity-based model. Results from a second experiment, in which 
participants were instructed to use recollection to avoid making conjunction 
errors, gave some support to the dual-process theory. Error rate was lowest at a 
lag of zero, the shortest lag. Once again, however, the simple familiarity model 
fitted the pattern of results at greater lags. The poor recollective ability of 
participants was explained with reference to the divided attention thought to be 
produced by the continuous recognition task. 
1.2.4 Modelling retention 
While most of the studies detailed above have attempted to explain 
specific memory phenomena with manipulations of the continuous recognition 
paradigm, Rubin et al. (1999) were interested in mathematically modelling the 
retention process, without manipulation, as precisely as possible. The rationale 
behind elucidating a retention function was to enable practical estimation of the 
time period for retention of material, and also to inform psychologists about the 
nature of the retention process.  
The experiments were carried out on a large number of participants (100 
in each condition), over a wide range of lags (0, 1, 2, 4, 7, 12, 21, 35, 59 and 99), 
and with many repetitions of each lag (27 for recognition), giving a total of 600 
trials per participant. The lags were chosen because they provided a wide range 
of points spaced evenly on a logarithmic scale. The large numbers of trials and 
participants ensured that the data collected were reliable, and that accurate 
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curve-fitting could be carried out. There were two conditions for recognition, a 
standard continuous recognition paradigm and a remember-know adaptation, 
similar to that described for the Reder et al. (2000) study above. The stimuli used 
were digit-letter-digit trigrams. They could occur in any of the outer positions of a 
screen divided into a 3x3 matrix, with the middle position reserved for feedback. 
The data collected were then fit to a large number of functions, and from these a 
sum of exponentials was selected as the best fit to the data (Figure 1.4). The 
function, y = a1e-t/T1 + a2e-t/T2 + a3e-t/T3, described three components of the curve, 
defined by exponentials of the time constants T1, T2 and T3. T3 was infinite and 
T1 was set at 1.15, but the best fitting T2 value was different for old-new 
recognition (13.38) compared with 27.55 for remember and remember+know 
responses. With these parameters a curve with an r2 value (goodness of fit) of 
.998 was obtained for remember judgements, and 0.996 for old-new recognition. 
The function fitted the data very well, although, given the 6 free parameters, this 
may not be too surprising.  
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Figure 1.4: The probability of recognition for words as a function of lag, for both old/new, 
and remember/know/new judgements. Figure reproduced from Rubin et al. (1999). 
Probability of recognition = (hits - false alarms) / (1 - false alarms). 
Rubin and colleagues argued that their results were the most precise data 
yet to be obtained for retention, and with such large numbers of participants and 
repetitions this seems a fair assumption. Certainly this precision allowed the 
authors to discriminate between functions to a greater degree than had been 
possible in their previous review of 100 years of forgetting data (Rubin & Wenzel, 
1996).The function held true for several data sets and for both grouped and 
individual data. When tested using data from a study of implicit tasks (McBride & 
Dosher, 1997), such as cued-recall and stem-completion, the function fit the data 
with r2 values in the range .86 to .99, suggesting that the retention function could 
be generalised to these types of task also.  
Rubin et al. (1999) discussed some of the theoretical implications of the 
findings and suggested that the three components of the equation might correlate 
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with different components of memory. The T1 component was proposed to 
describe working memory, consistent with a 2 sec phonological loop (A. D. 
Baddeley, 1997). In addition, the authors made the more controversial 
assumption that the other two components described either a divided long-term 
memory or intermediate- and long-term memory stores. They cite behavioural 
(Bahrick, 1965; Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995) and biological evidence (Ng et al., 
1991; Rosenzweig, Bennett, Colombo, Lee, & Serrano, 1993) to support such a 
division, but caution must be made when inferring that the three-component 
descriptive function is sufficient evidence to warrant such a re-division of 
memory. A three-component curve does not necessitate a three-component 
memory. Nonetheless, the debate over the nature and time-course of 
consolidation of memory remains pertinent, and offers the prospect of interesting 
future research (see Dudai, 2004; Wixted, 2004 for reviews). The modelling has 
provided a deeper insight into the time course of retention, and introduced a very 
rigorous and precise manner of studying recognition. 
1.2.5 Neural mechanisms 
Whilst the above studies largely approached recognition from a cognitive 
viewpoint, the use of neuroimaging in combination with traditional tasks has 
allowed inferences to be made about the brain regions involved in different 
aspects of memory. Coney and Macdonald (1988) investigated hemispheric 
differences in recognition by presenting stimuli to either the left or right visual 
field, thereby confining presentations to visual processing by one cerebral 
hemisphere or the other. Subsequent test presentations were either crossed (in 
the opposite field to the study presentation) or uncrossed (in the same field). The 
aim of the experiment was to determine whether hemispheric differences, for 
example the superior ability of the left hemisphere to process verbal material, 
contributed to lateral asymmetries in memory performance, and over what time 
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periods these asymmetries could be observed. Word stimuli were projected on a 
screen for 150ms, either to the left or right of a central fixation point.  
No main effect of the visual field to which the stimulus was initially 
presented was found in reaction time data. However, the effect of the visual field 
to which probe items were presented was significant, with faster reaction times 
when words were presented in the right visual field. There was also a significant 
interaction between the target and probe visual fields with congruent target and 
probe visual fields (i.e. presentation for target and probe in the same visual field) 
producing faster correct reaction times than incongruent fields (target and probe 
in different visual fields). Results for different lags suggested that hemispheric 
interaction varied significantly over time. At a retention interval of 3 sec (lag 1) no 
differences were observed between the 4 presentation conditions, suggesting 
that perceptual matching accounts for responses, as opposed to comparisons 
with memory. After 12 sec (lag 4) left hemispheric processing was clearly 
dominant, probably as a result of the left hemisphere’s superior verbal processing 
abilities. The effect of crossed presentations only diverged significantly from 
uncrossed presentations at intervals of 32 sec (lag 8) and 96 sec (lag 32). 
The results implied that memory traces were initially generated in both 
brain hemispheres in response to stimulus presentation, as no difference in 
recognition between crossed and uncrossed conditions was found, until a latency 
of 32 sec. These representations are likely to differ, however, in terms of their 
overall level of activation, with activation likely to be weaker in the indirectly-
activated hemisphere than that directly activated (contralateral to the visual field 
of presentation). Coney and Macdonald suggested two possible explanations for 
later hemispheric asymmetries. First, they suggested that decay of the two 
representations may have occurred to such an extent that the difference between 
direct and indirect traces affected retrieval time. Alternatively, once a trace had 
decayed to a critical level it may no longer have been effectively retrieved at all. 
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The fMRI study of Jessen and colleagues (Jessen et al., 2001) mentioned 
previously, found evidence of different activation patterns in participants when 
comparing encoding and recognition. Recognition of a test stimulus was 
associated with stronger activation of left parahippocampal and inferior frontal 
gyri than the initial study presentation of the same stimulus. These findings are 
consistent with the literature on amnesia and animal models of amnesia, which 
have found evidence of parahippocampal (Aggleton & Brown, 1999; Buffalo et al., 
1999; Meunier, Bachevalier, Mishkin, & Murray, 1993) and frontal lobe 
(Bachevalier & Mishkin, 1986; Janowsky, Shimamura, Kritchevsky, & Squire, 
1989; Owen, Sahakian, Semple, Polkey, & Robbins, 1995) involvement in 
recognition, and functional interaction between the two (Parker & Gaffan, 1998a). 
Furthermore, when comparing the first and second repetitions of ‘old’ items, 
bilateral activation of frontal areas was stronger on the first repetition. This 
decreased frontal activity during the second repetition was thought to be an 
indication of the correspondingly reduced retrieval effort associated with 
recognition of items repeated a second time.  
Whilst fMRI can give a good indication of the spatial profile of the 
anatomical substrate underlying the recognition process, better temporal 
resolution can be achieved with EEG measurements. Van Strien et al. (2005) 
examined changes in brain electrical activity during continuous recognition by 
EEG, and studied the resultant ERPs and induced band power, once again 
comparing novel items with their repetition, and repeated items at different levels 
of exposure. Recognition is associated with ‘old/new’ effects in the ERP, 
consisting of altered responses to repeated items compared to novel ones. Van 
Strien et al. found such an effect between 300 and 500 ms after exposure to a 
stimulus, when potentials for old items were associated with significantly greater 
positivity than those for new items. This effect was most pronounced around the 
midline parietal electrode position. In the time period 500-800 ms after 
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presentation, multiple repetitions of an item were associated with linearly 
increasing positivity, most pronounced at the midline central and fronto-central 
electrodes. Stronger memory for an item can therefore be related to increased 
positivity in this period. Similarly, induced bandpower (IBP) data showed 
evidence of higher bandpower in lower-2 alpha, theta, and delta bands for old 
items compared with new, and the induced delta activity was lessened with 
increasing repetitions in the period 375-750 ms after presentation. These effects 
constituted evidence, the authors suggested, for a dual-process interpretation of 
recognition, as familiarity was discernable from a graded recollection state 
dependent on repetitions of the stimulus. 
1.2.6 Different classes of stimuli 
Estes and Maddox’s (1995b) research had a bearing on an aspect of 
recognition memory research hitherto largely neglected. The amount of material 
memorised, and the process of retrieval, appear to be dependent on the type of 
stimulus used by the researcher. Most research using the continuous recognition 
paradigm until this point had been carried out using common English words as 
stimuli. However, other stimuli have been used in the paradigm, not just digit 
trigrams (Estes & Maddox, 1995a; Shepard & Teghtsoonian, 1961) but also 
pictorial and abstract visual stimuli (Doty & Savakis, 1997; Nickerson, 1965), and 
multisensory stimuli (Lehmann & Murray, 2005).  
Nickerson’s (1965) research, utilised a continuous recognition-type 
experiment with a series of black and white photographs, selected from 
photography periodicals. The paradigm was not strictly continuous recognition as 
the first 200 presentations were passively viewed new stimuli, followed by 400 
presentations which contained 200 new and 200 repeated photographs. Very 
long lags (40, 80, 120, 160 and 200) were employed. The aim of the experiment 
was to investigate the long-term memory capacity for complex meaningful 
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stimulus configurations. Nickerson’s results suggested that these stimuli were 
recognised significantly better than those that had been previously investigated 
(i.e. words, numbers and nonsense syllables), with participants performing at an 
average of 95% accuracy. This experiment served to demonstrate that, given the 
appropriate materials, the capacity of human recognition memory is very high 
indeed. The fact that these images were meaningful and perceptually rich 
undoubtedly contributed to the very high recognition rates obtained. 
Meaningfulness of stimuli has also been demonstrated to be critical in the 
recognition of word vs. letter stimuli in investigations such as Estes and Maddox’s 
(1995a), where strings of random letters were not memorised as effectively as 
meaningful words.  
 
Figure 1.5: Percent correct responses as a function of lag (Np) for images (2s 
presentation and 200ms presentation) vs. words (200ms presentation). Figure 
reproduced from Doty and Savakis (1997). 
In contrast, abstract and meaningless pictorial stimuli are remembered 
with much lower accuracy. Doty and Savakis (1997) assayed visual memory with 
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unique, non-objective images, and compared performance to that for common 4-
letter words. This was done in an attempt to determine whether recognition for 
the two different stimulus types was carried out via the same or different 
processes. Visual and verbal processes are known to involve, at least to some 
degree, separate neuronal systems in different brain regions, and with focuses in 
different hemispheres. Visual memory is largely independent of learning and 
language, and is thought not to differ greatly between humans and macaques. 
Doty and Savakis attempted to generate stimuli that did not suffer from the 
drawbacks of those used in previous experiments (e.g. Lewine, 1989; Shepard, 
1967; Standing, 1973) in that they were full colour and not readily nameable 
items. The images proved to be extremely difficult to retain, but nonetheless their 
recognition was very similar to that of words in terms of both accuracy and 
patterns of reaction times at the lags used (0, 1, 3, 7, 15 and 31) (see Figure 1.5). 
Despite the differences in the y-intercepts of the curves plotted, the shape of the 
curves were very similar. Doty and Savakis concluded that these findings implied 
a basic commonality of the mnemonic neuronal processes involved in the 
recognition of word and picture stimuli. 
In addition to studies employing single modality stimuli, Lehmann and 
Murray (2005) have used multisensory stimuli in conjunction with continuous 
recognition. They found that recognition of repeated images was significantly 
impaired if they were initially presented paired with an auditory tone, when 
compared with recognition of items studied without a tone. However, recognition 
was significantly improved when images were paired with a congruent sound 
(e.g. a picture of a gun with the sound of a gunshot) at the first presentation. The 
authors proposed that object-based multisensory interactions are particularly 
sensitive to the identity and semantic attributes of stimuli, and reveal the 
opposing effects of semantic and episodic contexts in auditory-visual 
multisensory events. The pairing of an image with an unrelated sound appears to 
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impair the episodic encoding of that image, whereas the pairing of the image with 
a semantically-related sound enhances its recognition.  
1.2.7 Conclusions 
Research conducted so far with the continuous recognition paradigm has 
provided many insights into the workings of recognition memory under conditions 
approaching steady state. Whilst the research summarised above has provided 
many explanations of the processes of recognition, it appears that research into 
this field has thus far been limited by the choice of study materials. Experiments 
have been carried out predominantly with word stimuli which, as Estes and 
Maddox (1995a) have demonstrated, are over-learned as a stimulus set, and 
appear to be memorised in a manner different to stimuli charged with fewer 
semantic associations. In Estes and Maddox’s experiment, trigrams and 
nonsense words were used, but these too rely on ‘reading’ (e.g. phonological 
recoding) in order to be effectively memorised. Word frequency effects, such as 
those investigated by Reder et al. (2000), suggest that a participant’s general 
familiarity with a word is likely to affect the accuracy of its recognition. The 
advantages of using non-meaningful, parametrically-defined visual stimuli to 
probe short-term memory are discussed in Section 1.4. 
1.3 Studying memory with word stimuli 
Historically, the majority of studies of human memory have been carried 
out using word stimuli. Whilst there are advantages of practicality involved with 
such study materials, it should be clear from some of the evidence discussed 
above that words are not ideal stimuli for a number of reasons. The most 
important of these is that words are familiar stimuli, and that this familiarity varies 
according to a person’s previous experience of these words. There are ways of 
attempting to control the level of prior familiarity, for example, by the use of word 
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frequency measures which give an approximation of the mean occurrence of 
words in writing, but every individual’s level of exposure to, and associations with 
a word are different. As well as individual differences there are systematic 
differences according to word frequency. High frequency words are associated 
with a higher base level of familiarity than low frequency words and this affects 
their recognition profile (e.g. Glanzer and Adams, 1990).  
There is also the problem of interpreting the level at which words are 
processed and memorised. If they are presented as written words, they must be 
recognised by the visual system, but the encoding process usually involves 
reading, e.g. phonological recoding. This is also true of letters and numbers. In 
addition, with the use of word stimuli there is the added complication of semantic 
associations with the stimuli. As well as visual and phonological associations, 
words have meanings associated with them. These different modalities of 
representation and their semantic associations constitute complex entities that 
may rely on interactions between semantic and episodic memory. More simple, 
single modality stimuli may be more straightforward to study, and may yield 
results that are easier to interpret. The study of recognition using simple visual 
stimuli that are not amenable to naming, and vary only in their physical 
parameters, has been suggested as an appropriate avenue for future research 
(Kahana & Sekuler, 2002). 
1.3.1 Word frequency effects 
One of the most commonly reported phenomena that demonstrates the 
variability of recognition of word stimuli, is the word frequency (or mirror) effect 
(e.g. Glanzer & Adams, 1985; Glanzer & Adams, 1990; Glanzer, Adams, Iverson, 
& Kim, 1993). This is the much-replicated finding of very different response 
profiles for recognition of common (high normative frequency) and rare (low 
normative frequency) words. If the study items in a recognition task are common 
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words, participants are more likely to respond ‘old’ than they are for less common 
words, giving rise to more false alarms with these words. Despite this, the hit rate 
(i.e. correct recognition) is actually higher for low frequency words.  
These effects are assumed to be due to participants making decisions 
based on feelings of familiarity with these common words, as opposed to explicit 
recognition. Rarer words are less likely to be familiar but are more distinctive, and 
subsequently, are better recognised. The more frequently a word has been 
encountered, the greater the number of associations that have been made with 
that word. Reder et al. (2000) posit the theory that the greater the number of 
episodes associated with a word, the less distinctive the specific encoding 
episode during an experiment is, and, as a result, recollection of the experience 
becomes more difficult. This may explain the lower hit rate encountered for high 
frequency words. The high base rate of familiarity for common words makes them 
harder to identify as novel within the experimental context, compared with 
relatively rare words, resulting in a higher rate of false alarms.  
The word frequency effect is an example of a mirror effect. This is the 
consistent finding that conditions that give rise to better recognition of old items 
as old also give rise to better recognition of new items as new, and can be 
understood as a series of distributions according to signal detection theory. Old 
responses for condition A (improved recognition) will be distributed further 
towards the old end of the decision axis than for condition B, whilst new 
responses for the two conditions will have the opposite arrangement (closer to 
the new end of the decision axis for condition A). This mirror effect holds true 
across a wide range of variables (Glanzer & Adams, 1985), although it is not 
predicted by many of the strength theories of memory (Atkinson & Juola, 1974; 
Bower, 1972; Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984; Glanzer & Bowles, 1976; Hintzman, 1988; 
Hockley & Murdock, 1987; Juola, Fischler, Wood, & Atkinson, 1971; Kintsch, 
1967; Mandler, 1980; B. B. J. Murdock & Dufty, 1972; Parks, 1966). These 
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theories propose that memory strength (or familiarity, amount of marking, number 
of representations, or amount of cuing) defines the decision axis. Glanzer et al. 
(1993) suggest an attention/likelihood model to account for the observed effects, 
focusing on the role of attention in the participant’s learning and the role of 
likelihood ratios, derived from information about old and new items, in the 
recognition decision. In addition to the noting of memory strength the participant 
evaluates the likelihood of the stimulus being new or old, and this evaluation 
determines the decision. Because information about both old and new 
distributions is incorporated into the likelihood ratio, and therefore the decision 
about each old or new item, anything that affects either old or new likelihood 
distribution affects the other as well. This theory appears to account for the mirror 
effect better than older strength-based models. 
The word frequency effect clearly indicates that memory for words can be 
affected by semantic influences, and that recognition of stimuli that occur 
frequently in everyday life, are harder for participants to recognise in a specific 
experimental episode.  
1.3.2 Levels of processing 
Experiments manipulating the level at which information is processed 
demonstrate how important the type of processing a stimulus undergoes is to its 
memorability. Studies using semantic and graphemic orienting tasks to 
manipulate the level of processing word stimuli undergo (McBride & Dosher, 
1997; Roediger, Weldon, Stadler, & Riegler, 1992) have elicited differences in 
participants’ performance at explicit memory tasks. Studying items at a semantic 
level (deep level of processing) resulted in significantly better recognition for 
those items than that for items studied at the level of physical appearance 
(shallow level of processing). However, no significant difference between 
performance at the two levels of processing was observed for implicit tasks, 
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providing further evidence for a dual process approach to memory. Some 
experimenters, however, have been able to elicit level of processing differences 
in implicit tasks through changes in experimental design (e.g. the use of between-
participants design) (Challis & Brodbeck, 1992; Thapar & Greene, 1994). Indeed, 
Brown and Mitchell’s (1994) review of 38 studies manipulating level of processing 
in both implicit and explicit tasks suggests that 79% of the studies showed 
greater performance for semantic study than graphemic study in implicit tasks.  
As a result of the dual processing of words, both visually and recoded 
phonologically, short-term memory (STM) for words appears to be affected by 
manipulations of either orthographic or phonological length (Coltheart, Mondy, 
Dux, & Stephenson, 2004). Recall and recognition of words presented in lists at 
either STM rate (1 per second) or rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) rate (8 
per second) were affected by orthographic length (measured by the number of 
letters), but only presentation at the STM rate was affected by phonological 
length (measured by the number of syllables). This was assumed to be because 
phonological recoding was impossible at the fast presentation times in RSVP. 
Recognition of words appears to be affected by manipulations at visual, 
phonological and semantic levels. This is another factor that makes the study of 
memory with words problematic. 
1.4 The use of visual stimuli in recognition experiments 
In addition to the classic literature on recognition derived from word 
experiments, an increasing body of literature is examining recognition of other 
visually presented material. As with words, the study of visual objects is 
problematic due to the human propensity for naming images where possible. 
However, a new approach is to take well-characterised stimuli from vision 
research (e.g. sinusoidal grating patterns) and use them in memory experiments 
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(e.g. Kahana & Sekuler, 2002). This combination of visual psychophysics and 
memory appears to be a fruitful avenue for future research. 
1.4.1 Categories and naming 
Studies examining recognition memory for both words and pictures in the 
same paradigm have sometimes suggested that memory for pictures is superior 
to that for words (e.g. Standing, 1973). However, as Goldstein and Chance 
(1970) pointed out, the recognition of heterogeneous sets of pictures may be 
dependent on verbal labelling of the stimuli. In order to prevent phonological 
recoding and semantic classification there is a need to avoid this. Certainly there 
is a need to ensure that, when comparing pictorial memory to memory for words, 
that the test items must be discriminated as being unique stimuli, rather than 
being recognised on the basis of class membership. Making the stimulus set 
relatively homogenous minimises the opportunity for verbal labelling and ensures 
that a task is oriented towards visual discrimination rather than naming.  
Picture naming, is an example of referential processing from nonverbal to 
verbal information (Paivio, Clark, Digdon, & Bons, 1989). The naming process is 
well-characterised, as are the features of a visual object that affect the process 
(see Johnson, Paivio, & Clark, 1996 for a review). Naming can occur at several 
levels of generality, the subordinate (e.g. a Granny Smith), the intermediate or 
basic (e.g. an apple) and the superordinate (e.g. a piece of fruit), and this affects 
naming performance. Names at the basic level are given faster than names at 
either the superordinate or subordinate conditions (Jolicoeur, Gluck, & Kosslyn, 
1984), and these form the basis of common categories. A selection of stimuli 
from different basic categories can be readily named. However, stimuli from 
within a common category are much harder to give unique labels. If the stimuli 
are unfamiliar it is likely that participants will have no existing names for them, 
and will only be able to distinguish between them verbally with complex labels. In 
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this scenario it is predicted that processes of purely visual discrimination would 
allow a much more effective way of discriminating between stimuli than by the 
process of naming. 
Serial order in visual memory for pictures has been shown to be 
supported by phonological codes (G. Cohen, 1972; Manning & Schreier, 1988). 
Nelson et al. (1976) found that the phonological similarity between labels 
impaired serial order recall for pictures, and that this strategy was spontaneously 
adopted by participants. Visual similarity also reduced memory performance, 
suggesting that both modalities were involved.  
Naming pictures appears to increase recognition performance, as shown 
by Wright et al. (1990) in a study using abstract kaleidoscope pictures. Learning 
names for these images resulted in a recognition profile similar to that 
encountered with travel slides, pictures of nameable objects, people and scenes, 
in that increasing interstimulus interval (ISI) was associated with increasing 
memory performance. Recognition of the kaleidoscope patterns without naming 
was not related to ISI. Participants were interviewed about the strategies they 
used to remember stimuli and were subsequently divided into those who 
attended only to sensory aspects of the stimuli, those who repeated a verbal label 
for the current stimulus, and those who ‘chained’ verbal labels together into a list. 
Those who carried out the task with sensory features alone showed a flat ISI 
function, as opposed to those using verbal labels for whom ISI had a significant 
effect on their recognition accuracy. The chaining strategy resulted in a greater 
effect of ISI, and was the most effective strategy for accurate recognition. It was 
effective even at a presentation rate of a 6-item list in 0.88 sec, too fast to 
actually carry out verbal rehearsal of the items. These results appear to 
demonstrate that the development of naming and rehearsal strategies 
qualitatively alters participants’ recognition of pictures.  
36 
In a similar study comparing rapid and slowly presented lists of pictures, 
Coltheart (1999) found evidence of phonological similarity effects at the slow rate 
but not the rapid. Items were presented at RSVP rate (8 per second) or STM rate 
(1 per second), and phonological similarity of the picture names decreased 
memory performance at STM rate but not RSVP rate, suggesting that pictures 
shown this rapidly are not phonologically recoded. However, when the written 
names of the pictures were presented, a phonological similarity effect did occur at 
this rate. This gives some indication of the time course of automatic naming. 
Potter and Levy (1969) have previously found evidence of picture 
comprehension, even at presentation rates of 10-12 per second. Presumably, at 
these very rapid rates of presentation, naming was not possible and a purely 
visual representation of stimuli was memorised. 
The findings of the studies described above appear to suggest that visual 
sensory and verbal information are memorised in different ways, but a recent 
study suggests functional equivalence for these modalities (Ward, Avons, & 
Melling, 2005). Both recognition and serial order memory were tested for 
unfamiliar faces and heard nonwords, and similar memory profiles were observed 
across modalities. Recognition of both types of stimuli in a 2-alternative forced 
choice (2AFC) test found limited recency and no primacy, whereas serial 
reconstruction was associated with U-shaped serial position curves. The authors 
suggested that these findings are evidence that the type of information 
memorised (i.e. information about items vs. information about their order) has 
more effect on memory performance than the modality of the stimuli. 
Performance in the reconstruction of order task is dependent on prior responses, 
and is therefore serially dependent, whereas performance in the 2AFC task is 
not. The authors also inferred that the differences found in previous studies may 
have resulted from comparisons of novel pictures with familiar words.  
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A comparison of memory for sequences of colours or tones found that, 
although memory for visual sequential memory was poorer it produced a similar 
U-shaped curve to that for the auditory sequence (McFarland & Cacace, 1995). 
This would appear to suggest that the serial position curve is not dependent on 
modality, but is a general property of memory for sequences. 
To return to the investigation of memory for the items studied, rather than 
the sequence in which they are presented, previous investigations of visual 
memory for novel patterns, rather than nameable pictures, are not associated 
with a U-shaped curve. The typical serial position function of recognition of such 
stimuli has no primacy effect and a recency effect limited to the most recent item 
only (e.g. Broadbent & Broadbent, 1981; Hines, 1975; W. A. Phillips & D. F. 
Christie, 1977; W. A. Phillips & D. F. M. Christie, 1977). Phillips and Christie 
(1977; , 1977) theorised that the recency effect was the product of a short-term 
visualisation process, and that the earlier part of the curve could be attributed to 
long-term components, in their duplex interpretation of visual STM. This one-item 
recency has also been observed in memory for scenes (Weaver & Stanny, 1978), 
and memory for spatiotemporal sequences (P. Walker, Hitch, & Duroe, 1993). If 
the visualisation process proposed by the duplex theory encodes spatial location 
as well as configuration of the item, it can also explain the findings of Walker and 
colleagues.  
In order to examine memory for novel visual stimuli in the absence of 
serial position effects one must turn to continuous recognition studies. One such 
study using visual stimuli selected for their ‘unnameability’ (Doty & Savakis, 1997) 
also appears to demonstrate that recognition of visual stimuli is comparable in 
form to recognition of words, although it is slower and less accurate. A major 
problem with Doty and Savakis’ stimuli, however, was that they varied randomly. 
There was no systematic configuration or framework underlying their 
construction, and as such, it is hard to determine whether recognition in their 
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experiments was true recognition of individual items within a class. It would be 
very difficult with such stimuli to control for distinctive items. Ideally stimuli should 
have the same basic configuration, so that they may be recognised as members 
of a class, but they should have features that vary within well-defined limits, 
giving rise to individual items within a population. 
1.4.2 Combining vision research and memory 
An avenue in visual recognition research that has potential for future 
exploration is the integration of findings from visual research, into discrimination 
and categorisation, into memory research. Whilst memory research represents 
items and uses decision processes similar to those involved in visual 
discrimination and classification models (e.g. Hockley & Murdock, 1987), the area 
has so far failed to ground abstract stimuli in perceptually-defined structures, with 
the resulting problems mentioned above. Likewise, vision research has only 
recently begun to acknowledge the importance of memory in simple perceptual 
tasks (e.g. Blake, Cepeda, & Hiris, 1997; Kahana & Bennett, 1994; Magnussen, 
2000). Understanding vision and memory depends crucially on how they interact. 
The vast majority of sensory information available to individuals to form memories 
(more than 90%) is visual, and its storage (visual memory) can only be 
understood through its encoding (the results of visual processing). Conversely, 
lower functions like visual processing may be affected by higher functions 
through perceptual learning (e.g. Ahissar & Hochstein, 2002). A recent paper by 
Kahana and Sekuler (2002) has attempted to reconcile the two worlds by using 
elemental visual stimuli (2D textures composed of summed sinusoidal gratings) in 
a recognition memory experiment (Figure 1.6). 
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Figure 1.6: Schematic illustration of the experiments of Kahana and Sekuler, including 
examples of their stimuli. Figure reproduced from Kahana and Sekuler (2002). 
The advantage of using such stimuli is that the neuronal processes 
associated with their perception are well-characterised (De Valois & De Valois, 
1988), and it has been suggested that these dimensions may form the basis of 
organisation in short-term visual memory (Kosslyn et al., 1999; Magnussen, 
2000). As these gratings have a number of well-defined properties such as 
spatial frequency, interitem similarity may be readily quantified and manipulated 
with such stimuli. The stimuli are also very resistant to symbolic encoding, the 
problem that has dogged the use of words and pictures. 
Kahana and Sekuler’s (2002) study has given an insight and an 
introduction into a more specific and systematic approach to the problems of 
visual memory research, avoiding the problems of symbolic recoding of visual 
stimuli, and providing a way in which interitem similarity may be quantifiably 
tested. Interitem similarity within short lists of stimuli, was used by participants in 
their recognition judgements, in addition to probe-item similarity. Certainly such 
systematic techniques point to a possible future in memory research, in which the 
stimuli employed will be parametrically defined and mathematically quantifiable. 
This will enable the study of memory from the bottom up, identifying the basic 
components and processes accurately rather than tackling the more diffuse 
semantic components of memory. 
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1.5 Visual processing in the inferotemporal cortex 
In order to properly understand visual memory it is necessary to have an 
understanding of both higher level vision and memory, and how the two nominally 
distinct systems interact with one another. Indeed higher level visual object 
processing and memory storage are intimately connected in a way that makes 
them hard to separate. Described and discussed in this section are the neural 
mechanisms that contribute to the perception of objects from individual visual 
features. 
Visual processing in primates, beyond the primary visual cortex, divides 
into two major pathways, or ‘streams’, devoted to two separate tasks (Desimone 
& Ungerleider, 1989; Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982). These have been defined as 
the ‘what?’ and ‘where?’ streams, as their purported purposes are to identify what 
an object is, and to represent the space in which objects are detected and 
manipulated, respectively. The identification of objects relies on the successful 
separation of individual objects from a scene. The signals that represent the 
component parts of an object must be combined into a coherent representation of 
the object that can be remembered, and used in interactions with that object. This 
processing is carried out in the ventral stream, a pathway roughly corresponding 
to the inferior longitudinal fasciculus, and passing ventrally in extrastriate cortex 
to reach the inferotemporal (IT) cortex. This stream comprises areas V2, V4, and 
areas TEO, TE, and the perirhinal cortex, within IT cortex (see Figure 1.7). The 
second pathway, or dorsal stream, roughly corresponds to the superior 
longitudinal fasciculus, and passes dorsally in extrastriate cortex to end in the 
posterior parietal lobule and frontal lobe. It consists of areas V2, V3, MT, MST, 
and PO, and is responsible for the encoding of spatial parameters including the 
representation of an animal’s environment, the objects within it, and the space in 
which movement and manipulation of objects occurs, although it is a distinct 
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possibility that information from ventral stream processing of objects is necessary 
for the construction of a scene.  
The representation of visual objects in memory appears to rely heavily on 
the output of ventral visual processing, and of particular interest are the later 
stages in the chain of processing, especially those mediated by IT cortex.  
1.5.1 Anatomy 
IT cortex is a large region extending from just anterior to the inferior 
occipital sulcus to an area a few millimetres posterior to the temporal pole, 
extending from the fundus of the superior temporal sulcus to the fundus of the 
occipito-temporal sulcus (Logothetis & Sheinberg, 1996). This area roughly 
corresponds to Brodmann areas 20 and 21, or can be subdivided into areas TEO 
(posteriorly), TE (anteriorly) (Iwai & Mishkin, 1969; Von Bonin & Bailey, 1950), 
and perirhinal cortex (Brodmann areas 35 and 36).  
 
Figure 1.7: Diagrams of the visual areas of the brains of Macaque monkeys (Macaca 
mulatta) (a and b), and humans (c and d). Shown are Von Bonin and Bailey’s (1947) 
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maps of the lateral (a) and medial (b) surfaces of the macaque brain with major visual 
areas superimposed by Felleman and Van Essen (1991). Labelled are visual areas 1, 2 
and 4 (V1, V2, V4), ventral posterior (VP), posterior, central and anterior inferotemporal 
(PIT, CIT, AIT), and dorsal parietal (DP) cortical regions. The human brain’s lateral (c) 
and medial (d) surfaces are also shown with Brodmann’s areas numbered. Reproduced 
from Logothetis and Sheinberg (1996). 
Area TEO is a strip from the edge of the superior temporal sulcus, to a 
few millimetres medial to the occipto-temporal sulcus. Information, largely from 
V4 but also from V2 and V3, is received by TEO, which contains a map of the 
contralateral visual field. However, later areas in the stream are not visuotopically 
organised in this manner (Desimone, Fleming, & Gross, 1980). Interhemispheric 
connections are mediated via the corpus callosum. All of these areas also receive 
feedback connections from TEO (Distler, Boussaoud, Desimone, & Ungerleider, 
1993; Rockland, Saleem, & Tanaka, 1994). TEO receives feedback from the 
parahippocampal area TH. 
The average receptive field (RF) size of neurones in TEO, that is the area 
of the visual field in which an effective stimulus may be detected by neurones, is 
larger than that of neurones in V4, and this trend continues, into TE. RF sizes 
have been estimated as 8° of visual angle in V4, 20° in TEO, and 50° in TE, and 
increase by a factor of approximately 2.5 for each level of processing 
(Boussaoud, Desimone, & Ungerleider, 1991).  
Area TE extends further anteriorly from TEO, to about the sphenoid 
(Logothetis & Sheinberg, 1996). The RFs of TE almost always include the centre 
of gaze, sometimes encompass the whole contralateral visual field, and often 
extend into areas of the ipsilateral visual field (Desimone & Gross, 1979; Gross, 
Rocha-Miranda, & Bender, 1972). TE has direct connections to the amygdaloid 
complex (Amaral & Price, 1984; Iwai & Yukie, 1987) and to the hippocampus 
(Yukie & Iwai, 1988), as well as an indirect connection to the hippocampus via 
the parahippocampal gyrus (Van Hoesen, 1982). Both TEO and TE receive 
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inputs from several nuclei of the thalamus, the hypothalamus, locus coeruleus, 
reticular formation, and the dorsal and median raphe nuclei. The region is critical 
for object identification and recognition (Dean, 1976), and appears to be 
perceptual rather than memory-related (Gaffan, Harrison, & Gaffan, 1986). 
However, the diverse subcortical connections of many areas posterior to IT, 
indicate that object-related information does not have to pass through this area to 
reach motor and memory systems.  
Perirhinal cortex receives the majority of its input from TE and projects to 
the hippocampus via the entorhinal cortex. In addition to these connections there 
are direct pathways from V2 to TEO, and V4 to TE, and each area sends 
feedback signals to the area before it in the stream (W. Suzuki, Saleem, & 
Tanaka, 2000). 
1.5.2 Lesion studies 
Total removal of IT cortex in monkeys results in severe impairments of 
visual discrimination learning and retention, in the absence of changes to sensory 
thresholds such as acuity (see Dean, 1976, for reviews; Mishkin, 1966). 
Performance on tasks that require judgements of recency (working memory), or 
stimulus familiarity (recognition memory), is impaired, as the memory of a visual 
stimulus decays significantly over a minute or two, and may occur even more 
rapidly when stimuli intervene between study and test (Mishkin, 1982). 
Bilateral lesions of TEO in the monkey result in deficits of colour, texture, 
and shape perception (Iwai & Mishkin, 1969), although ablation of both TEO and 
TE leads to much more significant impairments (Gaffan, Harrison, & Gaffan, 
1986). TEO lesions do not appear to effect performance on tasks involving shape 
distortion, colour and oddity discrimination, or perceptual grouping (Huxlin, 
Saunders, Marchionini, Pham, & Merigan, 2000).  
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TE, however, is critical for object identification and recognition (Dean, 
1976), and deficits appear to be perceptual rather than memory-related (Gaffan, 
Harrison, & Gaffan, 1986). TE lesions result in a permanent deficit in colour 
threshold. Animals appear to be able to perform normally in tasks requiring the 
memorisation of one object pair, but when larger numbers of objects must be 
remembered impairment is evident (Buffalo et al., 1999). These authors also 
found that this impairment was present for visual object recognition whilst tactual 
recognition memory was spared, suggesting that primarily visual recognition is 
affected. Altogether this evidence points to a major involvement of IT in both 
higher-level visual perception and visual recognition. 
Perirhinal cortex is considered to be part of a circuit of structures involved 
in memory, the Delay-Brion system, on the basis of lesion studies (Buffalo, 
Stefanacci, Squire, & Zola, 1998; Squire & Zola-Morgan, 1991), but there is 
growing evidence that the region has a perceptual function as well (see Buckley, 
2005). Murray and Bussey (1999) propose that perirhinal cortex represents 
objects whose visual features are represented in area TE, as monkeys with 
perirhinal ablations are impaired at object memory tasks when the perceptual 
difficulty of the task is increased. For example, monkeys with bilateral perirhinal 
ablations are unimpaired in their learning of 20 two-choice object-reward 
associations, but increasing the number of distracter objects, or increasing the 
number of problems to be learnt, impaired the lesioned animals’ performance 
(Buckley & Gaffan, 1997). Similarly, showing the objects from different viewpoints 
on every trial (Buckley & Gaffan, 1998a) or presenting real objects in naturalistic 
scenes (Buckley & Gaffan, 1998b), which also increase the perceptual difficulty of 
the tasks, resulted in impairments specific to the operated animals. More 
recently, Bussey et al. (2003) demonstrated impairment in the discrimination of 
very similar morphed images of objects in the macaque, and this has also been 
observed in humans with perirhinal damage (A. C. Lee, Barense, & Graham, 
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2005). The discrimination of stimuli with high levels of feature overlap is also 
impaired in monkeys (Bussey, Saksida, & Murray, 2002, 2005). These findings 
have led to the proposal that the perirhinal cortex has both mnemonic and 
perceptual roles (Buckley, 2005; Buckley & Gaffan, 1998c; E. A. Murray & 
Bussey, 1999). Buckley (2005) concludes that the perirhinal cortex is specialised 
for the processing of stimuli at the object level and the binding of object features. 
This function is not only essential for the perception of objects but has a 
mnemonic role in the maintenance of associative linkages between constituent 
object features necessary for configural and paired-associate learning, as well as 
recognition. 
1.5.3 Neurophysiology 
Neurophysiological measurements of the firing rates of neurones in TEO 
in macaque monkeys have demonstrated that firing is driven by more complex 
stimuli than those effective for V4 neurones (Kobatake & Tanaka, 1994). The 
neurones are selective for object features including shape, colour, and texture 
(Komatsu & Ideura, 1993), suggesting a role for TEO in object perception and 
recognition, although such a role has not been confirmed in lesion studies.  
TE neurones are similar in that they respond to complex visual stimuli, 
and there is evidence that cells responding to similar object features cluster 
together in columns, in a similar manner to cells in earlier visual areas (Fujita, 
Tanaka, Ito, & Cheng, 1992). As with other visual areas, most neurones in IT 
respond to many different visual stimuli and, therefore, cannot be considered as 
narrowly tuned ‘detectors’ of particular objects. The output of any one individual 
cell is inherently ambiguous with regards to the identity of the stimulus that gave 
rise to its change in firing rate. However, those cells that are stimulus-selective 
are usually selective along dimensions of shape, co
46 
(Desimone, Albright, Gross, & Bruce, 1984), although the level of complexity 
necessary to drive cells appears to be much greater than that for cells in TEO.  
It has been suggested that the function of the large RFs found in IT cortex 
is the mediation of perceptual equivalence of objects across retinal translation, as 
the same stimuli can be detected across a large area of the visual field (Gross & 
Mishkin, 1977; Seacord, Gross, & Mishkin, 1979). In addition, some cells respond 
to the same stimuli at different sizes within their RFs (Desimone, Albright, Gross, 
& Bruce, 1984; Schwartz, Desimone, Albright, & Gross, 1983). The relative 
preferences to particular stimuli remain, although with both position and size 
changes the firing rates may alter.  
1.5.3.1 Stimulus selectivity 
Ito et al. (1995) have found that IT cells are selective, across their large 
receptive fields, for the shape of critical features, as determined by the reduction 
method. This method attempts to reduce an effective stimulus to the minimum 
complexity required to drive the cell. Preferences for faces, hands, and complex 
geometrical shapes have been found in cells of TE (Tanaka, 1996), and their 
responses are dependent on the configuration of specific features (Desimone, 
Albright, Gross, & Bruce, 1984). These face-selective neurones respond 2-20 
times more to faces than to a wide range of gratings, simple geometrical stimuli, 
or complex 3-D objects (see Rolls, 1984, 1992), and reflect more information 
about face stimuli (average of 0.4 bits) than about non-face stimuli (0.07 bits) in a 
mixed set (Tovee & Rolls, 1995).  
Tanaka (1996) presents data demonstrating the large effects of stimulus 
rotation on the responses of TE cells to effective stimuli. A rotation of 90° 
decreased neuronal responses by more than half of the cells they recorded, 
although the remaining cells were tuned more broadly. For some of these cells 
even rotations of 180° did not result in a change in firing response comparable to 
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that measured for the first group. The responses to changes of size were more 
noticeable, with 21% cells responding to change of size less than 4 octaves of 
the critical features, and 43% cells responding to changes of less than 2 octaves. 
TE cells seem to maintain a response-selectivity to shapes across differences of 
luminosity, and coarseness of texture (Sary, Vogels, & Orban, 1993). 
Logothetis and his colleagues (Logothetis & Pauls, 1995; Logothetis, 
Pauls, Buelthoff, & Poggio, 1994; Logothetis, Pauls, & Poggio, 1995) have used 
combined psychophysical üand neurophysiological experiments in macaques in 
an attempt to determine whether the configural selectivity observed for hands and 
faces is generated for other, novel object classes. Extensive training of the 
monkeys using novel computer-generated wire and spheroidal objects, with no 
biological relevance for the animals, resulted in the animals learning to 
discriminate the objects from highly similar distracters (Logothetis, Pauls, 
Buelthoff, & Poggio, 1994). The objects were all composed of highly similar parts, 
so discrimination was only possible on the basis of subtle shape variation, and 
the authors assert that this is similar to the categorisation of, for example, birds, 
or identification of specific faces. The suggestion that IT is involved in 
categorisation is backed up by a more recent experiment by Vogels (1999), who 
demonstrated interaction between cells coding for specific members of a 
category and those responding to all members of a category, but not to cells 
responding to other categories of objects. 
Recordings from neurones in IT, near the anterior medial temporal sulcus, 
have revealed a subpopulation of neurones that respond to views of the 
unfamiliar objects used in the Logothetis et al. (1994) study (Logothetis & Pauls, 
1995; Logothetis, Pauls, & Poggio, 1995). Certain views were optimal for 
activation of the cells, and as the object was rotated in 3-D the firing rate dropped 
off. The gradual decline in the responses of these cells to rotated optimal stimuli 
means that they act like “blurred templates” (Logothetis & Sheinberg, 1996). 
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Whilst the representations of objects encoded in these subpopulations do not 
appear to generalise to all viewpoints, they are also not specific to a single 
viewpoint, so some generalisation is possible. 
Kobatake et al. (1993) have induced stimulus selectivity in cells of IT 
cortex in monkeys, through extensive training at a discrimination task with 28 
simple shapes composed of geometric primitives. IT cells were subsequently 
tested using a battery of stimuli, and a much higher proportion of cells recorded 
responded to the test stimuli than other objects. This suggests that the monkeys’ 
experiences modified the response properties of cells in IT cortex, resulting in 
changes to their tuning characteristics.  
Altogether, this evidence demonstrates that IT cortex neural 
representations may contribute to the recognition of objects at subordinate level, 
i.e. of individual items from the same basic category, and that this appears to be 
dependent on experience. High stimulus selectivity does not appear to be limited 
to faces and other biological forms, but may involve similar mechanisms to those 
that produce face-selective cells. 
1.5.3.2 Columnar organisation 
IT is proposed to have a columnar organisation, similar in some respects 
to that observed in primary visual cortex. This organisation was inferred from 
simultaneous recordings of cells located close together in the cortex (Fujita, 
Tanaka, Ito, & Cheng, 1992). The second cell often responded to the optimal and 
suboptimal stimuli of the first cell, but with slightly differing selectivities. Cells 
recorded along penetrations made tangenitally to the surface of the cortex usually 
responded to the same critical features of the first cell, through all cortical layers. 
Those recorded from penetrations made oblique to the cortical surface showed 
similarities to other cells in an area of approximately 400 µm. Cells outside of this 
area did not appear to have similar response profiles to stimuli effective for cells 
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within the 400 µm area. The TE region of IT, therefore, appears to be composed 
of columnar “modules” of cells responding to similar visual features. By dividing 
the area of TEd (dorsal TE) into 500 x 500 µm squares, an estimate of 1300 such 
modules was obtained.  
Further study of the putative columnar organisation using optical imaging 
(Wang, Tanaka, & Tanifuji, 1996) has uncovered more about this arrangement. 
The optical imaging technique utilises light with a wavelength of 605 nm, which is 
absorbed more by deoxygenated than oxygenated haemoglobin. When the light 
is shone on exposed cortex, active areas are darker than the surrounding 
illuminated cortex, because the active cortex uses oxygen from the blood leaving 
the surrounding capillaries with a greater concentration of deoxygenated 
haemoglobin. This technique was combined with neurophysiological recordings 
from single cells. 
First, critical features for the cells were determined by the reduction 
method and neuronal recording. The 605 nm light revealed 2-10 dark spots within 
the imaged region in response to previously determined critical features, and 
each time one of the spots covered the position of the initial electrode 
penetration. Spots were approximately 490 µm in diameter, and are further 
evidence that cells responding to similar complex features are clustered. 
Interestingly, some partial overlapping of different critical features was 
observed in one optical imaging session. These three features were similar in 
that they included two combinations of colours of different luminosities and a 
gradation of colour, and all evoked dark spots around the original electrode 
penetration. For each critical feature, a spot of 500 µm diameter was observed, 
along a region about 1100 µm long. A similar overlap was found for face stimuli 
at different viewing angles. Five different viewing angles of a face were used and 
all evoked spots around the original penetration. As the face was turned from the 
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left profile to the right profile the position of the dark spot moved in one direction 
along the surface of the cortex, suggesting a corresponding axis of 
representation in TE, 800 µm long. Together these findings suggest that related 
stimulus features may be represented in adjacent columns forming larger scale 
units. The findings from face rotation suggest that certain complex features may 
be continuously mapped within these larger units. Tanaka (1996) suggests that 
this is only the case for faces, as these are the only complex stimuli that are 
critical features for TE cells. As such, non-face objects must be represented 
across multiple cortical sites and different locations are activated by different 
views of these objects. 
 
Figure 1.8: Schematic diagram of columnar organisation in TE, detailing the cortical 
surface's subdivision into areas responsive to similar stimuli. Figure reproduced from 
Tanaka (1996). 
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The columnar organisation suggested by the studies detailed above 
suggest that, in TE, object features are represented by the activity of many cells 
in columnar “modules” (Figure 1.8). This organisation may allow robustness to 
subtle changes in sensory input (i.e. a certain amount of transformation 
invariance), combined with preciseness of representation. It has been suggested 
that the clustering of cells with overlapping but slightly different selectivities may 
act as a buffer for slight changes to the input image, allowing some degree of 
transformation invariance (Tanaka, 1996). Whilst individual cells in this region are 
usually selective for size, orientation, and contrast polarity, the columnar modules 
may contain cells with selectivity for different sizes, orientations and contrast 
polarities for the same object feature. A more precise representation may also be 
achieved by many cells with overlapping selectivities, than summations of 
representations from individual cells. Tanaka (1996) suggests a mechanism 
similar to that proposed for hyperacuity (R. P. Erickson, 1968), whereby the 
difference between activities for nearby cells is thought to be used to obtain a 
greater resolution than that possible from the simple summation of outputs. 
Whilst activation within a column might represent a particular feature, subtle 
changes to that feature may be precisely represented by differences in the 
activities of cells with different selectivities. 
1.5.3.3 Feature binding 
Binding individual visual features to form coherent objects is an essential 
process in perception. Individual cells in IT only respond to moderately complex 
object features, so the information provided by individual columns is only ever 
partial. To represent an object in its entirety information from many columns must 
be combined. This is problematic where more than one object must be 
represented simultaneously, as features from different nearby objects must be 
discriminated from one another. The receptive fields of neurones in IT are too 
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large to discriminate objects according to their retinal locations. Several 
mechanisms have been proposed to deal with this, including synchronisation of 
firing (Engel, Konig, Kreiter, Schillen, & Singer, 1992; Singer, 1993), attentional 
selection (Crick, 1984), and the formation of loops of activity with earlier areas in 
the visual pathway (Kawato, Hayakawa, & Inui, 1993).  
Synchronisation of firing evoked by one object and desynchronisation of 
firing evoked by other objects allows the two sets of responses to be 
differentiated. Synchronisation of firing with oscillations has been observed in 
cells in cat visual cortex, and is proposed to be context dependent. Oscillatory 
firing has not been found in TE, but nonperiodic synchronisation may be present. 
Another possible solution to the feature binding problem is selective 
attention. Only one, or possibly a few, objects can be attended to at a time, and if 
the features of an attended object are enhanced relative to other objects, it may 
be differentiated from them. Strong effects of attention on the responses of TE 
cells have been reported (Chelazzi, Miller, Duncan, & Desimone, 1993; Moran & 
Desimone, 1985; Richmond & Sato, 1987; Spitzer, Desimone, & Moran, 1988), 
suggesting that this is a distinct possibility.  
Finally, there exists the possibility that representations of features in IT 
are combined with retinotopically organised areas at earlier stages in the ventral 
pathway by the formation of loops of activity. Feedback projections between TE 
and TEO, V4, V2 and V1 exist (Rockland, Saleem, & Tanaka, 1994; Rockland & 
Van Hoesen, 1994) and there are also feedback connections between each 
stage and areas immediately posterior in the pathway. Whilst these three 
solutions have been suggested independently there is a distinct possibility that 
more than one mechanism might work in combination. 
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1.5.3.4 Organisation through experience 
Whilst much is now known about the columnar organisation of IT, less is 
known about how this arrangement may arise. Erickson et al. (2000) suggest that 
the perirhinal cortex has a dynamic functional architecture, and that it is moulded 
by experience. From studying the activity of pairs of simultaneously recorded 
neurones whilst monkeys viewed novel and familiar objects, they found a 
difference between the patterns of neuronal responses for the different classes of 
objects. When familiar objects (seen a few dozen times on the previous day) 
were viewed, neurones within about 100 µm of one another frequently responded 
similarly. This trend was not observed for responses to entirely novel objects. The 
similarity was such that, if a cell responded to e.g. 5 objects from a set of 16 
familiar objects, nearby neurones would have a tendency to respond to the same 
5 items. This is evidence that perirhinal neurones undergo rapid experience-
related development to form functional groups, like the columns described by 
Fujita et al. (1992), requiring only a few dozen prior experiences. This ongoing 
plasticity appears to be essential for the function of this cortical area, and 
suggests its involvement in memory. This plasticity is certainly not unique within 
the cortex; Zohary et al. (1994) have described experience-dependent sensitivity 
to motion in cells of visual area MT, and neurones in other regions of IT that are 
responsive to temporal association have been described by Miyashita (1988).  
Erickson et al.’s (2000) results suggest that the perirhinal cortex may 
represent not simply an object’s features, as is the case in earlier areas of the 
visual system, but also an animal’s experience with the object. They add further 
weight to the hypothesis that this brain region is involved in object categorisation, 
essential for higher cognitive functions. Objects associated with one another by 
experience within the experimental context might form a category, represented by 
neurones grouped together in the same region of cortex. 
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Miller (2000) speculates that these results mean that the organisation of 
perirhinal cortex is not only local, but may have some global pattern, drawing 
from the organisation of primary visual cortex (V1), which has both local, 
columnar organisation based on the similarity of visual features, and a global 
organisation that maps the retina on the surface of the cortex. Such a retinotopic 
mapping has not been found in IT but there may be a larger scale organisational 
pattern to the cortex that is still undiscovered. The mechanism by which the local 
organisation occurs so rapidly is unknown, although it may occur through the 
strengthening of lateral connections between neurones. 
1.5.3.5 Learning in IT neurones 
Miller et al. (1991) proposed a neural mechanism for working memory and 
recognition memory in IT cortex, from recordings made in monkeys required to 
retain items held in memory whilst viewing a series of stimuli. Study stimuli were 
presented at fixation and followed by one to five test stimuli. The animals were 
required to release a bar when a stimulus matching the sample was presented. 
For most cells that showed selectivity for matching stimuli, a response was 
apparent even when the maximum four items intervened, and it appeared that 
this was caused by an active matching process that was ‘reset’ between trials. 
The responses of these cells to matching and nonmatching items tended to 
become more difficult to distinguish from one another as the number of 
intervening items increased. However, the results of a separate experiment 
showed that a difference was still detectable when up to 6 items intervened 
between study and test. In fact, the authors suggested that there may be no limit 
on the ‘memory span’ of these neurones. 
Logistic regression was used to estimate the functions relating cells’ 
response magnitude and the probability that a stimulus was matching. Whilst 
these individual cell functions were not good predictors of whether a stimulus was 
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matching or nonmatching, in principle the success rate could be improved to 
behavioural performance levels (90%) by averaging over populations of 
neurones. 
Additionally, Miller et al. (1991) used repetitions of initially novel sample 
stimuli throughout a 200-400 trial session, to examine the effects of increasing 
familiarity with these stimuli. For many neurones (over one third of a sample of 
72), a systematic decline was observed as familiarity with these stimuli increased 
across the course of the experiment. Again, the magnitude in the decrease of 
response was dependent on the number of intervening trials between 
presentations of the same sample, which is not predicted by simple fatigue of the 
neurones. Familiarity with stimuli could still, in principle, be coded by a response 
decrement even after 140 intervening stimuli. Miller and colleagues conclude that 
“IT neurons may be acting as adaptive mnemonic filters that seek to preferentially 
pass information about new, unexpected, or not recently seen stimuli,” (E. K. 
Miller, Li, & Desimone, 1991, p. 1379, p.1379). These functions have undoubted 
importance for the formation of memories about new objects and the selection of 
behaviourally relevant information for further processing. 
 
Figure 1.9: An example of repetition suppression in macaque IT cortex. Averaged 
responses to stimuli appearing as samples (first presentation), non-matches (first 
presentation of a new stimulus after a sample) or matches (repeated presentation of the 
sample stimulus). The bar beneath each graph shows stimulus presentation. Figure 
reproduced from Li et al. (1993). 
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The properties of IT neurones observed by Miller et al. (1991) have been 
described as stimulus specific adaptation (SSA): large changes in cell firing rates 
between initial and repeated presentations of effective stimuli. Such learning in 
both TE and perirhinal cortex is thought to occur rapidly, and repetition effects 
have been reported both in individual neurones (e.g. Li, Miller, & Desimone, 
1993; E. K. Miller & Desimone, 1994) and also fMRI measurements in humans 
representing the activity of millions of neurones (e.g. Buckner et al., 1995). The 
changes in response to repetition may code for the familiarity of objects. There is 
some variety in the persistence of this response, and its latency, but in many cells 
there is a clear change in firing rate between the initial and second presentation 
of a stimulus. The commonest form of SSA is repetition-suppression (RS) 
whereby cells’ firing rates are suppressed on repetition of a previously seen 
stimulus (Grill-Spector, Henson, & Martin, 2006; see Figure 1.9). RS effects have 
been observed in awake behaving monkeys performing match-to-sample tasks 
(E. K. Miller, Li, & Desimone, 1993) and recognition memory tasks (M. W. Brown 
& Xiang, 1998; Sobotka & Ringo, 1993), as well as in anaesthetised animals (E. 
K. Miller & Desimone, 1993). Because RFs in this region are very large the 
nature of the information processed is hard to identify, but the RS can be 
considered to be stimulus-specific in that it does not appear to reflect global 
changes in the firing rate of neurones to subsequent stimuli. However, neural RS 
has been demonstrated to be invariant with regards to certain changes in 
stimulus dimensions, including size and position of an object within the RF 
(Lueschow, Miller, & Desimone, 1994). RS persists even when many stimuli 
intervene between the initial and subsequent presentations of an item (E. K. 
Miller, Li, & Desimone, 1993; Xiang & Brown, 1998) and increases with further 
repetitions (Li, Miller, & Desimone, 1993). The mean latency of RS in IT has been 
estimated at 150ms and is thought to occur for about 50-67% of neurones 
responsive to visual stimulation (E. K. Miller, Li, & Desimone, 1993; Ringo, 1996). 
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In cells of the perirhinal cortex certain cells can be classified as familiarity 
and recency neurones according to the pattern of response observed. Response 
latencies in this region can be very rapid: as fast as 70-80 ms in some neurones 
(Xiang & Brown, 1998). Familiarity cells are thought to code whether a stimulus 
has ever been seen before (absolute novelty), whereas recency cells code 
whether an object has been seen in the recent past. In most of the perirhinal cells 
exhibiting SSA, responses are highest for new stimuli and decline with repeated 
presentations (Xiang & Brown, 1998), and this novelty response is thought to be 
involved in establishing the representation of a novel stimulus. These firing 
properties combined with extensive feedback connections to TE suggest that the 
perirhinal cortex may integrate simpler object features from earlier areas in the 
ventral stream, into object representations. 
In a detailed study of these different types of cell, Fahy et al. (1993) 
carried out recordings from cells of the entorhinal, perirhinal and IT cortex, during 
monkeys’ performance on a serial recognition task. The stimuli used were 
complex pictures of abstract and naturalistic scenes and objects, and, of the 2705 
neurones that were visually responsive, only 120 (9.7%) showed significant RS. 
Of these, most were found in perirhinal cortex as well as areas TE1 and TE2, 
whilst they were not as common in TEO. The responses of 14.4% of neurones 
exhibiting RS showed significantly greater responses to unfamiliar compared with 
highly familiar stimuli and these cells were found in perirhinal and lateral 
entorhinal cortices, as well as areas TE1, TE2 and TE3. Decrements were 
observed even with long study-test lags and even after 24hrs in 6 of the neurones 
tested (Figure 1.10). The authors classified 7 neurones as familiarity neurones 
and 58 as recency neurones, based on their response profiles, and suggested 
that such neurones capable of signalling information useful for recognition were 
found in cortex close to the rhinal sulcus.  
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Figure 1.10: The effects of number of intervening items (lag) (A) and elapsed time (B) 
between study and test, on the responses of visual neurones. A) Responses of a single 
TE neurone to old items during continuous recognition. The broken line indicates the 
response to new items. The intercept of the regression line indicates a memory span of 
up to 120 intervening items. SA = spontaneous activity. B) Responses of a single 
perirhinal neurone to successive presentations of unfamiliar objects. The response never 
recovered to the value for an objects’ first presentation even after more than 30 min. 
Figure reproduced from Fahy et al. (1993). 
Judgements of whether a stimulus is entirely novel or has been seen 
before (is familiar) can be used to determine the recurrence of objects that are 
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entirely novel when first presented. For items that are already familiar, 
judgements of recency (whether an item has been seen recently) are required to 
make a decision about whether or not the item has been seen during the current 
experimental context. The information coded by the familiarity and recency 
neurones studied by Fahy and colleagues is therefore essential for accurate 
performance on recognition, and working memory tasks. In addition, they are 
thought to be useful for priming memory, as initial large responses facilitate future 
performance on tasks. 
1.6 Neural mechanisms of memory 
Visual memory, the ability to store and retrieve aspects of visual 
experience, relies heavily on the same areas involved in higher visual processing, 
as described in the section above. Whilst this is especially true for memory for 
visual objects and their properties, memory also necessitates the integration of 
visual information into specific episodes, involving entire visual scenes. 
Described below are some of the brain regions and processes that are thought to 
achieve the different forms of memory in humans. 
The study of the neural basis of memory has historically been centred on 
the medial temporal lobe (MTL), as damage to this region in human patients has 
been associated with anterograde amnesia, and recognition memory impairment 
(e.g. Scoville & Milner, 1957). Anterograde amnesia is the inability to form 
memories of new episodes experienced by the patient. For many years the 
hippocampus was viewed as the key structure for the encoding and storage of 
memory, however, more recent studies in animals have suggested that the 
perirhinal cortex may be more important for recognition. Groups studying the 
effects of hippocampal and perirhinal lesions in monkeys and rats tend to agree 
that perirhinal lesions are more detrimental to recognition than hippocampal 
damage (Aggleton & Brown, 1999; Gaffan & Murray, 1992; Meunier, Bachevalier, 
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Mishkin, & Murray, 1993; Meunier, Hadfield, Bachevalier, & Murray, 1996; E. A. 
Murray & Mishkin, 1998; W. A. Suzuki, Zola-Morgan, Squire, & Amaral, 1993; 
Zola et al., 2000). Consequently, a new model of separate memory systems is 
emerging, in which areas such as IT and perirhinal cortex have major roles. 
The IT and perirhinal cortices have important roles in visual memory, and 
interact with specialised memory structures of the Delay-Brion circuit. The type of 
memory encoded is related to the sensory information relevant to the task 
performed, and three major systems are thought to be present in this area. 
Object memory is thought to be located in the ventral stream itself (i.e. in IT), with 
memory about the properties of objects (semantic memory in humans) also 
thought to reside in the cortex of the temporal lobe. Episodic memory, the 
memory for personally experienced events and their context, is considered to 
involve the areas involved in object memory, as all events contain objects. In 
addition, other cortical areas that process the spatial layout of the environment 
are required, as is the hippocampus and the Delay-Brion system of cortical and 
subcortical structures.  
The mechanisms within IT thought to be responsible for object memory 
have already been discussed in greater detail above. Primates have an ability to 
rapidly form detailed memories of novel objects, and these representations are 
thought to be encoded and stored within the ventral visual stream. The precise 
mechanisms via which this occurs are poorly understood, however, the repetition 
suppression observed for many neurones in IT, when objects are seen more than 
once, is a mechanism that may be of importance.  
Knowledge about object properties enables the development of 
categorical knowledge about different types of objects. In humans this is linked to 
language and is known as semantic memory. The study of human semantic 
memory is complicated by the fact that humans can learn about objects without 
directly perceiving them. However, the development of a semantic memory 
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category is likely to involve repeated exposures to individual members of a class 
of objects. This is thought to result in a distributed representation of a category 
composed of specific feature representations (e.g. orangeness as a feature of 
carrots). Miyashita (2000) has demonstrated IT neuronal responses to temporally 
contiguous pairs of visual stimuli regularly occurring together, even though the 
two items are separated by a delay of 1-3 sec. These ‘pair-coding’ neurones are 
thought to be involved in making connections between specific object features, as 
part of a category within semantic memory. In addition, Erickson et al. (2000) 
have demonstrated that neurones in perirhinal cortex adapt with increased 
familiarity with objects, such that cells responding to familiar objects are likely to 
be physically proximal to one another in the cortex. When the same objects were 
first observed, neurones responsive to the objects were more widely distributed. 
This suggests a reorganisation of the cortex, perhaps in order to categorise the 
objects observed as a result of experience. 
Human patients with damage to anterior temporal cortex show a memory 
deficit without episodic memory impairments but are deficient at general 
knowledge, or semantic memory. Whilst they are able to remember specific 
events such as the visit of a family member they may be deficient at identifying 
and describing that family member (Hodges, Patterson, Oxbury, & Funnell, 
1992). The deficits are thought to be caused by damage to the perirhinal cortex, 
as the impairments are similar to those caused by lesions of the perirhinal cortex 
in monkeys. Monkeys with such lesions appear to have a disorder of knowledge 
about objects, as revealed by impaired ability to discriminate between objects for 
reward (Gaffan, 1994a), and impaired ability to match target stimuli to a sample 
(Gaffan & Murray, 1992). These deficits are only present when animals have to 
deal with more than one pair of objects (Eacott, Gaffan, & Murray, 1994). Deficits 
in delayed non-matching-to-sample (DNMS) have been observed in perirhinal 
cortex lesioned animals for both simple objects (Meunier, Bachevalier, Mishkin, & 
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Murray, 1993) and discrimination learning with scenes (Gaffan, 1994a). Together, 
these data suggest a crucial role for the perirhinal cortex in learning about 
objects. 
Episodic memory is more complicated in that it appears to rely on both 
object memory and knowledge about the objects, as well as information about the 
environmental context in which these objects are experienced. In humans 
episodic memory is memory for personally experienced events involving the 
retrieval of perceptual information in spatiotemporal settings, and the re-
experiencing of these events is a defining feature. The integration of objects into 
scenes is of particular importance. Research with animals suggests that other 
species can remember events in their contexts (Clayton & Dickinson, 1998), 
although whether this resembles human episodic memory is impossible to say. 
Work is underway to elucidate episodic-like memory in animals in order to model 
the human system. 
The different functional memory systems can be adapted to different 
tasks, allowing for some redundancy and the compensation of damage to one 
system. Each independent system can have independent access to behavioural 
output as well as combined output through episodic memory.  
1.6.1 The medial temporal lobe and the Delay-Brion circuit 
The medial temporal lobe (MTL) system, consisting of the hippocampus, 
entorhinal, perirhinal, and parahippocampal cortices (Figure 1.11), has been 
implicated in episodic memory ever since studies of amnesic patients suggested 
a link between their pathology and sustained damage to this area of the brain. 
Human patients with extensive damage to the MTL are profoundly amnesic, 
whereas those with less extensive damage centred on the hippocampus are less 
so. The structures that form the MTL system are part of the ‘Papez’ circuit of 
cortical and subcortical structures, first suggested as involved in episodic memory 
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by Benedek and Juba (1940). Delay and Brion (1969) proposed that diencephalic 
and temporal lobe amnesia are the result of interruptions to the circuit at different 
points, and Kopelman (1995), in reviewing the evidence accrued since then, 
suggests that this circuit should include the hippocampus, entorhinal and 
perirhinal cortex, the mamillary bodies, mamillo-thalamic tract, and the anterior 
nucleus of the thalamus. The lack of patients with damage limited to individual 
structures, in whom pre-morbid memory ability is unknown, make studies of 
patients with damage to the Delay-Brion circuit difficult to interpret. As a result, 
much effort has been devoted to the development of animal models of amnesia. 
Studies investigating macaque monkeys with ablations to regions of the 
Delay-Brion circuit have revealed significant impairments to their memory for 
complex spatially organised scenes. For example, impairments in spatial memory 
in mazes (E. A. Murray, Davidson, Gaffan, Olton, & Suomi, 1989), memory for 
the location of hidden food rewards (Gaffan & Harrison, 1989), memory for 
complex naturalistic scenes (Gaffan, 1992), and memory for artificial computer-
generated scenes (object-in-place task, Gaffan, 1994b), have been observed. 
However, object memory, independent of the context in which objects are placed, 
is spared. The Delay-Brion system, then, appears to be specialised for 
remembering specific events, which likely correspond to human episodic 
memory. 
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Figure 1.11: Diagram of medial temporal lobe areas involved in memory in the monkey 
(macaque) brain. The hippocampus refers to the dentate gyrus (DG), subfields CA 1-3 of 
the hippocampus, and the subicular complex. The thickness of arrows indicates the size 
of the projection. EC = entorhinal cortex, rs = rhinal sulcus, STG = superior temporal 
gyrus, STS = superior temporal sulcus. Reproduced from Witter et al. (1989).  
Parker and Gaffan (1998b) presented the results of a series of 
experiments in which the memory performance of monkeys with lesions of 
specific structures of the Delay-Brion circuit were compared. The object-in-place 
task required the monkey to select a particular object from a pair of objects for a 
reward. The object always occupied a particular position in a background 
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randomly composed of shapes and colours, and the monkey was required to 
learn lists of these scenes. Impairments in monkeys’ performance of the task 
were observed following fornix transection (Gaffan, 1994b), lesion of the 
mamillary-body (Parker & Gaffan, 1997b), and lesion of the anterior thalamus 
(Parker & Gaffan, 1997a). Anterior thalamus lesions have also been shown to 
result in anterograde amnesia in humans (Daum & Ackermann, 1994; Hankey & 
Stewart-Wynne, 1988; M. H. Kim, Hong, & Roh, 1994), in the absence of object 
recognition memory impairment. Lesions of the cingulate cortex, a region 
included by Papez in the originally proposed circuit (Papez, 1995), did not impair 
monkeys’ performance on the object-in-place task. Whilst cingulate cortex 
damage has been implicated in the development of amnesia in some human 
patients, e.g. the patient studied by Valenstein et al. (1987), it is possible that this 
patient also sustained damage to the fornix. However, the retrosplenial cortex 
has reciprocal connections with anterior nuclei of the thalamus, and the 
subiculum and presubiculum of the hippocampus, suggesting some role in 
memory (Devinsky & Luciano, 1993). Comparison of mean increases in error 
rates for macaques in the Gaffan and Parker studies suggests that the cingulate 
gyrus is not critical to the circuit. Whilst the increases in error score for fornix 
(13.0%), mamillary-body (18.3%), and anterior thalamus (12.2%) lesions were 
similar, that for lesion of the cingulate (3.6%) was significantly lower. 
The hippocampus appears to be critical for episodic memory encoding 
and retrieval but is not essential for visual object memory. The hippocampus 
receives input from the entorhinal cortex, the presumed endpoint of the ventral 
visual stream. In addition, a pathway passes through the parahippocampal 
cortex, which receives inputs from V4, TEO, and TE of the ventral visual stream, 
and parietal areas 7a and LIP, to the hippocampus. This pathway is less well 
characterised than the entorhinal pathway, but due to the combination of 
information from visual processing and parietal cortex, it is likely that it may be 
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involved in the integration of visual scenes in memory. A study of humans using 
fMRI has revealed activation of this region when participants are studying natural 
scenes (Menon, White, Eliez, Glover, & Reiss, 2000) supporting this putative role. 
The parahippocampal gyrus and hippocampus have recently been found 
to contain neurones exhibiting repetition suppression similar to that previously 
discovered in perirhinal and entorhinal cortex in an fMRI study (Brozinsky, 
Yonelinas, Kroll, & Ranganath, 2005). These responses were also sensitive to 
lag in a continuous recognition task, only occurring when the repetition interval 
was relatively short. The relationship of these responses to memory performance 
could not be determined as there were insufficient trials for analysis, but they 
suggest a role for these regions in recognition.  
The Delay-Brion system’s function in episodic-like memory can be 
dissociated from the semantic-like memory of the perirhinal cortex through 
selective lesions. Interruption of the Delay-Brion system, e.g. by fornix 
transection, results in a severe impairment to memory for the spatial organisation 
of scenes with only a mild impairment in matching-to-sample with objects, 
whereas ablation of the perirhinal cortex results in the opposite pattern of effects 
(Gaffan, 1994a). The different computational tasks performed by the two systems 
relate back to the two types of information processed by the two visual streams, 
discussed previously. One system is required to solve the problem of storing 
information required for object perception and recognition (ventral visual stream 
and perirhinal cortex), and one system for the perception and memorisation of the 
animal’s position in space (dorsal visual stream and Delay-Brion system). 
However, there are certain tasks that require the flow of information between the 
two systems, e.g. the object-in-place task, which requires the animal to 
remember spatial arrangements of multiple objects. The perirhinal cortex is 
reciprocally connected to the subiculum of the hippocampus (Amaral & Insausti, 
1990) and can also exchange information via the entorhinal cortex (Insausti, 
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Amaral, & Cowan, 1987; Witter & Amaral, 1991). When surgical disconnection of 
the two regions is carried out, normal performance on the object-in-place task is 
severely disrupted (Gaffan & Parker, 1996). 
1.6.2 The encoding circuit 
In order for memory encoding of objects or episodes to occur in the areas 
discussed above, modulation of neurones that are active during perception must 
occur. This modulation is thought to be achieved by a circuit of structures that 
connect representations of goals (e.g. food rewards for animal subjects) in the 
frontal cortex (E. K. Miller, 2000), with the representations of objects and scenes 
in the temporal lobe. The interaction and communication of goals with structures 
involved in encoding is achieved through subcortical connections, and current 
evidence implicates the basal forebrain. This region contains cholinergic 
neurones that project to IT and MTL and disconnection of this region from the 
temporal cortex results in dense amnesia (Gaffan, Parker, & Easton, 2001). 
There are three main routes from the basal forebrain to the temporal lobe: via the 
temporal stem, the amygdala, and the fornix, and disruption of any of these 
pathways results in severe anterograde amnesia (Gaffan, Parker, & Easton, 
2001).  
1.6.3 The neural bases of recognition memory 
As has been described previously, recognition memory requires both the 
ability to identify objects and events, and also the judgement of their prior 
occurrence (Mandler, 1980). Whilst some accounts view recognition as a unitary 
process, in which recognition memory is an integral part of the memory lost in 
amnesia (Donaldson, 1996; Haist, Shimamura, & Squire, 1992; Hirshman & 
Master, 1997), an alternative theory posits two component processes (Gardiner & 
Parkin, 1990; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Mandler, 1980). Only one of these 
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processes should be lost in anterograde amnesia (Aggleton & Brown, 1999). The 
suggestion from recent studies with animals is that episodic recollection is served 
by the Delay-Brion system, whilst familiarity may be coded in the perirhinal and IT 
cortex. 
The repetition suppression (RS) effect in responses of neurones of the 
temporal lobe observed in electrophysiological studies of these neurones (M. W. 
Brown, Wilson, & Riches, 1987; M. W. Brown & Xiang, 1998; Fahy, Riches, & 
Brown, 1993; Li, Miller, & Desimone, 1993; E. K. Miller, Li, & Desimone, 1993; 
Sobotka & Ringo, 1993; Xiang & Brown, 1998) carries information useful for 
judgements of the prior occurrence of stimuli. These responses occur most 
frequently in anterior IT, especially the perirhinal cortex, and are much less 
common in the hippocampus (Brown et al., 1987; Rolls et al., 1989; Riches et al., 
1991; Miller et al., 1993; Sobotka and Ringo, 1993; Xiang and Brown, 1998; 
Brown and Xiang, 1998). Indeed, cells showing these responses in the 
hippocampus were found at no more than chance levels in two studies (Riches, 
Wilson, & Brown, 1991; Xiang & Brown, 1998). A recent fMRI study has 
discovered lag-sensitive cells exhibiting RS in the hippocampus (Brozinsky, 
Yonelinas, Kroll, & Ranganath, 2005) although their significance is yet to be 
understood, and may relate to other aspects of the continuous recognition task. 
On the basis of the evidence accumulated thus far, anterior IT, especially the 
perirhinal region, appears to contain the majority of neurones with familiarity 
signalling properties. 
Within the perirhinal cortex, neurones that exhibit RS show very rapid 
(~75 ms) familiarity and recency discrimination of individual stimuli, and are 
capable of single-trial learning, with a relatively long-term (>24 hr), and high 
capacity of storage (E. K. Miller, Li, & Desimone, 1993; Xiang & Brown, 1998). 
Thus RS is thought to be a mechanism of long-term memory storage, and this is 
supported by the performance of perirhinal lesioned monkeys at two variants of a 
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delayed matching-to-sample (DMS) task (Eacott, Gaffan, & Murray, 1994). In the 
trial unique stimulus variation, where long-term memory is required, animals are 
significantly impaired, whereas performance of the variant in which stimuli repeat 
frequently and working memory is taxed, performance is unimpaired. Together 
this is strong evidence for the involvement of perirhinal cortex and area TE in the 
discrimination of the recency and familiarity of visual stimuli, independently of the 
hippocampus and other Delay-Brion structures. The latency for discrimination of 
prior occurrence is as fast as the latency for identification within monkey 
perirhinal cortex and TE (E. K. Miller, Li, & Desimone, 1993; Xiang & Brown, 
1998), which excludes the possibility of top-down input from either prefrontal 
areas or the hippocampus. These findings tally with the evidence available from 
perirhinal lesion studies, which have noted impaired recognition memory for 
individual objects (Meunier, Bachevalier, Mishkin, & Murray, 1993; Meunier, 
Hadfield, Bachevalier, & Murray, 1996; W. A. Suzuki, Zola-Morgan, Squire, & 
Amaral, 1993).  
Electrophysiological recordings from the hippocampus have suggested its 
role in transmitting information about the spatial environment of the animal. Some 
authors have found neurones signalling the familiarity of a visual stimulus 
occurring in a particular spatial position (Eichenbaum, 2000; Rolls et al., 1989). 
These neurones, then, may perform context-dependent recognition; the object-in-
place memory described by Gaffan and Parker (1996). The entorhinal cortex, the 
anatomical region between the hippocampus and perirhinal cortex, may contain 
neurones encoding information about both stimulus familiarity and spatial 
information (M. W. Brown & Xiang, 1998; W. A. Suzuki, Miller, & Desimone, 
1997; Xiang & Brown, 1998), and thus, may act as a junctional region between 
the two. 
In hippocampal lesioned animals, standard object recognition memory 
task performance is only mildly impaired compared with perirhinal lesioned 
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subjects (Aggleton & Brown, 1999). Murray and Mishkin (1998) found no change 
in performance at all following hippocampal lesion, whilst other studies report 
varying deficits most apparent at long retention delays (Alvarez, Zola-Morgan, & 
Squire, 1995; Beason-Held, Rosene, Killiany, & Moss, 1999; Zola-Morgan, 
Squire, Rempel, Clower, & Amaral, 1992; Zola et al., 2000). More reliable effects 
of hippocampal damage have been observed in Gaffan and Parker’s (1996) 
object-in-place task. The hippocampus appears to have a role in recognition 
memory when familiarity judgements depend on associations between items, 
which are often spatial.  
1.6.3.1 Evidence from clinical studies 
The dissociable effects of perirhinal and hippocampal lesions in animals 
suggest that there may be similar dissociations in the abilities of amnesic patients 
with damage to these different structures. There is some evidence of amnesics 
with spared recognition memory in the literature (Aggleton & Shaw, 1996; Hirst et 
al., 1986; McMackin, Cockburn, Anslow, & Gaffan, 1995), although few studies 
have comprehensively examined the role of task difficulty. Some case studies 
have demonstrated a sparing of recognition memory irrespective of severity of 
amnesia or task difficulty (Hanley & Davies, 1997; Parkin, Dunn, Lee, O'Hara, & 
Nussbaum, 1993; Parkin, Rees, Hunkin, & Rose, 1994). In one case (Parkin, 
Rees, Hunkin, & Rose, 1994) recognition appeared to rely on judgements of 
stimulus familiarity, although the amnesia did not appear to be caused by 
damage to the hippocampus. 
Studies of patients with pathology confined to the hippocampus or fornix 
have, again, demonstrated single instances where recognition based on 
familiarity is spared (Aggleton et al., 2000; Mayes, Van Eijk, Gooding, Isaac, & 
Holdstock, 1999; McMackin, Cockburn, Anslow, & Gaffan, 1995; Vargha-Khadem 
et al., 1997). In one particular case (Holdstock et al., 2000; Mayes, Van Eijk, 
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Gooding, Isaac, & Holdstock, 1999), a patient with bilateral atrophy of the 
hippocampus and apparent sparing of adjacent regions, recognition memory 
appears to be preserved but is accompanied by persistent episodic amnesia. 
Recognition memory deficits are observed only where associative memory is 
required (e.g. memory for specific object pairings), and loss of this kind of 
memory has been associated with early hippocampal damage (Vargha-Khadem 
et al., 1997). 
Use of Yonelinas’ (1994) method of separating familiarity and recollection 
in recognition memory, the dissociation of processes procedure, has found loss 
of both processes in amnesics with extensive pathology (Yonelinas, Kroll, 
Dobbins, Lazzara, & Knight, 1998). Patients with pathology centred in the 
hippocampus have also been shown to be impaired at both components 
(Knowlton & Squire, 1995; Squire & Zola, 1998), supporting a single-process 
model of recognition.  
1.6.3.2 Evidence from human imaging studies 
Important findings on the nature of recognition are starting to emerge from 
ERP and fMRI studies. Rugg et al. (1998) manipulated the level of processing at 
which stimulus words were encoded, and then examined ERPs during 
subsequent recognition. The recorded activity suggested that three functionally 
dissociable populations of neurones responded to recognised stimuli. One was 
insensitive to both the accuracy of recognition and depth of processing and was 
thought to reflect priming. Another population, recorded above the left parietal 
cortex, was sensitive to level of processing giving rise to ERPs occurring 500 ms 
after stimulus onset, and thought to reflect explicit recollection. The third group, 
recorded over the frontal scalp, and present 300-500 ms after onset, was 
insensitive to level of processing, but was sensitive to whether items had been 
seen before or not, only being present for old items. This third response was 
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thought to reflect familiarity. Similar findings of a later (400-800 ms) parietal 
recollective ERP and an earlier (300-500 ms) frontal familiarity ERP have been 
made in a subsequent study (Curran, 1999). When ERP differences have been 
studied using the ‘remember’/’know’ paradigm, enhanced ERPs were recorded 
over left parietotemporal and bilateral frontal sites for ‘remember’ (R) compared 
to ‘know’ (K) responses (Duzel, Yonelinas, Mangun, Heinze, & Tulving, 1997). 
These studies suggest that different neuronal populations signal different aspects 
of recognition, although this technique does not have the spatial resolution to 
locate these responses with any high degree of specificity.  
Recognition has also been studied using fMRI, in order to achieve a better 
understanding of where functionally different neuronal populations might exist.  
Brewer et al. (1998) observed different bilateral medial temporal lobe activations 
during encoding of visual scenes, which could be used to predict whether the 
stimuli would be successfully recognised, and whether they would be 
remembered (R) or described as feeling familiar (K). Examination of retrieval 
found evidence of a dissociation amongst recognition memory components for 
words (Eldridge, Knowlton, Furmanski, Bookheimer, & Engel, 2000; Henson, 
Rugg, Shallice, Josephs, & Dolan, 1999). Henson et al. (Henson, Rugg, Shallice, 
Josephs, & Dolan, 1999)(1999) found evidence of different activity in the frontal 
cortex for R and K responses, and an increased response in the left posterior 
hippocampus for ‘remember’ vs. ‘not remember’ responses. Eldridge et al. (2000) 
found that increased activity in the hippocampus was only found during conscious 
recollection (R). In other studies, familiarity with scenes was found to be 
associated with decreased activity in the parahippocampal region (Gabrieli, 
Brewer, Desmond, & Glover, 1997). Reduced activity associated with familiarity 
with items has also been reported in IT (Jiang, Haxby, Martin, Ungerleider, & 
Parasuraman, 2000; Stern et al., 1996; Tulving, Markowitsch, Kapur, Habib, & 
Houle, 1994; Vandenberghe, Dupont, Bormans, Mortelmans, & Orban, 1995).  
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These responses contrast with those of the hippocampus, which are 
increased when recognising objects, studied as pictures, from test words naming 
the objects (Gabrieli, Brewer, Desmond, & Glover, 1997; Stark & Squire, 2000). 
This is a task involving associative memory of the type previously demonstrated 
to involve the hippocampus, although Stark and Squire (2000) show that this 
increased activity is not limited to conditions requiring association between items. 
It is not yet known whether such activity is present when conscious recollection is 
precluded. 
Familiarity (K) decisions are made faster than recollect (R) decisions 
(Hintzman, Caulton, & Levitin, 1998; McElree, Dolan, & Jacoby, 1999; Seeck et 
al., 1997), and this parallels the finding of faster ERPs associated with familiarity 
than recall (Curran, 2000). The familiarity system might provide rapid and 
accurate detection of novelty but is unable to provide associative recollection. A 
second associative system centred on the hippocampus is required to remember 
associations with a stimulus, or the formation of new categories of stimuli.  
Differences of neuronal responses to novel and familiar stimuli are 
common in the perirhinal cortex, whilst they are rarely found in the hippocampus, 
and do not persist over long intervals. Hippocampal neurones carry spatial or 
associational information, whereas perirhinal neurones do not seem as important 
for these processes. Neuroimaging has established qualitative differences 
between brain potentials and regions involved in the signalling of different 
aspects of recognition. 
1.7 Translation invariance in memory and perception 
Having explored current knowledge about the neural mechanisms 
involved in higher level visual processing and memory, it is important to examine 
one of the key problems of object perception and how it may be solved. 
Translation invariance in recognition is the ability to recognise the same object at 
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different retinal locations, sizes, viewing angles, illumination conditions, etc. 
Whilst under different conditions objects may cause entirely different patterns of 
activation of the retina, higher level processing can usually identify that the object 
remains the same. Answering the question of how translation invariance is 
achieved, and under what conditions it breaks down, are likely to reveal much 
about how object identity is represented by the brain. Reviewed below are some 
of the key findings from studies of invariance in retinal location, one of the most 
widely studied phenomena in this field.  
Electrophysiological recordings and lesion studies in monkeys have found 
evidence of both translation invariance and positional specificity of recognition-
related responses. In monkeys where the optic chiasm has been sectioned, inter-
ocular transfer of discriminations learnt in one visual hemifield is critically 
dependent on IT cortex (Seacord, Gross, & Mishkin, 1979), suggesting that this 
brain area is essential in the attainment of translation invariance. Studies of the 
electrophysiological properties of IT neurones can be divided into those showing 
some degree of translation invariance (E. K. Miller, Li, & Desimone, 1991; Tovee, 
Rolls, & Azzopardi, 1994) and findings of positional specificity (Chelazzi, Duncan, 
Miller, & Desimone, 1998; DiCarlo & Maunsell, 2003; Lueschow, Miller, & 
Desimone, 1994).  
Desimone et al. (1984) found that most IT neurones respond to a variety 
of visual stimuli although their responses do appear to be selective along 
dimensions of shape, colour or texture. This selectivity was maintained 
throughout the neurones’ receptive fields. As receptive fields of IT neurones are 
often large (median size 26° x 26°), and usually extend into both visual hemifields 
(Desimone & Gross, 1979; Gross, Rocha-Miranda, & Bender, 1972), these can 
be considered to be relatively translation invariant responses to specific 
properties of objects. This conclusion is supported by the findings of Tovee et al. 
(1994) that firing rates of temporal visual neurones in response to an effective 
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image were not altered when the edge of the object was shifted up to 4° 
eccentrically from fixation. Even at this eccentricity there were only small 
decreases in responses.  
However, not all IT neuronal responses are so invariant for changes in 
position. In a study of object recognition in which monkeys were required to 
discriminate between target images and distracters, changes in object location of 
1.5° from fixation had minimal effects on behavioural accuracy and speed of 
recognition (DiCarlo & Maunsell, 2003). However, the anterior IT neurone 
responses were demonstrated to have a much greater sensitivity to positional 
change, showing a mean 60% decrease in response between locations. In a 
similar finding in a DMS task, Lueschow and colleagues found that, whilst the 
order of neurones’ stimulus preferences did not change, 69% of cells recorded 
preferred a given retinal location (Lueschow, Miller, & Desimone, 1994). The 
change in location was much larger in this study (5°). Of the cells exhibiting 
repetition-sensitive responses, those with putative mnemonic capacity, only 7% 
of cells were not invariant for location. The authors suggested that retinal location 
is treated like a feature of the object by some IT neurones. 
Psychophysical studies of memory for stimuli occurring at different 
positions in the visual field also provide evidence that is apparently contradictory. 
Some studies have suggested that the mnemonic representation is translation 
invariant – that once an item is encoded it will be recognised equally at any 
positional location (e.g. Biederman & Cooper, 1991; Bricolo & Bulthoff, 1993), 
whilst others suggest that a change of position between study and test incurs 
cognitive costs. Biederman and Cooper (1991) carried out an experiment in 
which pictures of readily nameable objects were presented to participants twice in 
two separate blocks for identification by naming. The interval between study and 
test presentations was approximately 7 min. Priming of the first presentation on 
an object’s subsequent naming, measured as both a faster reaction time and a 
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reduced error rate, was found to be independent of whether the initial 
presentation was in the same or opposite left/right or upper/lower visual 
hemifield. Performance for items with the same basic-level name that were 
different exemplars of the category (e.g. a blackbird and a sparrow) was poorer 
than for identical objects, suggesting that at least some of the priming was visual. 
The authors concluded that the activation of an object’s basic-level concept and 
name were mediated by a position invariant representation. Bricolo and Bülthoff’s 
(1993) study also suggested that object recognition is independent of test 
position. In a single interval forced-choice design participants were trained with 
wire-line objects at one position, 2.5° left or right, or up or down from fixation. 
Training position had no effect on later object recognition, although with a mean 
recognition rate of 90% any effect of translation may have been obscured by a 
ceiling effect. The translation invariant recognition that these two studies appear 
to support may well be dependent on the types of neuronal responses recorded 
by Desimone et al. (1984) and Tovee et al. (1994). 
Evidence against complete translation invariance in humans comes 
largely from studies of pattern recognition. Kahn and Foster’s (1981) study of 
participants’ ability to discriminate sequentially presented dot patterns found that 
the distance between the two patterns was most important in determining the 
accuracy of responses. Stimuli were presented either at fixation or 0.5° to the left 
or right. Subsequently there were three possible separation distances: same 
position, 0.5° (centre-left/right), and 1° (left-right). D-prime was highest for 
identical study and test positions, and then decreased as a function of increasing 
distance. It should be noted, however, that better discrimination was measured 
when both study and test were at fixation, than when they occurred at an 
identical, but peripheral, location to either the left or right of fixation. There was 
also no attempt to separate trials on the basis of shift, taking into account the 
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study and test positions, although the order of the two may be of importance to 
discriminability.  
Nazir and O’Regan (1990) trained participants to discriminate dot patterns 
or columns of grey squares from two non-target distracters, at a fixed location to 
the left or right of fixation. Subsequently, discrimination was tested at three test 
locations – to the left or right of fixation, or at fixation (see Figure 1.12). 
Recognition rates dropped when stimuli were presented at novel positions, 
regardless of whether the eccentricity was 2.4°, 0.86°, or 0.49°. Later 
experiments demonstrated a similar pattern for stimuli presented above and 
below fixation. Error rates were greatest for the largest distance between stimuli 
(at 2.4° eccentricity). The results suggest that a change in location causes an 
increase in error rate, presumably due to a decreased ability to recognise the 
target. However, the error rates were similar whether the target item occurred at 
fixation or in the opposite visual hemifield, suggesting that it was the change in 
position that caused a decrement rather than its magnitude.  
 
Figure 1.12: An example of the presentation positions of stimuli in a classic positional 
translation experiment. Reproduced from Nazir and O'Regan (1990). 
78 
In a similar experiment, Dill and Fahle (1997) confirmed the finding of 
Nazir and O’Regan, that improvement in discrimination performance at one 
retinal location does not transfer to new locations. This positional specificity 
seems to be found for novel patterns and demanding discriminations, suggesting 
that the achievement of positional invariance is memory-intensive. However, as 
accuracy following transfer from the learned to the unlearned position was 
significantly above chance in this study, some translation invariant recognition 
ability appears to be present. 
One problem with all of the three preceding studies (Dill & Fahle, 1997; 
Kahn & Foster, 1981; Nazir & O'Regan, 1990) is that it is impossible to discern 
whether their results reflect a global positional specificity or whether this 
phenomenon is linked to the presentation of items at particular locations in the 
visual field (i.e. at fixation vs. outside fixation, left vs. right hemifield). Several 
studies have examined comparable shifts outside the region of fixation and 
including within-hemifield shifts (Dill & Fahle, 1998; Gratton, Corballis, & Jain, 
1997; Hornak, Duncan, & Gaffan, 2002). The Gratton study compared the effects 
of both horizontal and vertical positional shifts of the same magnitude, so that 
stimuli appeared at different locations around fixation. A significant recognition 
advantage was found for same/different recognition of line pattern stimuli 
presented in the same visual hemifield, regardless of the distance between 
locations. In a further experiment systematically more negative recognition-
related event-related potentials (ERPs) were found over the contralateral cortical 
hemisphere to the hemifield in which the stimulus was presented at study. The 
authors suggested that visual memories are contralaterally organised. 
Hornak and colleagues (2002) used similar shifts in their design where 
stimuli could appear at any of the four corners of an imaginary square around the 
fixation point. Each point was equidistant from fixation, allowing the comparison 
of vertical and horizontal shifts at a constant retinal eccentricity. During learning, 
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stimuli (pictures of nameable objects, containing different exemplars of the same 
categories) were presented in pairs in diametrically opposite positions. In a later 
test phase, pairs contained either two novel pictures or one learned and one 
novel picture, and participants were required to discriminate between the two 
(Figure 1.13). Old stimuli appeared either in an identical position, or shifted 
horizontally or vertically. The results showed a significant decrement in 
recognition of horizontally shifted stimuli when presentation times were 100ms 
(too short for the initiation of a saccade), compared to both the no change 
condition and the vertical shift. This appears to provide further evidence for a 
hemispheric organisation of memory, as shifts between left and right visual 
hemifields cause a greater recognition decrement than shifts between upper and 
lower visual field.  
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Figure 1.13: Possible configurations of learning and test trials from Hornak et al.'s (2002) 
'square' experiment. Reproduced from Hornak et al. (2002). 
The findings of Dill and Fahle (1998), however, seem to contradict the 
idea that shifts between hemifields produce a decrement greater than 
comparable vertical shifts. They found that horizontal and vertical shifts were 
equally effective in decreasing performance in a same/different task. Vertical and 
horizontal displacements of 0°, 0.5°, 1°, 1.5°, and 2° from an initial position 1° in 
the parafovea were examined with different types of stimuli (dot clouds and 
checkerboards) and different difficulty levels. Increasing decrements in 
performance were observed with increasing displacement, and this effect was 
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independent of the similarity of the patterns. Larsen and Bundesen (1998) carried 
out a same/different experiment in which the patterns to be discriminated were 
presented simultaneously with varying spatial separation. In an experiment in 
which objects could be transformed by rotation as well as position, but the 
rotational component of the target was 0 (i.e. it was not rotated), d’ was a 
monotonically decreasing function of spatial separation. This is a similar effect to 
the effect of displacement described by Dill and Fahle (1998) although the finding 
that it occurred without any temporal separation between the two items suggests 
that there is a perceptual component to the effect.  
Despite evidence for translation invariant properties of IT neurones, and 
the recognition of pictures and 3-D objects (relatively naturalistic stimuli) 
occurring seemingly without regard for the position in which they were learnt, it 
would appear that certain discriminations utilise representations that are position 
specific. From the human experimental data we can ascertain that these are 
discriminations that are more demanding due to the abstract and/or highly similar 
nature of the stimuli employed (e.g. dot clouds, checkerboards). These patterns 
are unlikely to have been seen by participants before engaging in the experiment, 
and they are unlikely to have experience with similar objects. This suggests that 
some degree of perceptual learning of similar objects before an experiment may 
facilitate the formation of translation invariant representations. With utterly novel 
stimuli no such framework exists, and the perceptual apparatus must relearn the 
stimuli at each new location. This view appears to be consistent with the finding 
of experience-dependent organisation in the perirhinal cortex (C. A. Erickson, 
Jagadeesh, & Desimone, 2000). Perhaps translation invariance is a consequence 
of higher visual neurones adapting to many experiences with objects or 
categories of object. If this is the case, then discovering how much, and what kind 
of experience is required to achieve translation invariance is an important avenue 
for future research. 
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One study that combined naturalistic stimuli with a more demanding task 
found evidence of both translational invariance and positional effects depending 
on the stimuli employed (Dill & Edelman, 2001). In same/different experiments 
there was no effect of translation for ‘animal-like’ stimuli, regardless of their 
interstimulus similarity. The animal-like stimuli were composed of a standard 
number of computer-generated features such as legs and heads, and different 
‘animals’ were defined both by the identity of their features and the features’ 
positional configurations. Translation invariance was observed when stimuli were 
‘scrambled’ by randomising the identity of the component features whilst 
maintaining the global configuration of an animal, but not when the stimuli were 
made to differ in the locations but not the shapes of corresponding parts (Figure 
1.14). This suggests that the representation of the identity of features may be 
position invariant, although the representation of their configuration may be 
specific to learning position.  
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Figure 1.14: Example of 'scrambled' animal-like stimuli. Each column contains the same 
spatial configuration but the component features are different in each example. Each row 
shows examples of stimuli containing the same features, but in different spatial 
configurations. Figure reproduced from Dill and Edelman (2001). 
Logothetis and Sheinberg (1996) conclude that object recognition occurs 
differently at the level of basic object categories and at the subordinate level. 
Whilst recognition at the basic level appears largely invariant to image 
transformations, and this may be carried out in the columnar modules of IT, 
recognition at the subordinate level may involve different types of representation 
using different neural mechanisms. Recognition at this level is initially highly 
dependent on specific views of objects, with generalisation thought to occur 
through perceptual learning. Dissociation between these two types of recognition 
is evident in agnosic patients. Whilst they are occasionally able to recognise 
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objects with distinct shapes belonging to different categories, the identification of 
specific members of classes is typically impossible. The putative generalisation 
that results in translation invariance may occur through experience of objects 
changing position in the visual field, enabling feature analysers at different stages 
of cortical processing to become associated with one another through the 
strengthening of synaptic connections (Wallis & Rolls, 1997). As is the case with 
other kinds of reorganisation of visual areas, the questions that remain to be 
answered are how much and what kind of experience are required in order to 
achieve the changes. 
1.8 Summary 
This literature review has examined recognition memory, a form of 
memory requiring the identification of objects and events, and knowledge of their 
prior occurrence. The continuous recognition paradigm has been focused on as a 
powerful tool for the examination of recognition due to its avoidance of serial 
position effects, and the possibility of calculating signal detection measurements 
from data obtained with this procedure. However, a detailed examination of the 
mechanisms underlying forgetting in this type of task is yet to be undertaken. The 
difficulties of comparing data from studies with word stimuli and visual objects 
have been examined, and differences between visual and verbal memories 
considered. A new approach to visual memory combining techniques from vision 
research and memory psychophysics has been outlined as a promising avenue in 
future research. The brain regions and neural mechanisms involved in both 
higher level visual processing and the different categories of memory have been 
discussed, and their functions in producing translation invariant object recognition 
considered. In particular, the invariance of recognition to changes in object 
position has been examined. The question of under what conditions this 
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invariance breaks down is of importance in determining how different 
representational systems operate under different task conditions.  
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2.1 Experiment 1: Retention of information during continuous 
recognition of pictures, faces, fractals and trigrams 
2.1.1 Introduction 
The goal of mathematically modelling the time course of memory retention 
is over 100 years old (e.g. Ebbinghaus, 1964; see Rubin and Wenzel, 1996). The 
purposes of obtaining a function, or collection of functions, to describe the 
process whereby memory performance declines from almost 100% accuracy to 
chance performance, are both practical and theoretical. The ability to accurately 
predict individuals’ retention of information is of practical importance, whilst the 
elucidation of the function(s) would reveal important information regarding the 
components contributing to memory output.  
As has been detailed in Chapter 1, attempts to evaluate retention of 
information using list-based memory tasks have been complicated by the 
presence of serial position effects. In a typical list-based task, the list of items is 
presented for memorisation, followed by a recognition or recall task. Plotting 
memory performance against serial position of study reveals that items towards 
the start and the end of lists are remembered better than those in the middle 
(primacy and recency effects), typically resulting in a U-shaped curve. This is 
observed even for lists as short as 4 items (e.g. Korsnes, Magnussen, & 
Reinvang, 1996; Wright, Santiago, Sands, Kendrick, & Cook, 1985) but is more 
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pronounced for lists long enough to enable the plotting of the time course of 
retention.  
An alternative method of assessing memory that avoids this complication 
is the continuous recognition paradigm, first used by Shepard and Teghtsoonian 
(1961). By intermixing study and test trials in a continuous stream of information, 
the authors were able to examine recognition at a relatively ‘steady state’. Each 
stimulus occurs twice, once as a novel stimulus and then as an ‘old’ stimulus, and 
participants are required to distinguish between the two. An initial unscored buffer 
of trials serves to prevent primacy effects, and after this period a steady state is 
assumed to have been reached. Whilst this is not always strictly the case, as 
demonstrated by Shepard and Teghtsoonian’s (1961) own discovery that false 
alarm rates very gradually increased throughout the experiment, the effects of 
serial position are minimal compared with those observed in list-based tasks. The 
separation of study and test trials is normally controlled, and the number of trials 
intervening between the two is known as the ‘lag’. Because the stimuli intervening 
between study and test are randomly selected, study-test pairs of the same lag 
throughout the experiment are assumed to be equivalent, and hit rates can be 
obtained for each lag. By the inclusion of a wide range of lags in an experiment it 
is possible to plot a retention curve of performance against lag.  
This experimental paradigm has been used to good effect by Rubin et al. 
(1999) in the search for precise functions for the retention of information, tested 
by both recall and recognition. By using a very wide range of lags (0, 1, 2, 4, 7, 
12, 21, 35, 59 and 99), many repetitions of each lag (27), and using a large 
number of participants (100 per condition), the authors achieved very precise 
retention curves for both recall and recognition of trigrams. By fitting the data 
obtained to a wide range of functions, informed by the authors’ previous fitting of 
data from 100 years of previous memory experiments (Rubin & Wenzel, 1996), a 
series of exponentials was selected as the best fitting function. This function, y = 
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a1e
-t/T1
 + a2e
-t/T2
 + a3e
-t/T3
, contains three time constants (T1, T2, and T3). Of these 
T1 was set at 1.15, and T3 was infinite. T2 varied according to the memory 
measure employed, being 27.55 for cued-recall and remember-know recognition, 
whereas 13.38 was better for old-new recognition, reflecting the different shaped 
curves plotted. Coupling this difference with the apparent difference between 
functions obtained for most data sets and those from studies of autobiographical 
memory in Rubin and Wenzel’s (1996) study, it may be inferred that different 
memory processes produce retention curves that differ qualitatively as well as 
quantitatively.  
Adopting the methodology of Rubin et al. (1999) seems to offer a precise 
and powerful method of comparing retention of information for different classes of 
stimuli. In the current experiment, a range of visual stimuli was tested in order to 
systematically compare and contrast the retention curves produced. In addition to 
the trigrams used by Rubin and colleagues, cartoon pictures, algorithm-
generated fractals, and parametric face-like stimuli were also tested. The “clipart” 
cartoon images were chosen because they represented common objects, and 
are a stimulus type employed frequently in studies of visual memory (Barbarotto, 
Laiacona, Macchi, & Capitani, 2002; Biederman & Cooper, 1991; Hornak, 
Duncan, & Gaffan, 2002; Proverbio, Burco, del Zotto, & Zani, 2004; Snodgrass & 
Vanderwart, 1980; van Turennout, Bielamowicz, & Martin, 2003; Wan, Aggleton, 
& Brown, 1999). They were selected from several different basic level categories, 
with many exemplars from each (e.g. 10 oranges, 10 umbrellas, etc.). The 
fractals were chosen as an example of abstract stimuli that would be resistant to 
naming. As they are relatively complex, but do not resemble commonly 
encountered objects, recognition of these stimuli must largely rely on visual 
discrimination. Unlike the picture stimulus set, the fractal stimulus set can be 
considered to be composed of stimuli of a single category, and what is tested, 
therefore, is true recognition of individuals from a homogenous group, rather than 
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discrimination between categories (Goldstein & Chance, 1970). Fractals similar to 
those used here have been used by Miyashita et al. (1993) in the study of 
stimulus-selectivity for complex visual forms of IT neurones. The face-like stimuli 
were also generated in such a way that they could be considered a homogenous 
category. These stimuli had a similar configuration to human faces, but were 
generated from a series of manipulated ellipses, whose parameters could be 
precisely controlled (Prof Andrew Derrington, personal communication). Whilst, 
as with the fractals, recognition of these stimuli might be expected to be based on 
visual discrimination as individual stimuli were relatively homogenous, 
participants’ familiarity with the configuration of the features might be expected to 
result in a different recognition profile.  
In addition to the expected differences between recognition of the different 
sets of visual stimuli, a difference between the visual stimuli and the verbal 
trigram stimuli was also expected. Whilst the findings of Ward et al. (2005) 
suggest that the form of memory for verbal and visual memory is similar, a 
previous continuous recognition task comparing the two modalities suggests that 
verbally encoded stimuli are recognised faster and more accurately than abstract 
visual stimuli (Doty & Savakis, 1997). Whether this finding, obtained with 
common 4-letter words, could be generalised to the more complex digit-letter-
digit trigrams, was a matter of some considerable interest.  
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2.1.2 Methods 
2.1.2.1 Participants 
All of the participants were students at the University of Nottingham. 
There were 50 participants in each of the four stimulus conditions (faces, fractals, 
pictures, and trigrams), and the mean age of participants was 21-years-old in 
each group. In order to exclude data from participants who ‘gave up’ on the tasks, 
during the relatively long 30 min period, criteria were set for inclusion of the data 
in analyses. These were adapted from those used by Rubin et al. (1999). 
Participants were required to make fewer than 25 ‘no response’ trials (those 
where no response was measured during the allotted time), to prevent the 
inclusion of data from participants who had stopped responding. In addition they 
had to surpass the criterion of achieving recognition measures of at least 0.5 for 
lag 1 and lag 0 combined, and have a false alarm rate lower than 0.8, to eliminate 
participants who always responded with ‘old’. The recognition measure referred 
to here is the same measure used by Rubin and colleagues, [(hits-false 
alarms)/(1-false alarms)]. Mean numbers of ‘no responses’ for the remaining 
participants were 4.06 (faces), 4.14 (fractals), 3.04 (pictures), and 0.82 (trigrams). 
The mean probabilities of recognition for lags 0 and 1 combined for the remaining 
participants were 0.83 (SD=0.14) (faces), 0.81 (0.12) (fractals), 0.93 (0.07) 
(pictures), and 0.82 (0.13) (trigrams). Mean false alarm rates were 0.27 
(SD=0.10) (faces), 0.23 (0.13) (fractals), 0.10 (0.06) (pictures), and 0.38 (0.09) 
(trigrams). To obtain 50 participants with data meeting the inclusion requirements 
in each group (200 in total), 54 were tested for the faces, 53 for fractals, 51 for 
bitmaps, and 54 for trigrams. Those excluded in each group were all removed for 
having failed to achieve mean recognition scores of 0.5 across lags 0 and 1.  
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2.1.2.2 Stimuli 
Four different types of stimuli were generated: faces, fractals, pictures, 
and trigrams. 
2.1.2.2.1 Faces 
The faces were a set of 200 computer-generated ‘cartoon’ faces, 
generated by programs written by Andrew Derrington (see Figure 2.1). A seed for 
the random number generator was selected, based on the computer’s clock. The 
faces were generated in sequence by defining, and superimposing, 16 ‘egg-
shaped’ ellipses, configured to represent the outline of a face, eyes, nose, hair, 
mouth, cheeks and eyebrows. Each ellipse was defined by random determination 
of properties such as length, position, height, curve, angle and RGB values (to 
define the ellipse’s colour), within pre-defined limits to ensure that the resulting 
structure resembled a face. The resultant ‘egg-shaped’ ellipses differed from the 
standard ellipse by having a 2nd harmonic component on the long axis, meaning 
that the ellipse could be fatter at one end than the other. In addition ellipses could 
be made asymmetrical along the long axis, by giving the two halves of the short 
diameter different lengths, which could be negative giving rise to a crescent-
shaped ellipse. Details of each face’s parameters and the seed for the random 
number generator were stored in a data file.  
 
Figure 2.1: Example face stimuli. 
2.1.2.2.2 Fractals 
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Fractals were generated by a program adapted from an algorithm detailed 
by Miyashita et al. (1991) on a Viglen PC running Matlab v6.1, equipped with the 
image processing toolbox (see Figure 2.2). Briefly, a seed for a random number 
generator was entered and set, in order that the fractals generated could be 
regenerated at any time, provided the seed and other variables entered were the 
same. A series of minimum and maximum levels for various properties of the 
fractals were entered enabling adjustment of the program to produce fractals of 
sufficiently different appearance. For each fractal the recursion limits and number 
of superpositions were randomly set between the minimum and maximum values 
specified. For each superposition random red, green and blue values were 
generated to define its colour, number of edges was randomly set between the 
minimum and maximum values, and then a regular or irregular deflection 
subroutine was called, according to a ratio of regular to irregular set at the start of 
the program. Both subroutines calculated the co-ordinates of a regular polygon 
and then carried out deflections on its sides in accordance with the 
transformations detailed in the appendix of the Miyashita paper. The only 
difference between the two subroutines was that the regular subroutine always 
carried out uniform deflections for each edge of the polygon, whereas the 
irregular routine did not have this constraint. Finally, superpositions were 
normalised so that each was centred on the same point. Each fractal was 
composed of a number of such superpositions, which became progressively 
smaller, in order that early superpositions were not obscured by later ones. 
Fractals were plotted in a Matlab figure window, then saved as bitmap images. 
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Figure 2.2: Example fractal stimuli. 
2.1.2.2.3 Pictures 
The pictures consisted of 200 unique clipart images of readily nameable 
objects. The 200 images were made up from 20 categories (see Figure 2.3): 
animals, apples, briefcases, bananas, glasses of beer, birds, burgers, butterflies, 
cats, clowns, coffee pots, dogs, fish, grapes, keys, oranges, shoes, strawberries, 
suns, and umbrellas. Ten images of each class of object were included (see 
Figure 2.4). The first 25 participants were tested with full colour bitmaps, but the 
experimenters noted that almost perfect recognition was obtained for this 
condition. In an attempt to increase task difficulty and minimise potential ceiling 
effects, the latter 25 participants were tested with greyscale bitmaps; exactly the 
same images but with colour information removed.  
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Figure 2.3: Examples of each of the 20 categories of picture stimuli. 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Examples of stimuli within a category. The figure shows the 10 ‘apple’ stimuli 
employed in the experiment. 
2.1.2.2.4 Trigrams 
The trigrams employed were a randomly generated list of 200 ‘legal’ 
trigrams according to the rules of Rubin et al. (1999). That is that they were digit-
letter-digit, with the digit zero excluded, and only letters K, V, W, Y and Z allowed. 
The trigrams were presented in white letters on a black background, such that the 
width of the trigram was approximately 2°. 
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2.1.2.3 Presentation 
All stimuli were presented using an Apple Macintosh G3 computer (300 
Mhz, 384 Mb RAM) with a ATI Radeon 7000 (32 Mb) graphics card, on a 21” 
Mitsubishi colour display monitor (size: 1024 x 768 pixels, resolution: 72 x 72 dpi, 
refresh rate: 75 Hz). Stimuli were presented in the centre of the screen using 
Matlab v5.2.1 (Mathworks UK), running the psychophysics toolbox (Brainard, 
1997). All bitmap images (bitmaps, faces and fractals) were converted to a 
standard size of 59 x 59 pixels, covering an area of 2 cm x 2 cm on the screen 
when displayed at the resolution described above. Participants were seated at a 
distance of 57.5 cm from the screen so stimuli subtended an area of 
approximately 2° x 2° of visual angle.  
2.1.2.4 Session design 
A pseudorandomly determined frame of 120 trials was generated for each 
participant, providing 9 learning and 9 test trials at each of 6 lags (see Figure 
 2.5). These lags were chosen to be at regular intervals on a logarithmic scale 
being 0, 1, 2, 4, 6 and 9. Twelve filler trials made up the spaces in the frame. The 
filler trials were unscored study-test pairs, of variable lag. These were arranged 
so that the first unfilled space in the frame was a ‘study’ filler trial, the second was 
its ‘test’, the third was the second ‘study’ filler, and so on. The lag denotes the 
number of trials intervening between the learning and test presentations. Filler 
trials consisted of unscored learning and test presentation pairs. This frame was 
repeated three times, with novel stimuli each time, yielding 27 scored recognition 
tests for each of the lags. In addition, the experiment began with a buffer of 40 
unscored filler trial pairs to prevent the occurrence of primacy effects. The effects 
encountered here, therefore, reflect memory performance where interference is 
high. This yielded a total of 400 trials. Once the order of trials for the entirety of a 
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session had been generated, the 200 stimuli were randomly assigned to the 200 
pairs of trials, so that each participant experienced the stimuli in a different order. 
2.1.2.5 Procedure 
For each trial stimuli appeared on the screen for 2 sec (see Figure 
2.6Error! Reference source not found.). During this period participants were 
instructed to respond either ‘old’ or ‘new’ with the left or right mouse button 
respectively, ‘old’ to previously seen stimuli and ‘new’ to novel items. In order that 
participants did not forget which button corresponded to which response during 
the experiment, a clear notice of which was which was placed next to the mouse. 
After 2 sec the stimulus was replaced with a blank screen for 1 sec, and then 
feedback for 0.5 sec. Feedback consisted of either the word ‘Right’ in green 
letters if the response was correct, or ‘Wrong’ in red letters if it was incorrect, or 
no response was registered. Finally, a further 1 sec blank screen separated the 
feedback from the next trial, bringing each trial to a total of 4.5 sec. For 400 trials, 
the experiment therefore lasted 30 min.  
1 4 
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Figure 2.5: Schematic of an example region of the pseudorandom order frame. Assuming 
time proceeds from left to right, with each square representing a distinct trial. Yellow 
squares represent study trials connected by arrows to their corresponding (red) test trial 
trials. The number with each arrow is the value of the lag separating the pair. The brown 
square represents a filler trial. 
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2.1.2.6 Scoring 
As mentioned above, participants’ responses were only collected during 
the 2 sec presentation period of each stimulus. Once a response had been made 
it was final, and no opportunity for the correction of responses was allowed. Hit 
rates and false alarm rates were calculated from test and study trials respectively. 
From these scores, d’ was calculated. In addition, reaction time was measured as 
the latency from the start of the trial until the detection of the response. 
Figure 2.6: Schematic of the procedure for each trial. Sequence from top left to 
bottom right. Initially the stimulus was presented in the centre of the screen for 
2000 ms during which time a response was required. This was followed by a 
blank screen for 1000 ms, appropriate feedback for 500 ms, and a final blank 
screen for 1000 ms before the start of the next trial. 
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2.1.3 Results 
The number of correct responses to test presentations for each lag was 
divided by 27 (the number of test trials), to obtain the hit rate, or proportion of 
correct responses. False alarm rates for each participant were calculated by 
dividing the number of false alarms (‘old’ responses to novel stimuli) by the 
number of scored study trials. From these measures d’, the signal detection 
measure of sensitivity, could be calculated for recognition at each lag. The d’ 
score is independent of the participant’s bias for answering ‘old’. 
Recognition scores for the colour and greyscale pictures were compared 
using a 2 (colour vs. greyscale) x 6 (lag) mixed design analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). No significant difference between the two conditions was observed, 
and the data for both greyscale and colour pictures were included in further 
analyses as a single ‘pictures’ condition.  
2.1.3.1 D-prime scores 
The results for probability of recognition are shown in Figure 2.7. A 4 
(stimulus type) x 6 (lag) mixed ANOVA was performed on d’ data. Mauchly’s test 
for sphericity was significant for lag, and Greenhouse-Geisser epsilon corrected 
ANOVA results are reported for this factor. The ANOVA revealed a significant 
main effect of stimulus type (F(3,20)=118, MSe=2.12, p<0.001). As expected, 
participants found some classes of stimulus easier to recognise than others. 
Tukey HSD post-hoc tests revealed significant differences between pictures and 
all other stimulus types (all p<0.001), and between trigrams and all other stimulus 
types (all p<0.001) but not between faces and fractals. Picture stimuli were more 
accurately recognised than the three other classes of stimuli, and recognition of 
trigrams was significantly poorer.  
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A significant main effect of lag was also revealed (F(4.12, 161)=99.2, 
MSe=0.288, p<0.001). Tukey’s post-hoc tests were carried out to reveal that 
recognition at lag 0 was significantly better than at all greater lags (all p<0.001), 
recognition at lag 1 was better than at lags 4, 6 and 9 (all p<0.001), recognition at 
lag 2 was better than at lags 6 (p<0.01) and 9 (p<0.001), and that recognition at 
lag 4 was better than at lag 9 (p<0.01).  
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Figure 2.7: d’ as a function of lag. Data = mean ± SEM. 
There was a significant interaction between the stimulus type and lag 
(F(15, 807)=12.3, p<0.001 ), indicating that the effect of lag differed according to 
the stimulus set being recognised. Tukey’s tests revealed that, whilst d’ was 
significantly greater when there were no stimuli intervening between study and 
test (lag 0) for all stimulus types, further increases of lag did not affect retention of 
the picture stimuli. This differed from the pattern seen for other stimulus types 
where significant decline of d’ was observed between lags 1 and 9 (faces, fractals 
and trigrams: p<0.01), and between lags 2 and 9 (faces and trigrams: p<0.001). 
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Differences were also observed between lags 1 and 4 (p<0.01), lags 1 and 6 
(p<0.001) , lags 2 and 4 (p<0.05), and lags 2 and 6 (p<0.001) in the trigrams 
condition. It appeared that increasing lag had little effect on recognition of 
pictures, but resulted in a large and progressive decline in performance for 
recognition of trigrams. Face and fractal retention curves were similar in form, but 
shallower.  
2.1.3.2 False alarm rates 
False alarm rates were analysed in order to make inferences about how 
difficult discrimination between individual items within sets was. The more difficult 
stimuli were for participants to tell apart, the higher the number of false alarms 
they would be expected to make. The effect of stimulus type on false alarm rates 
(see Figure 2.8) was compared using a one-way ANOVA, and a significant main 
effect was revealed (F(3,196)=59.3, MSe=0.012, p<0.001). Tukey’s post-hoc 
tests revealed that participants recognising pictures made significantly fewer false 
alarms than those recognising all other stimulus types (p<0.001), and that 
participants recognising trigrams made significantly more false alarms than those 
recognising all other stimulus types (p<0.001). False alarm rates for faces and 
fractals were not significantly different. 
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Figure 2.8: False alarm rates associated with recognition of different stimuli. Data = 
mean ± SEM. 
2.1.3.3 Reaction times 
The reaction time data for hits across the four conditions is shown in 
Figure 2.9. Mauchly’s test of sphericity was significant for lag, and Greenhouse-
Geisser epsilon corrected results are reported below. A similar 4 x 6 ANOVA to 
that described for d’ data was carried out on these data, and revealed a 
significant main effect of stimulus type (F(3,196)=3.90, MSe=105000, p<0.05). 
Tukey’s post-hoc analysis revealed significant differences between pictures and 
faces (p<0.05), and between pictures and fractals (p<0.05) but not between any 
other groups. Pictures were recognised faster than the faces and fractals. Once 
again, a significant main effect of lag was revealed (F(4.56, 161)=90.5, 
MSe=21400, p<0.001). Post-hoc Tukey’s tests revealed significantly faster 
reaction times for hits at lag 0 than all other lags (p<0.001). There were also 
faster reaction times at lag 1 than lag 4 (p<0.05), 6, and 9 (p<0.001), and at lag 2 
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compared with lags 6 (p<0.01) and lag 9 (p<0.05). The interaction between 
stimulus type and lag was significant (F(13.7, 893)=3.54, p<0.001). Tukey’s post-
hoc tests revealed significantly faster reaction times at lag 0 than all other lags for 
all stimuli, faster reaction times at lag 1 compared with lag 6 and 9 for faces 
(p<0.05) and trigrams (p<0.01, p<0.05), and at lag 2 compared with lag 6 for 
trigrams only (0.05). Whilst recognition latency was significantly slower when 
stimuli intervened between study and test for all stimuli, further significant 
increases in reaction time with increasing lag were only incurred for recognition of 
certain stimuli (faces and trigrams). 
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Figure 2.9: Reaction times for correct recognition (ms) as a function of lag. Data = mean 
± SEM. 
 
2.1.3.4 Hit and false alarm rates by epoch 
Whilst the overall performance of participants during the experiment are of 
interest, inferences about stimulus sets can be made from analysing changes in 
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the hit (p(hit)) and false alarm (p(false)) rates during the course of the 
experiment. It is possible to determine when (or if) these rates reach a ‘steady 
state’, and whether there are differences between different types of stimulus. By 
dividing data into epochs of 10 consecutive trials, a p(hit) and p(false) for each 
epoch was determined. These data are shown in Figure 2.10 and Figure 2.12, 
respectively. What is clear from these graphs is that both p(hit) and p(false) were 
low at the start of the experiment, and then rose to reach stable levels during the 
course of the experiment. The rate at which these changes occurred appeared to 
differ between stimulus types. To further explore these phenomena the p(hit) data 
for the first 10 epochs (see Figure 2.11) were compared in a 4 (stimulus type) x 
10 (epoch) ANOVA. Mauchly’s test of sphericity was significant and Greenhouse-
Geisser epsilon corrected data are reported. A significant effect of stimulus type 
was found (F(3,193)=53.6, MSe=0.071, p<0.001) with Tukey’s post-hoc tests 
revealing significantly higher p(hit) values for pictures than all other stimuli during 
this period (p<0.001). Values for faces were also greater than those for fractals 
(p<0.05). An effect of epoch was also found (F(6.87,133)=16.1, MSe=0.053, 
p<0.001) and there was a significant interaction between epoch and stimulus 
type (F(20.6,133)=2.63, MSe=0.053, p<0.001). Using Tukey’s post-hoc tests it 
was determined that p(hit) reached a stable level (defined as being the first epoch 
for which significant differences between p(hit) at that epoch at later epochs were 
not found) at epoch 3 for faces, epoch 4 for trigrams, and epoch 5 for fractals. It 
was stable from the start of the experiment for pictures. 
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Figure 2.10: Hit rate variability during the course of the experiment. Hit rate was 
calculated for 10 trial epochs. Data = mean ± SEM. 
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Figure 2.11: Hit rate data for the first 10 epochs. Data = mean ± SEM. 
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False alarm rate data was put into a similar 4 x 10 ANOVA as that 
described for the p(hit) data above (see Figure 2.13). Mauchly’s test of sphericity 
was significant, and Greenhouse-Geisser epsilon corrected degrees of freedom 
are reported. Stimulus type was significant (F(3,179)=75.9, MSe=0.101, 
p<0.001), and Tukey’s post-hoc analysis revealed significant differences between 
all stimulus types (all p<0.001, except faces vs. fractals, p<0.01). Trigram p(false) 
values were the highest, followed by faces, fractals, and pictures respectively. 
Epoch was significant (F(6.89,123)=19.2, MSe=0.057, p<0.001) as was the 
interaction between stimulus type and epoch (F(20.7,123)=3.37, p<0.001). In a 
similar manner as described above for p(hit), stabilisation of p(false) was 
determined to occur at epoch 3 for trigrams, and epoch 5 for faces and fractals. 
Again, values were stable for pictures throughout this period. 
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Figure 2.12: False alarm rate variability during the course of the experiment. False alarm 
rate was calculated for 10 trial epochs. Data = mean ± SEM. 
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Figure 2.13: False alarm rate data for the first 10 epochs. Data = mean ± SEM. 
2.1.3.5 Summary 
To summarise, the results can broadly be said to divide the stimuli into 
three classes, based on participants’ ability to recognise them. Recognition of 
pictures was far superior to that for all other stimuli, on all measures reported (d’, 
reaction times, hit rates and false alarm rates). Trigram recognition was worse in 
terms of accuracy (d’), although was no slower than that of faces and fractals. 
False recognition of the trigrams was very high. Faces and fractals were largely 
indistinguishable, although hit rate data from the early part of the experiment 
suggest that it took participants’ longer to achieve a stable hit rate with the fractal 
stimuli than any other stimulus type.  
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2.1.4 Discussion 
The results clearly demonstrate that the manipulation of the stimulus set 
had marked effects on recognition. The most robust of these effects was the clear 
superiority of participants’ recognition for picture stimuli compared to that for all 
other stimulus sets. Pictures were recognised more accurately and rapidly than 
other stimulus types, and were associated with very low false alarm rates. No 
differences on any of these measures were observed between recognition of 
faces and recognition of fractals, but recognition of trigrams was less accurate, 
apparently as a result of a greater false alarm rate as opposed to a reduced hit 
rate. Whilst no detailed curve fitting was carried out for these data1, the statistical 
and graphical comparisons of different stimulus types at different lags reveal that 
the retention curves asymptoted at different points for different stimuli. Stimuli 
that were less accurately recognised overall were also associated with retention 
curves that asymptoted at higher lags.  
The differences in performance that were observed must be attributable to 
some aspects of the composition of the stimulus sets. Indeed the picture set was 
composed in a manner that was very different to the others. Whereas stimuli in 
                                               
1
 Although it would be possible to fit an arbitrary function to the data relating recognition 
performance (e.g. d’) to lag this was not done for a number of reasons. Firstly, although 
previous studies (e.g. Rubin et al., 1999) have shown that performance on continuous 
recognition memory experiments may be reasonably well described by a function 
composed of a series of exponentials, its psychological validity in terms of the underlying 
memory process(es) involved is currently indeterminate. Secondly, without an established 
a priori reason for preferring one permitted function over another, caution must be 
expressed when deciding, meaningfully, what is the best fitting function to a set of data, 
especially when the candidate functions are permitted to differ in terms of the number of 
free parameters available. All else being equal, more free parameters will inevitably lead 
to better fits. Indeed, the best fitting curve of Rubin et al. (1999) has a relatively large 
number (6) of free parameters, when compared with the number of lag values used in the 
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the other sets were relatively homogeneous and differed only in their features, 
stimuli in the pictures set differed from each other in two different ways, requiring 
two different types of discrimination. Within-category discriminations, between 
two different stimuli from the same category (e.g. two oranges), would be 
assumed to rely on similar processes to those required for the discrimination of 
two faces or two fractals, whereas cross-category discriminations (e.g. an orange 
and a dog) do not require such subtle abilities. Two items from different 
categories can be discriminated by verbal label, perhaps supplemented by visual 
discrimination of gross physical differences. The interference generated by stimuli 
intervening between the learning and test presentations is likely to be 
considerably less if these stimuli are from different categories, than if they are 
different items from the same category. Bearing in mind that within the total set of 
200 pictures, pictures from 20 different categories were represented, a simple 
calculation (200/20) reveals that items from each category occurred once every 
10 stimuli on average. In an experiment where the longest lag was 10, in an 
average run of 10 presentations the number of within-category discriminations 
required would be less than 1. 
Recognition of the pictures set and recognition of the faces and fractals 
sets can be considered to be mediated by two different cognitive processes. 
Recognition of specific items from others of the same category (as was the case 
for faces and fractals), is different to the participants’ ability to categorise (as 
seen for the pictures condition). As Goldstein and Chance (1970) argued, in 
criticism of Shepard’s (1967) and Nickerson’s (1968) studies of picture 
recognition, participants’ ability to recognise pictorial and other visual stimuli 
cannot be assessed where these items vary widely within a set (as they also did 
                                                                                                                                
present study, and thus it would be surprising if it did not fit the recognition memory data 
well. The usefulness of such a function in the present context may be limited. 
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in the picture set featured in this study). The experimenter cannot tell whether the 
recognition of items within such sets is reliant on semantic factors, such as the 
gist of a scene, or is due to faithful memorisation of an item’s visual 
representation. The difference between categorisation and ‘true’ recognition is 
revealed in the fact that the retention curve for the pictures appeared to be only 
minimally affected by lag. Apart from a difference between immediate recognition 
(lag 0) and delayed recognition (lags greater than 0) no further differences to 
either the d’ or reaction time data were observed. Also, whilst there appeared to 
be some learning of the other stimuli categories during the first 40-60 trials, as 
observed in an increasing hit rate, no such learning was observed for pictures. 
Likewise, no build up of interference, as inferred from the increase in false alarm 
rates at the start of the experiment, was found for picture stimuli, although it was 
observed for the other classes of stimuli. These results suggest that 
discrimination between the pictures, probably on the basis of basic level naming, 
was already optimal, and was not improved by experience.  
A previous study investigating both cross- and within-category 
discrimination of colours and facial expressions (Roberson & Davidoff, 2000), 
examined the effect of both verbal and visual interference between the study and 
test phases of a 2 alternative forced choice procedure. Participants were 
tachistoscopically presented with target stimuli followed by a delay of 5 or 10 
seconds, and were then asked to choose which of two test stimuli matched the 
target. During the delay, participants were presented with either a blank card 
(control), a multicoloured dot pattern or face-like features (visual interference), or 
a list of nonbasic colour words or adjectives relating to emotional expressions 
(verbal interference). The most important finding of the study was that verbal 
interference selectively affected cross-category discriminations. Visual 
interference produced the same decrement on both within- and cross-category 
judgements. These findings provide a useful insight into the possible basis of the 
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recognition advantage for cross-category discriminations, suggesting that it is 
entirely reliant on verbal processes. Visual discrimination was shown by the study 
to play some part in both types of discrimination, but whether the discrimination 
was categorical or not had no effect on the decrement in recognition caused by 
visual interference. One should be careful in applying these findings to the 
current results, as the stimuli employed here were considerably more visually 
complex than dot patterns, but the effect of naming is of undoubted important for 
discriminating between items from different categories.  
Roberson and Davidoff suggested that the greater accuracy of recognition 
they observed for cross-category discriminations was due to implicit naming on 
the part of the participants. Implicit naming is the term given to the propensity for 
humans to automatically name items where this is possible, and has been 
proposed to account for the finding that memory span for pictures of objects does 
not exceed that for their labels (Schiano & Watkins, 1981). Naming is proposed 
by Paivio (1989) to be initiated by object recognition, which leads to referential 
processing whereby activation of verbal representations connected to the 
appropriate imagen (nonverbal representation of the object) occurs. The most 
appropriate verbal representation (logogen) (i.e. the one that exceeds the 
threshold of activation first) is selected to name the item. This dual coding theory 
therefore proposes two systems of cognitive representations, logogens and 
imagens, which are connected by association, and that naming is the process 
whereby an imagen activates the most strongly associated logogen.  
In the current study, recognition of the picture images could be considered 
to be most amenable to this process, as the different categories have commonly 
used labels at the basic level of generality (e.g. apple, dog, etc.) The faces and 
fractals could only be distinguished with much more complex verbal labels, with 
correspondingly more complex connections to the initial imagen. It can be 
reasonably assumed that, given the assumptions of the dual coding model, 
111 
implicit naming would have occurred most rapidly and with most certainty for 
items in the picture set where a single strong connection between the image of 
an item and the corresponding category label would have generated an 
unambiguous name. For trigrams, naming involved a longer more complex name 
(e.g. “three-X-two”), perhaps explaining why there was no reaction time 
advantage for correct recognition of these stimuli. The names generated for these 
items were also considerably more similar to one another, given that they were 
composed of different combinations of a limited set of component digits and 
letters. This may be the reason why trigram recognition gave rise to a much 
higher false alarm rate than other stimulus sets. As regards face and fractal 
recognition, it could be hypothesised that assigning names would have been 
useless in discriminating between the individual items and the naming process 
would take considerably longer in generating unique verbal labels. In this 
scenario a more efficient procedure would be to perform discrimination between 
the imagens themselves without ever relying on the referential process of 
naming. 
There is evidence from brain imaging studies to support the hypothesis 
that different neural systems are involved in the identification of familiar objects 
and unfamiliar, unnamed items. Verbal encoding and retrieval of items in memory 
tests has been associated with activation of prefrontal and medial temporal 
regions of the left cerebral hemisphere, whereas nonverbal encoding and 
retrieval is associated with analogous regions in the right hemisphere (Kelley et 
al., 1998; J. J. Kim et al., 1999; A. C. H. Lee, Robbins, Pickard, & Owen, 2000; 
McDermott, Buckner, Peterson, Kelley, & Sanders, 1999; Wagner, Desmond, 
Glover, & Gabrieli, 1998), although quite often bilateral activation is found and 
has been explained with reference to dual coding theory. A recent PET study of 
object and face recognition (Simons, Graham, Owen, Patterson, & Hodges, 
2001) found that recognition of familiar items was associated with activation of 
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left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (associated with verbal memory), whereas 
unfamiliar item recognition caused activation of occipital regions, associated with 
visual perception, most marked in the right hemisphere. These data provide 
strong evidence that familiar items are memorised by association with verbal 
labels, otherwise a process of perceptual discrimination occurs. Given this 
increasing utilisation of brain areas associated with verbal material for recognition 
as items become more familiar, it can be suggested that naming is a more 
efficient process for discrimination than visual discrimination. This would also 
account for the findings of this study – that nameable items are remembered 
more accurately and rapidly than unnameable items. 
An alternative explanation for the finding that the picture stimuli were 
easier to recognise than the other types of stimuli, is that, due to the greater 
variation in visually detectable features present in this heterogeneous set, such 
as the shape and configuration of elements within the image, perceptual 
representations of pictures were more distinct from one another. Murdock (1960) 
defined the distinctiveness of a given stimulus as the extent to which it “stands 
out” relative to others within a set. Whilst the phenomenon was initially studied for 
cases where a few ‘distinctive’ items were recognised considerably better than 
the majority of ‘typical’ items within a set, more recent attempts to map 
distinctiveness to co-ordinates in multidimensional similarity space (e.g. Busey & 
Tunnicliff, 1999) demonstrate the possibility of defining distinctive and typical 
sets. Sets where the stimuli are much less constrained (such as the pictures) can 
be considered as having a high average distinctiveness between pairs of stimuli, 
whereas sets of stimuli generated with highly constrained parameters (such as 
the faces) give rise to stimuli that are very similar and less visually distinctive. 
Busey and Tunnicliff found that items defined as distinctive in terms of their 
position in multidimensional similiarity space, were associated with higher hit 
rates and lower false alarms in tests of recognition, and this is a similar profile to 
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that seen for pictures in this study. However, given the finding of Roberson and 
Davidoff (2000) that visual interference causes a comparable decrement to 
measures of recognition in both within- and cross-category discriminations, it 
would appear that distinctiveness does not facilitate visual discrimination per se, 
but may make an item easier to label verbally. Indeed, this is borne out by the 
findings of Busey and Tunnicliff who noted that items distinct in multidimensional 
similarity space were also more likely to have qualitatively different features to 
other more typical faces (e.g. beards), allowing differential classification.  
The question that remains is why discrimination of verbal labels is more 
accurate and faster than visual discrimination. It would appear to contradict 
intuition about the visual system and the order in which visual stimuli are 
processed. Information entering the human visual system passes through stages 
of elemental feature recognition in areas concerned with visual perception in the 
occipital cortex, before objects are recognised by networks of cells in the 
inferotemporal (IT) cortex. These stages can be thought of as encompassing the 
initial ‘object recognition’ stage of naming proposed in the dual encoding model 
(Paivio, 1986), through the production of object perception. Once this is achieved, 
information about object identity can be linked with verbal labels in other brain 
regions. Why is it, then, that naming, and the discrimination of names, can occur 
so much more rapidly than visual discrimination of the perceived object from 
others in memory? 
Some light may be shed on the question by authors investigating a rather 
different phenomenon – perceptual learning (Ahissar & Hochstein, 2002). These 
authors proposed that learning begins at higher levels in the perceptual 
hierarchy, and progresses downwards in reverse to the visual process. Higher 
levels, such as populations of neurones involved in categorisation and 
recognition (e.g. IT cortex), are the default location for learning because these 
are tuned to global entities, including objects, rather than local features, and can 
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generalise over the spatial dimensions of stimuli. These neuronal populations 
provide the information necessary for the performance of simple visual 
discriminations. However, where more specific spatial discriminations are 
required populations of neurones at lower levels in the visual system are better 
suited for the task. Ahissar and Hochstein propose a search tree seeking the best 
neuronal population to yield the best signal:noise ratio according to the task 
demands, starting at high levels and continuing down through the hierarchy.  
Whilst the task demands required of participants in the current study are 
unlikely to have involved perceptual learning of the kind studied by Ahissar and 
Hochstein, it seems possible that a similar reverse hierarchy may be operating. 
Once visual processing has led to perception of the stimulus, higher level 
cognitive processes may then begin to compare the item to others in memory. If 
the high-level visual representation outputted by the visual system is sufficient to 
discriminate it from objects from other categories the task may be completed. 
Otherwise, a search process may commence looking for lower levels of visual 
representation to distinguish the specific visual features of the object from others 
of the same class, taking correspondingly longer to generate a response.  
Whether the recognition advantage for pictures is due to verbal labelling 
of the stimuli or simply faster and more accurate visual discrimination, it has been 
hypothesised that the form of memory retention is the same for recognition of 
both verbal and visual stimuli. The findings of Ward et al. (2005) using lists of 
stimuli in a 2-alternative forced choice memory task, and those of Doty and 
Savakis (1997) with continuous recognition, support this theory. Ward and 
colleagues (2005) compared recognition for unfamiliar faces and nonwords and 
found similar profiles, with limited recency and no primacy. Doty and Savakis 
(1997) compared the recognition of common words and random abstract stimuli 
during continuous recognition, and found evidence that, whilst recognition of the 
words was more accurate, the shape of the retention curves were similar (see 
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Figure 1.5). Whether the better recognition profile observed for pictures here was 
the result of a switch to simple verbal coding, or of the detection of more salient 
visual features, the result might have been the same. Only further 
experimentation will shed light on how categories are encoded for pictures. 
Whilst the discussion thus far has focussed on the overall distinctions 
between stimulus types, averaged across the whole experiment, sorting the data 
into epochs allowed the examination of changes during the course of the 
experiment. Interestingly, whilst initial increases in p(false) were observed during 
the first 100 trials, after this p(false) stabilised at a roughly steady state. This is 
different to the observation of Shepard and Teghtsoonian (1961) that p(false) was 
still increasing after several hundred trials. There were also differences between 
stimulus types in how quickly this occurred. These increases are presumed to be 
the result of a build-up of proactive interference from stimuli in previous trials. 
Perhaps the differences between the current data and those of Shepard and 
Teghtsoonian can be attributed to the nature of the stimuli employed. Whilst their 
three digit number stimuli were similar to the trigrams used here, there would 
appear to be yet more interstimulus similarity between items in their set than in 
the trigrams used in the present study. This might be expected to result in a 
considerably longer period before a steady state could be achieved, as was the 
case in their experiment. Amongst the stimuli used in the current experiment, a 
steady state of interference appeared to be reached during epoch 3 for trigrams, 
and then by faces and fractals during epoch 5. There appeared to be no build-up 
of interference at all for pictures. These findings are similar to those concerning 
changes in p(hit) during the first 10 epochs. Again, whilst there was no systematic 
change in p(hit) during this period for the pictures, increases in p(hit) stabilised at 
epoch 3 for faces, 4 for trigrams, and 5 for fractals; a similar pattern to that found 
for p(false). The findings indicate that for faces, fractals and trigrams, there is a 
period during which participants learn to optimally discriminate the stimuli. The 
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fact that this does not occur for pictures indicates that it is not the result of 
learning how to carry out the task, but is the result of learning about the stimuli 
themselves. The differences between stimulus types can be explained with 
reference to participants’ familiarity with discriminating them. Whilst the pictures 
were of common objects that participants were likely to have already been highly 
familiar with, the other stimuli were not likely to have been familiar to participants. 
This might explain not just the differences in learning to discriminate the stimuli, 
but also the differences in the level of interference caused by stimuli. Because 
faces, fractals and trigrams were initially novel, individual items may have 
seemed more distinctive at the start of the experiment than they did once 
participants became familiar with these stimulus types. Conversely, because the 
category of objects was constantly changing for participants in the pictures 
condition, novelty would have been maintained, to some extent, throughout the 
experiment.  
In conclusion, the significantly more accurate and faster recognition of 
stimuli from the pictures set is likely to be attributable to the relative ease with 
which participants discriminate between categories as opposed to individual 
exemplars of a single category. Such categorisation, whether related to verbal 
labelling or not, was not feasible when comparing faces or fractals that varied 
only in the dimensions of their local features. The recognition of trigrams was 
seriously hindered by a higher rate of false recognition than observed for 
recognition of the other sets, and this was assumed to be due to the much 
greater interitem similarity for this set. An important question that remains to be 
answered, is whether or not pictures of cartoon objects are recognised better 
than faces and fractals even when selected from the same category. In order to 
test this, a future experiment could include a condition in which all of the pictorial 
stimuli are drawn from a single basic level category. This would be an excellent 
way of testing whether restricting the category from which recognised objects are 
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drawn has any effect on the recognition of those items. In addition, the 
suggestion that interitem similarity had a significant effect on recognition of 
trigrams leads to the question of exactly what factors affect recognition in this 
paradigm. The current results suggest that an interference- or distinctiveness-
based account might be most appropriate, although the effect of decay is yet to 
be tested. 
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2.2 Experiment 2: The recognition advantage for pictures is not 
solely the result of cross-category discriminations 
2.2.1 Introduction 
In Experiment 1, a robust recognition advantage for a set of picture stimuli 
over face-like, fractal, and trigram stimuli was observed. Recognition accuracy 
and speed were considerably superior for this set. The set was composed of 
clipart images selected from a number of different basic level categories (e.g. 
apples, umbrellas, animals) in such a manner that it was highly probable that all 
stimuli in a retention period would be drawn from different categories. This was 
different from the other stimulus sets used, which were composed of stimuli that 
all had a similar configuration but differed in their features. As such it was not 
possible to definitively state whether the advantage was a result of this different 
set composition, or whether it was due to the nature of the stimuli themselves. 
Was better recognition the result of an ability to rely on basic level category 
naming or the visual distinctiveness of items from different categories, or was it 
that images of familiar objects were better recognised than abstract images? 
Whilst, in discussing the results of Experiment 1, evidence implicating the 
role of verbal naming and visual distinctiveness in determining recognition 
performance was heavily drawn upon, there is also a substantial literature 
suggesting that prior familiarity with a class of objects improves the ability to 
discriminate them. A general finding from the literature on such perceptual 
learning, is that stimuli that were previously psychologically “fused” can become 
differentiated with repeated exposure (Goldstone, 1998). Tarr and Gauthier 
(1998) found that familiarity with several members of a class of objects 
generalised to other objects of the same class, in a viewpoint-dependent manner. 
In other words, increased exposure to members of a class of objects results in 
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learning about other objects from the same class. In the neurophysiological 
literature, Rainer and Miller (2000) have found evidence that monkey prefrontal 
cortex neurones that were responsive to visual objects became more finely tuned 
and resistant to image degradation with experience. A similar sharpening of 
tuning for IT neurones in monkeys was found to occur to a greater extent for 
diagnostic than non-diagnostic features learned during a categorisation task 
(Sigala & Logothetis, 2002). These results suggest that experience results in a 
heightened ability to discriminate between members of a category of objects. 
Indeed, Tarr and Gauthier suggest that the human ability to discriminate very 
perceptually similar faces is the result of our expertise with these stimuli, gained 
through repeated exposure to this category of objects. Could better recognition of 
pictures in comparison to other classes of stimuli result from expertise with these 
objects, in comparison to a lack of expertise with novel visual stimuli like 
schematic face-like stimuli and fractals? 
In order to determine to what extent the advantage for recognition of 
pictures over other stimuli was the result of a reliance on categorical labels, the 
continuous recognition paradigm used in Experiment 1 was replicated with a set 
of picture stimuli drawn entirely from the ‘birds’2 category. This made impossible 
the reliance of participants on basic-level verbal labels for the discrimination of 
items, and allowed the comparison of recognition of a class of familiar visual 
stimuli (pictures of different kinds of birds) with recognition of unfamiliar classes 
of visual stimuli (faces and fractals). It also made possible the comparison of 
                                               
2
 Birds are popular with certain experimenters (e.g. Grill-Spector & Kanwisher, 2005; 
Rhodes & McLean, 1990), as an example of a relatively homogenous class of living 
objects, with which most humans have only limited expertise. They were also chosen for 
practical reasons, as the clipart collections from which we drew stimuli contained large 
numbers of bird pictures drawn from a similar viewpoint. 
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recognition of pictures from different categories (the pictures set from Experiment 
1) with recognition of pictures from within a single category (the new birds set).  
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2.2.2 Methods 
2.2.2.1 Participants 
All of the 25 participants were students at the University of Nottingham, of 
which 16 were female and 9 male. The mean age of participants was 23 years. 
Inclusion criteria were the same as those for Experiment 1, and all participants 
met these criteria. The mean number of ‘no responses’ was 4.16, the mean 
probability of recognition for lags 0 and 1 combined was 0.91 (SD=0.08), and the 
mean false alarm rate was 0.22 (SD=0.09).  
2.2.2.2 Stimuli 
The pictures consisted of 200 unique clipart images of birds, converted to 
greyscale in order to make them more homogeneous. Examples are given in 
Figure 2.14.  
 
Figure 2.14: Example bird stimuli. 
2.2.2.3 Presentation, design, procedure and scoring 
All stimuli were presented using the same hardware and software 
described for Experiment 1. Stimuli were presented in the centre of the screen 
using Matlab v5.2.1 (Mathworks UK), running the psychophysics toolbox. All 
images were converted to the same standard size of 59 x 59 pixels, as described 
previously. Session design, procedure, and scoring were all the same as 
described in the Methods section of Experiment 1. 
122 
2.2.3 Results 
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 Figure 2.15: d’ as a function of lag for birds and stimuli from Experiment 1. Data = mean 
± SEM. 
2.2.3.1 D-prime scores 
The d’ results for recognition of birds are shown alongside the results of 
Experiment 1 in  Figure 2.15. Mauchly’s test for sphericity was significant for lag, 
so Greenhouse-Geisser epsilon corrected ANOVA results are reported for this 
factor. A 5 (stimulus type) x 6 (lag) mixed ANOVA was performed on d’ data from 
the birds set, and the 4 data sets from Experiment 1, and revealed a significant 
main effect of stimulus type (F(4,220)=85.5, MSe=2.20, p<0.001). Tukey HSD 
post-hoc tests revealed that birds were recognised more accurately than faces 
(p<0.01) and trigrams (p<0.001), but less accurately than the pictures (p<0.001). 
A significant main effect of lag was also revealed (F(4.15, 913)=239, MSe=0.284, 
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p<0.001) and there was a significant interaction between stimulus type and lag 
(F(16.6, 913)=4.17, p<0.001 ). Tukey tests revealed that, for bird stimuli d’ scores 
were greater at lag 0 than all other lags (p<0.001), at lag 1 than lag 9 (p<0.01), at 
lag 2 than lag 9 (p<0.01), and at lag 4 than lag 9 (p<0.05). 
2.2.3.2 False alarm rates 
The mean false alarm rate for birds was 0.220±0.094, and false alarm 
rate data were compared with data from Experiment 1 using a one-way ANOVA. 
A significant main effect was revealed (F(4,220)=46.1, MSe=0.009, p<0.001). 
Tukey’s post-hoc tests revealed that recognition of birds was associated with 
greater false alarm rates than pictures (p<0.001), and lower false alarm rates 
than trigrams (p<0.001), in a similar pattern to the results observed for faces and 
fractals. 
2.2.3.3 Reaction times 
The reaction time data for correct recognition of birds accompanied by 
data from Experiment 1 is shown in Figure 2.16. Mauchly’s test of sphericity was 
significant for lag, and Greenhouse-Geisser epsilon corrected results are 
reported below. A similar 5 x 6 ANOVA to that described for the d’ data was 
carried out on these data, and revealed a significant main effect of stimulus type 
(F(4,220)=2.93, MSe=109000 p<0.05). Tukey post-hoc analysis failed to reveal 
any significant differences between birds and other stimulus types. Lag was 
significant (F(4.56,1000)=110, MSe=4570, p<0.001), and post-hoc Tukey tests 
revealed the same differences between lags as those found in analysis of the 
data from Experiment 1 alone. The interaction between stimulus type and lag was 
also significant (F(18.2,1000)=3.02, p<0.001) and Tukey post-hoc tests revealed 
significantly faster reaction times for recognition of birds at lag 0 than all other 
lags (p<0.001), as was observed for fractals and pictures. This was different to 
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the pattern for faces and trigrams, which were associated with differences 
between reaction times at greater lags. 
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Figure 2.16: Reaction times for correct recognition (ms) as a function of lag for birds, with 
data from Experiment 1 for comparison. Data = mean ± SEM. 
2.2.3.4 Hit and false alarm rates by epoch 
Comparison of p(hit) and p(false) for birds by epoch (as described for 
Experiment 1) was carried out, and the data for the first 10 epochs are shown in 
Figure 2.17 and Figure 2.18 respectively. The p(hit) data for this period were 
compared in a 5 (stimulus type) x 10 (epoch) ANOVA. Mauchly’s test of sphericity 
was significant for epoch and Greenhouse-Geisser epsilon corrected data are 
reported. A significant effect of stimulus type was found (F(4,220)=32.7, 
MSe=0.0764, p<0.001) with Tukey’s post-hoc tests revealing significantly higher 
p(hit) values for birds than fractals (p<0.001) and trigrams (p<0.01), and lower 
values than pictures (p<0.001). A main effect of epoch was also found 
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(F(6.94,1500)=13.8, MSe=0.0518, p<0.001) and there was a significant 
interaction between epoch and stimulus type (F(27.8,1500)=2.39, MSe=0.0518, 
p<0.001). Using Tukey’s post-hoc tests it was determined that p(hit) for birds did 
not significantly differ across these first 10 epochs, in a similar manner to the 
pattern observed for the pictures condition in Experiment 1. 
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Figure 2.17: Hit rate data for birds for the first 10 epochs, compared with similar data 
from Experiment 1. Data = mean ± SEM. 
False alarm rate data were analysed using a similar 5 x 10 ANOVA as 
that described for p(hit) data above. Mauchly’s test of sphericity was significant 
for epoch, and Greenhouse-Geisser epsilon corrected degrees of freedom are 
reported. The main effect of stimulus type was significant (F(4,220)=53.5, 
MSe=0.0967, p<0.001), and Tukey’s post-hoc analysis revealed significantly 
greater false alarm rates for birds compared with pictures (p<0.001) and lower 
false alarm rates compared with trigrams (p<0.001). The main effect of epoch 
was significant (F(7.12,1410)=16.8, MSe=0.0561, p<0.001) as was the 
interaction between stimulus type and epoch (F(28.5,1410)=2.65, MSe=0.0561, 
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p<0.001). Post-hoc tests demonstrated that whilst p(false) for birds was 
significantly lower at epoch 1 compared with epoch 9 (p<0.05), no other 
differences were found for these stimuli. This was similar to the effect of epoch on 
false alarm rates to fractals and pictures, but different from the pattern for faces 
and trigrams, where significant differences were found at greater lags as well. As 
with the lack of change observed for p(hit), the relative lack of interference build-
up measured by p(false) across this period suggests that birds are similar to the 
pictures set for these measures. 
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Figure 2.18: False alarm rate data for birds for the first 10 epochs, in comparison to data 
from Experiment 1. Data = mean ± SEM. 
2.2.3.5 Summary 
The comparison of recognition of the new birds set of stimuli with that of 
previously defined sets suggests that the birds set shares some characteristics 
with faces and fractals, and some with pictures. Unlike the relatively flat d’ curve 
for pictures, the retention curve for birds continues to decrease at lags greater 
than 0, in a manner similar to those for other stimuli. However, whilst d’ scores for 
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birds were significantly lower than those for pictures, they were also significantly 
greater than the values for faces and trigrams, suggesting that there is a 
recognition advantage for birds over these stimuli. False alarm rates for birds 
were similar to those observed for faces and fractals, being significantly lower 
than those for picture recognition. However, analysis of p(hit) and p(false) during 
the first quarter of the experiment revealed no systematic effects of epoch on 
either measure for birds, whereas increases across early epochs were found for 
both measures with faces, fractals and trigrams. The lack of an effect related to 
epoch for birds is similar to that noted for picture stimuli in Experiment 1. 
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2.2.4 Discussion 
By taking images from one form of stimulus (clip art pictures) and 
including items of only one category (birds) it was possible to show that most of 
the recognition advantage that was observed for pictures in Experiment 1 was 
related to a reliance on cross-category discriminations. Once pictures were drawn 
from only one category to make a stimulus set, and recognition required 
discrimination between individual exemplars of this bird category, the false alarm 
rates observed were similar to those previously seen for faces and fractals. The 
speed of recognition was also significantly slower than that for pictures, and was 
indistinguishable from the reaction time profiles for faces, fractals and trigrams. 
These data are evidence that the discrimination of items from different categories 
can be achieved more rapidly, and with less interstimulus interference, than 
discrimination of similar items selected from the same category.  
The d’ values calculated for recognition of the birds were significantly 
lower than those calculated for pictures, providing further evidence that the cross-
category composition of the pictures set had a large effect in producing the 
recognition advantage for these stimuli. However, whilst d’ scores for birds were 
not statistically different from those of fractals, they were higher than those 
measured for faces, suggesting that discrimination of birds was better than 
discrimination of faces. This may seem surprising as both sets consisted of visual 
stimuli with a similar configuration whose features differed from item to item. 
However, there are two possible explanations for the difference. Firstly, there is 
the difference of familiarity. The faces were unfamiliar in the sense that they were 
not realistic representations of faces, being composed of face-like configurations 
of ellipses that were probably unlike anything the participants had seen before. 
The bird pictures, however, were realistic depictions of birds. It can be argued 
that the bird stimuli, despite their similarities, would have been more familiar to 
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participants than the face stimuli and that, as such, the participants had some 
expertise in their perception and discrimination. This is likely the result of some 
form of perceptual learning about stimuli and may be related to the reorganisation 
of higher visual perceptual and mnemonic areas with experience (C. A. Erickson, 
Jagadeesh, & Desimone, 2000; Rainer & Miller, 2000). In addition, participants 
might have used subordinate level categorisation of this familiar category to 
discriminate between certain individual birds (e.g. sparrow vs. blackbird). 
However, given that this familiarity-based explanation would also predict an 
advantage of bird recognition over fractal recognition, and no difference was 
found between these stimulus types, this explanation seems incomplete.  
The second possibility is that there was more variation in physical 
characteristics between the individual bird stimuli than there was between 
individual face stimuli. As the faces were generated algorithmically with 
constraints on the level of permitted variation, whereas the birds were simply 
selected from a set of pictures of a natural category with no such regularities, it 
can be assumed that there was greater variation between individual birds than 
individual faces. As such, birds would be expected to be more distinct from one 
another than faces, and would have been recognised with greater accuracy. This 
might also explain the lack of difference between d’ values for birds and fractals 
as, whilst fractals were also generated by computer algorithms with constraints 
on parameters, the nature of the algorithm meant that small variations in the 
parameters might lead to large variations in the outputted image. Whilst face 
parameters directly corresponded to feature dimensions, such as the height of a 
face or the width of an ‘eye’, fractal parameters corresponded to limits such as 
the maximum amount a line could ‘deflect’ (see the Methods section for 
Experiment 1 for more details about how these stimuli were generated). The net 
result of these differences was that fractal images could radically differ in their 
shape whilst faces retained the same basic shape throughout. Whilst this 
130 
difference was not enough to generate significant differences in participants’ 
ability to distinguish between faces and fractals, it may have been enough to 
make fractal recognition indistinguishable from bird recognition. The mean d’ 
scores show a pattern in which fractal d’ scores generally fall between the scores 
for birds and faces.  
However, this explanation of difference is hard to square with the false 
alarm data, that show statistically similar scores for all three stimulus types. If 
greater visual distinctiveness was the reason that bird stimuli were better 
recognised than faces one would expect to see this reflected in both higher hit 
rates and lower false alarm rates for the bird stimuli. However, whilst the mean 
false alarm rates for each stimulus type were not statistically distinguishable, the 
order of the mean values was what one would expect in that false alarm rates 
were lowest for birds, followed by fractals and then faces. As with the d’ scores, 
which did not show a dissociation between fractals and faces or fractals and 
birds, the differences are small and further research is needed to establish the 
reliability of this finding. It can certainly be concluded that, whilst small differences 
in recognition accuracy may be produced by these different stimuli, these pale in 
comparison to the much larger distinction between pictures and all other stimuli 
as a result of cross-category discrimination. 
Interestingly, the results that show birds to be most similar to pictures are 
the epoch-based analyses of hit and false alarm rates. Whilst there are periods 
for face, fractal and trigram stimuli where participants’ hit and false alarm rates 
increase significantly over the course of several epochs, this is not the case for 
either pictures or birds. In the discussion of the results of Experiment 1 it was 
suggested that the lack of interference and learning for the picture stimuli was the 
result of an already optimal perceptual representation of these familiar items. This 
would mean that participants could not learn to discriminate them any better than 
they were already doing. This result lends support to the familiarity-based 
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explanation for the superiority of bird recognition over other stimulus types. If 
these stimuli were more familiar to participants than the novel computer-
generated stimuli one would expect to see better discrimination of them 
accompanied by little to no learning during the course of the experiment, as was 
the case. 
Whilst this experiment has clearly demonstrated that the large differences 
between picture stimuli and all other stimulus types observed in Experiment 1 
were mainly the result of the cross-category composition of that set, it has also 
revealed important differences between recognition of pictures of familiar objects 
and recognition of artificial stimuli. Recognition was superior for the more familiar 
bird stimuli although it is unclear whether this was the result of an ability to use 
subordinate level verbal labels, or perceptual learning resulting in a better ability 
to visually discriminate between individual items. Indeed it may be the case that 
the bird stimulus set contained more interstimulus variety of physical 
characteristics than other sets as a result of its composition. Further experiments 
manipulating the physical similarity of stimuli resistant to naming are required, in 
order to determine the exact involvement of similarity in recognition performance.  
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3.1 Experiment 3: Separating decay and interference in continuous 
recognition 
3.1.1 Introduction 
Experiments 1 and 2 made extensive use of the continuous recognition 
paradigm and plotted conventional curves of recognition performance as a 
function of lag. Whilst lag nominally denotes the number of items intervening 
between study and test presentations, because trials are presented at a constant 
rate, the time between study and test is also proportional to lag. In explaining the 
results obtained it is not possible to distinguish between the effect of time and the 
effect of intervening stimuli. Traditional accounts of loss of information from 
memory utilise two concepts: decay and interference. Decay-based theories 
propose a loss that is directly related to the time elapsed since exposure to the 
material to be memorised, whereas interference theory proposes that forgetting is 
caused by interference from other information. In order to discriminate between 
the two, a continuous recognition experiment was carried out in which 
interstimulus interval was manipulated. 
The standard model of short-term memory (STM) is based upon the idea 
of activation, a mnemonic property that keeps information in an accessible form 
(Cowan, 2001; Shiffrin, 1999). Information may be activated from long-term 
stores to become accessible in STM. Two counter-acting processes are 
proposed to determine whether information is retained or forgotten: rehearsal and 
decay. The activated items are presumed to rapidly decay with time unless they 
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are consciously rehearsed. This rehearsal is sufficient to ‘refresh’ the memory, 
and counteract decay of activated information. 
Evidence for decay as the mechanism of forgetting from STM came from 
experiments which prevented rehearsal by requiring participants to count 
backwards, or read a list of digits, after presentation of material (lists of letters) to 
be retained (J. Brown, 1958; Peterson & Peterson, 1959). The finding that there 
was a rapid loss of information to be recalled, was considered striking because 
the distracting material (digits) was sufficiently different from the study material 
(letters) that interference could be considered to have been avoided (Wickens, 
Born, & Allen, 1963). The conclusion the authors arrived at was that, during the 
period that rehearsal had been prevented, the memory trace decayed over time. 
Support for this conclusion came from later findings that forgetting occurred in the 
absence of interference from previous trials (i.e. on the very first trial) when 
ceiling effects were avoided (A. D. Baddeley & Scott, 1971). It has been 
suggested that decay is an adaptation to the statistical structure of the 
environment (Anderson & Milson, 1989) as it allows “overwriting” of the memory 
with the most recent and relevant information about the individual’s environment.  
Some authors (e.g. Nairne, 2002), however, have dispensed with the 
rehearsal mechanism in their theories pointing to evidence that item-based 
differences in memory remain when rehearsal is blocked and articulation rates 
are held constant. For example, high-frequency words have a greater memory 
span than low-frequency words when the articulation rate is held constant 
(Roodenrys, Hulme, Alban, Ellis, & Brown, 1994), as do words over nonwords 
(Hulme, Maughan, & Brown, 1991), and concrete words over abstract words (I. 
Walker & Hulme, 1999). Theories relying solely on decay ignore the effects of the 
retrieval environment and the type of activity between study and retrieval. In 
contrast, many authors have attempted to create models of STM without 
appealing to the process of decay, explaining forgetting by the various forms of 
134 
interference that can occur (e.g. G. D. A. Brown & Hulme, 1995; G. D. A. Brown, 
Preece, & Hulme, 2000; Neath, 1993).  
The idea that the interference of existing memories with new information 
is responsible for forgetting has a long history dating back to the work of 
McGeoch (1932). Interference can be either proactive (when associations 
learned prior to current learning interfere with current learning) or retroactive 
(when associations learned after the learning of material to be retained interfere 
with that learning). Keppel and Underwood (1962) proposed that proactive 
interference could account for the findings of Peterson and Peterson (1959). 
Rather than the memory trace for study material decaying whilst the participants 
were engaged in the distractor task, Keppel and Underwood argued that 
forgetting occurred due to the build up of interference from previously learnt 
material. Waugh and Norman (1965) found that varying the rate of presentation in 
a list-based memory task had little effect compared to the serial position of an 
item, suggesting that time was not as important as the number of intervening, 
interfering items between study and test. However, whilst interference-based 
explanations for forgetting are attractive, it is advisable to bear in mind the fact 
that any putative effect of time can be explained by various combinations of 
retroactive and proactive interference (Cowan, 2001).  
Whilst interference and decay have historically been contrasted with one 
another as opposing explanations, a recent theory of Altmann and Gray (2002) 
combines decay- and interference-based explanations of forgetting. The 
functional decay model proposes that, when an attribute has to be constantly 
updated in memory, its value decays to prevent proactive interference. This rate 
of decay is theorised to adapt to the rate at which memory must be updated. 
Such a system would avoid memory becoming rapidly filled with items that would 
hinder recall of the most recent information (proactive interference). The authors 
found evidence for this in the gradual decline of performance on the current task 
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set in a task-switching experiment. This decline was attributed to memory decay. 
Single-digit number stimuli were presented, and participants were required to 
label them either as odd or even, or greater or less than 5. The less frequently 
the task was updated, the more gradual the decline in performance became, 
suggesting an adaptive rate of forgetting.  
Shepard and Teghtsoonian designed the continuous recognition paradigm 
with the intention of studying recognition under conditions in which “the possibility 
of rehearsal is minimized while the interference of preceding material is 
maximized” (Shepard & Teghtsoonian, 1961, p. 303, p. 303). Their aim was to 
create an experimental situation in which forgetting occurred at a constant rate, 
although their results demonstrate that the false alarm rate was still gradually 
increasing at the end of the experiment, suggesting that this steady state was 
never actually achieved. This continual increase in the false alarm rate suggested 
that memory stores became overloaded with previous stimuli, making novel 
stimuli progressively more difficult to distinguish from an increasingly large set in 
memory. However, this effect was not found in Experiments 1 and 2; rather the 
false alarm rate initially increased and then reached a plateau. This finding 
compliments the findings of other researchers (Doty & Savakis, 1997; Hockley, 
1982) who noted that reaction times for correct responses in a continuous 
recognition procedure did not increase as a function of list position.  
Whether or not overall list position of a stimulus affects old/new 
discrimination, a  universally reported effect is the effect of lag. For example, 
Hockley (1982) noted that correct reaction times decreased with increasing lag, 
and that the function was approximately logarithmic. Doty and Savakis (1997) 
have studied old/new discrimination of completely novel stimuli from items tested 
in continuous recognition 1 or 2 weeks previously. Participants carried out 
continuous recognition of one set of complex, abstract images on week 1 (mean 
d’=1.82), and a second on week 2 (mean d’=1.26). On week 3 they carried out a 
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similar continuous recognition experiment where half of the stimuli had been seen 
previously in either the first or second weeks. The effect was to greatly decrease 
discriminative ability to a mean d’ of 0.52. The same participants carried out a 
similar procedure with common 4-letter words on weeks 4 and 5 and the resulting 
decrease in mean d’ was from 2.97 to 0.89. Significant increases in reaction 
times were also observed. Nonetheless, the authors concluded that the “robust 
behavioral retention over a period of 1 week or more offers the likelihood that 
time per se is not critical” (Doty & Savakis, 1997, p. 292, p.292).  
To the author’s knowledge no study has attempted to dissociate the 
effects of number of intervening items and time under conditions of continuous 
recognition, with the same participants, within the same experimental session. In 
the current experiment the intertrial interval (the time elapsed between 
successive trials) varied systematically across three blocks of either “long” (8 
sec), “medium” (3.5 sec) or “short” (1.25 sec) values. Within each block the 
frequencies of lags were controlled. As such the effect of intertrial interval and 
number of intervening items could be separated.  
Most of the classic literature regarding forgetting is based on experiments 
using words and other verbalisable stimuli, and often refers to subvocal rehearsal 
as a mechanism for maintaining information (e.g. B. B. J. Murdock, 1961; 
Peterson & Peterson, 1959; Waugh & Norman, 1965). Given the assumption set 
out in Chapter 2 that certain visual stimuli (e.g. fractals) are not amenable to 
verbal labels, it was important to dissociate the effects of intertrial interval and 
number of intervening items for both verbalisable and non-verbalisable stimuli. 
Each participant, therefore, carried out two sessions: one where the stimuli were 
fractals and one where they were trigrams. 
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3.1.2 Methods 
3.1.2.1 Design 
The experiment had a three-way within subjects design. The independent 
variables were the type of stimulus tested, the time interval between successive 
stimuli (intertrial interval), and the number of intervening trials (lag). Stimulus type 
had 2 levels: fractals and trigrams. Intertrial interval had 3 levels: short (1.25 sec), 
medium (3.5 sec), and long (8 sec), giving total trial durations of 2.25 sec, 4.5 
sec, and 9 sec, respectively. Lag had 3 levels: 1, 4 and 9 intervening items. The 
dependent variables were the participants’ d’ scores, and reaction times for 
correct recognition. 
3.1.2.2 Participants 
A total of 21 participants were tested, of which 16 were female and 5 
male. All were students at the University of Nottingham with a mean age of 
20±0.3 years. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  
In order to exclude data from participants who ‘gave up’ on the tasks, 
during one or other of the relatively long 35 min sessions, criteria were set for 
inclusion of the data in analyses. Each participant’s data were entered into a one-
tailed chi square, to determine that the number of correct responses were 
significantly above that expected by chance.  
3.1.2.3 Stimuli 
Two different categories of stimulus were employed: fractals and trigrams. 
These stimulus sets were the same as those described in the Methods section of 
Experiment 1.  
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3.1.2.4 Presentation 
All stimuli were presented using an Apple Macintosh G3 computer 
(300Mhz, 384Mb RAM) with an ATI Radeon 7000 (32Mb) graphics card, on a 21” 
Mitsubishi colour display monitor (size: 1024 x 768 pixels, resolution: 72 x 72 dpi, 
refresh rate: 75Hz). Stimuli were presented in the centre of the screen using 
Matlab v5.2.1 (Mathworks UK), running the psychophysics toolbox. All bitmap 
images (fractals) were converted to a standard size of 59 x 59 pixels, and had an 
area of 2 cm x 2 cm when displayed at the screen resolution described above. 
Participants were seated at a distance of 57.5 cm from the screen so stimuli 
subtended an area of approximately 2° x 2° of visual angle.  
3.1.2.5 Procedure 
Each experiment took place in the form of two sessions, identical except 
for the type of stimuli (fractals and trigrams) and the order of intertrial interval 
blocks (see more info below). The order in which the participants carried out the 
fractals session and the trigrams session was counterbalanced across 
participants. 
For each session a pseudorandomly determined frame of 120 trials was 
generated, providing 16 study and 16 test trials at each of the 3 lags. These lags 
(1, 4, and 9) were selected as early, mid, and late points from the retention 
curves obtained in Chapter 2. Twelve study-test pairs of unscored filler trials 
made up the spaces in the frame.  
This frame, or block, was repeated three times, with novel stimuli each 
time. For each block the intertrial interval duration was different (1.25 sec, 3.5 
sec, or 8 sec), with the order in which these occurred counterbalanced across 
participants. In addition, the experiment began with a buffer of 40 unscored filler 
trial pairs to prevent the occurrence of primacy effects. Intertrial interval for the 
buffer was always medium length (3.5 sec). This yielded a total of 400 trials. 
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Once the order of trials for the entirety of a session had been generated, the 200 
stimuli were randomly assigned to the 200 pairs of trials, so that each participant 
experienced the stimuli in a different order. Once begun, the session progressed 
through the buffer, and the three blocks continuously without breaks in between, 
the aim being to maintain the steady state of performance encountered 
previously (see Chapter 2).  
For each trial stimuli appeared on the screen for 1 sec. During this period 
participants were instructed to respond either ‘old’ or ‘new’ with the left or right 
mouse button respectively, ‘old’ to previously seen and ‘new’ to previously 
unseen items. In order that participants did not forget which button corresponded 
to which response during the experiment, a label of which was which was placed 
in clear view of the participant. After 0.5 sec the stimulus was replaced with a 
blank screen. One second later feedback was given for incorrect responses, or 
where no response was given. Feedback consisted of a low-pitched beep. No 
feedback was given if the response was correct. The total length of time that the 
screen remained blank varied according to the intertrial interval. For the short 
intertrial interval the total period was 1.25 sec (total trial length of 2.25 sec), for 
medium it was 3.5 sec (trial length = 4.5 sec), and for long 8 sec (trial length = 9 
sec). The experiment lasted a total of 34.5 min.  
3.1.2.6 Scoring 
As mentioned previously, participants’ responses were only detected 
during the 1 sec presentation period of each stimulus. Once a response had been 
made it was final, and no opportunity for the correction of responses was allowed. 
Reaction time was measured as the latency from the start of the trial until the 
detection of the response. 
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3.1.3 Results 
‘No responses’, when participants failed to respond within the timeframe, 
were not scored. The number of correct responses to test presentations for each 
lag, for each interstimulus interval, for each stimulus type, was divided by the 
total number of scored test presentations for that category, to obtain the hit rate, 
or proportion of correct responses.  
From these results a one-tailed chi square test was conducted on each 
participant’s responses, to determine that the number of ‘old’ responses to 
repeated stimuli was significantly above that expected at chance. For four 
participants there was no significant difference, and those participants’ data were 
omitted from further analysis. 
To obtain a hit rate independent of the participant’s bias to respond ‘old’, 
d’ was calculated using hit rates and false alarm rates. The values for fractals and 
trigrams are presented as a function of the number of intervening items between 
study and test in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.3, and as a function of study-test 
interval in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.4. Study-test interval is the period of time, in 
seconds, elapsing between the end of the initial study presentation of a stimulus, 
and the onset of the second, test presentation. 
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Figure 3.1: d’ values for fractal recognition, as a function of the number of items 
intervening between study and test. ISI = interstimulus interval. Data = Mean ± SEM. 
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Figure 3.2: d’ values for fractal recognition, as a function of study-test interval (sec). ISI = 
interstimulus interval. Data = Mean ± SEM. 
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Figure 3.3: d’ values for trigram recognition, as a function of the number of items 
intervening between study and test. ISI = interstimulus interval. Data = Mean ± SEM. 
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Figure 3.4: d’ values for trigram recognition, as a function of study-test interval (sec). ISI 
= interstimulus interval. Data = Mean ± SEM. 
3.1.3.1 D-prime scores 
Mauchly’s test of sphericity was significant for lag, and all subsequent 
results for lag are Greenhouse-Geisser epsilon corrected. A 2 (stimulus type) x 3 
(interstimulus interval) x 3 (lag) repeated-measures ANOVA was performed on d’ 
data and revealed a significant main effect of stimulus type (F(1,16)=77.5, 
MSe=0.558, p<0.001). Fractal d’ scores were higher than those for trigrams, a 
finding consistent with the findings of Experiment 1. There was also a significant 
main effect of lag (F(1.33,21.2)=23.8, MSe=0.353, p<0.001), and Tukey’s post-
hoc tests revealed significantly higher scores at lag 1 than lag 4 (p<0.01), at lag 1 
than lag 9 (p<0.001), and at lag 4 than lag 9 (p<0.01). This finding is unsurprising 
and consistent with the effects of lag reported in Chapter 2. There was no main 
effect of interstimulus interval. No interactions between any of the factors reached 
significance. The amount of time elapsing between study and test had no effect 
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on the participants’ performance, which was instead affected by the number of 
items intervening between study and test. 
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Figure 3.5: Reaction time values for correct recognition of fractals (ms). ISI = 
interstimulus interval. Data = Mean ± SEM. 
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Figure 3.6: Reaction time values for correct recognition of trigrams (ms). ISI = 
interstimulus interval. Data = Mean ± SEM. 
3.1.3.2 Reaction times 
The reaction time data for hits (correct recognition) is shown in Figure 3.5 
(fractals) and Figure 3.6 (trigrams). Mauchly’s test of sphericity was significant for 
the stimulus type x intertrial interval interaction, the stimulus type x lag 
interaction, the intertrial interval x lag interaction, and the stimulus type x intertrial 
interval x lag interaction. All subsequent results pertaining to these interactions 
are quoted as Greenhouse-Geisser epsilon corrected values. A similar 2 x 3 x 3 
repeated measures ANOVA to that described for d’ results was carried out on 
these data, and revealed a significant main effect of stimulus type (F(1,16)=16.5, 
MSe=9640, p<0.01). Trigrams were recognised more rapidly than fractals, as 
was also the case in Experiment 1. There was also a significant main effect of 
intertrial interval (F(2,32)=64.9, MSe=3620, p<0.001). Short intertrial intervals 
were associated with faster reaction times for correct recognition than both 
medium and long intervals (p<0.001), and medium intervals were associated with 
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longer reaction times than long intervals (p<0.001). There was no effect of lag on 
reaction times, in a departure from the results of Experiment 1, which showed 
significantly faster reaction times at lower lags for both stimulus sets. However, 
the reaction times in the current experiment were much faster on average than 
those recorded for Experiment 1, and this may have resulted in a ceiling effect. 
No significant interactions were observed. 
3.1.3.3 Serial position 
Data for p(hit) and p(false) was again calculated for 10 trial epochs and 
are shown in Figure 3.7. As was found in Chapter 2, both p(hit) and p(false) were 
initially low and then increased throughout the course of the experiment before 
reaching a steady state, and p(false) was higher for trigrams than fractals. 
Interestingly, the steady state for p(false) during trigram recognition appeared to 
have been achieved later in current experiment, suggesting that trigram 
recognition was more difficult when interstimulus interval varied. This same effect 
was not present in fractal recognition. The data were complicated by the 
counterbalancing of the order in which short, medium, and long interstimulus 
intervals occurred, and no consistent trends associated with the start of 
experimental blocks were observable.  
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Figure 3.7: Hit and false alarm rates for recognition data by epoch. Epoch = 10 trials. 
Arrows indicate the start of each experimental block. Data = mean ± SEM. 
3.1.3.4 Summary 
Increasing lag decreased discriminative ability, as measured by the d’ 
scores, but it had no effect on reaction times for hits. Conversely, whilst 
increasing interstimulus interval had no effect on d’ scores, it led to significantly 
slower reaction times for correct recognition. That is, whilst accuracy of 
recognition was only affected by the number of items intervening between study 
and test, speed of recognition was affected only by the rate of presentation. No 
significant interactions were found between factors for any of the data, 
suggesting that recognition of both the fractals and the trigrams were similarly 
affected by interstimulus interval and lag. However, the serial position data 
suggest that trigram recognition was significantly adversely affected by the 
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manipulation of interstimulus interval, resulting in higher false alarm rates, and a 
longer period of interference buildup. 
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3.1.4 Discussion 
The results provided clear evidence that the number of items intervening 
between study and test was the major factor determining recognition accuracy, 
not the length of time elapsed. Even when the intertrial interval was increased 4-
fold, d’ values remained unchanged. Importantly, this suggests that interference 
is the major factor affecting memory performance in continuous recognition. 
Reaction times for correct responses to test stimuli (hits), however, were slower 
at greater interstimulus intervals. This suggests that it may take longer to retrieve 
the memory even though it has not decayed.  
The classic decay-based model of memory is inadequate to explain the 
kind of memory processes involved in visual continuous recognition. The 
continual presentation of novel information in the paradigm would have prevented 
any hypothetical ‘visual rehearsal’, leaving the participant with only a decaying 
memory trace for each item according to the classic model. How then, are 
participants still able to recognise items with reasonable accuracy as long as 90 
sec after their original presentation? Visual rehearsal, then, may be a redundant 
concept, as has been suggested previously (Washburn & Astur, 1998; Wright, 
Santiago, & Sands, 1984). 
A more plausible explanation of the forgetting observed, is that 
participants’ memories for items are reasonably accurate until they are presented 
with further items that must also be held in memory. Indeed, this hypothesis is 
supported by the data presented in Chapter 2, in which recognition of items 
tested without any intervening items was associated with high d’ values that fell 
sharply following one intervening item. Material appears to retroactively interfere 
with existing memory representations, so the more material intervening between 
study and test, the poorer recognition will be. In addition to a clear retroactive 
interference effect, proactive interference (PI) appears to have a limited effect in 
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this particular paradigm. Serial position data from Experiment 1 clearly revealed 
that false alarm rates for novel stimuli rose continually during early periods of the 
experiment, although they asymptoted beyond this point. The obvious 
explanation for this primacy effect is that, as the total number of items that had 
been seen increased, PI from these items also increased, causing new items to 
be more difficult to distinguish from old.  
Consistent with previous studies (Doty & Savakis, 1997; Korsnes, 
Magnussen, & Reinvang, 1996) recognition of both visual and verbalisable study 
materials appeared to be subject to the same lag effects. Nonetheless, correct 
recognition of trigrams was associated with significantly faster reaction times, 
perhaps a reflection of the relative speed at which simple verbal labels may be 
accessed, compared with visual feature identification. Also, the discrimination of 
trigrams was poorer at all levels, and dissociation of hit and false alarm rates 
revealed that this was the result of much higher false alarm rates associated with 
these stimuli. This is likely to have been the result of the trigrams’ much greater 
interstimulus similarity resulting in greater confusion between items. The greater 
false alarm rates observed in the current experiment than those for the same set 
in Experiment 1 suggests that something about the manipulation of interstimulus 
interval makes trigrams harder to discriminate. One possibility is that by 
decreasing the time interval between trials less time was available for verbal 
rehearsal of the trigram ‘name’, making labelling a less efficient strategy. 
However, as the d’ scores were unaffected by interstimulus interval, this seems 
unlikely. Perhaps then the very fact that the rate of presentation changed several 
(4) times during the experiment meant that it took longer for false alarm rates to 
settle at an approximately steady state. 
Whilst the data do not show any obvious evidence of decay, this may be 
because the decay was ‘functional’ (Altmann & Gray, 2002). As there was a 
constant rate of presentation within blocks it is possible that the decay rate could 
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have adapted in the manner proposed by functional decay theory, such that it 
remained appropriate in order to minimise the build-up of proactive interference. 
This would have differed according to which rate of presentation the participant 
was exposed to, and presumably would have changed throughout the 
experiment. However, the false alarm rates continued to rise for a relatively long 
period during the course of the experiment, indicative of a sustained period of 
proactive interference build-up. Also, one would expect there to be a continuous 
reduction in these effects during the course of an experimental block, followed by 
an abrupt increase at the start of a new block, as the decay rate would have to 
readapt to each new rate of presentation. In fact, the serial position data showed 
no evidence of this, with false alarm rates actually increasing overall during some 
blocks. 
Little reference to what is known about the neural mechanisms thought to 
be involved in recognition has previously been made in the cognitive psychology 
literature. However, Doty and Savakis’ (1997) comparative study of memory for 
words and pictures suggests that stimulus-specific adaptation (SSA) is a common 
mechanism underlying recognition of both types of stimuli. SSA is a property of 
neurones in the inferotemporal cortex (IT), a region of the brain central to visual 
object recognition. Certain cells of this area are known to respond to repetition of 
specific stimuli or object features with a significantly decreased firing rate (E. K. 
Miller, Li, & Desimone, 1991). Various subpopulations of IT neurones are thought 
to exist, with different types of repetition-sensitive responses. So-called ‘novelty 
neurones’ (Xiang & Brown, 1997) respond strongly to the first presentation of a 
novel object. There are also ‘familiarity neurones’ that respond significantly less 
to familiar than unfamiliar objects, and ‘recency neurones’ that respond differently 
according to whether an object is novel, unfamiliar, or familiar (Fahy, Riches, & 
Brown, 1993; Zhu, Brown, McCabe, & Aggleton, 1995). These repetition-sensitive 
responses, therefore, are capable of detecting relative recency in repetition of a 
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stimulus or feature, and also the frequency of repetitions. Indeed, decreased 
blood flow to anterior IT was detected in a human PET study when participants 
made judgements based on feelings of familiarity rather than explicit recollection 
(Vandenberghe, Dupont, Bormans, Mortelmans, & Orban, 1995). 
The altered response on the second presentation of a stimulus has been 
found at study-test intervals greater than 24hr and to outlast hundreds of 
intervening presentations for some cells (Fahy, Riches, & Brown, 1993; Xiang & 
Brown, 1997; , 1998), a span sufficient for memory at the longest lags tested in 
recognition experiments. Fahy et al. (1993) reported that 69% of neurones found 
to exhibit repetition sensitivity had a memory span of ≥5 intervening 
presentations, dropping to 60% for a span ≥20. The decreasing number of cells 
responsive to repetition at greater spans might explain why forgetting occurs. 
One might expect that, with decreasing numbers of neurones making the 
repetition-sensitive response, the signal that a stimulus is ‘old’ would become 
weaker and less discernable. It is not clear from the results of Fahy et al. whether 
time or intervening presentations is at the root of the drop-off in cell response 
rate, although one might expect that the system’s accuracy is based on the 
quantity of items to be remembered in a given period. 
In conclusion, the results suggest that the effect of time on the accuracy 
of recognition in continuous recognition is minimal. The most important factor in 
determining whether information is retained or not is the number of intervening 
items between study and test, as seen in the effect of lag. There is also a build-
up of proactive interference, reflected in an increasing false alarm rate, which 
reaches a steady state before the end of the experiment. This effect appears to 
be different for different stimuli, and is proposed to be dependent on the global 
similarity between stimuli within a set. Further experiments manipulating the 
global similarity within the constraints of a stimulus category are needed, to 
determine whether this is the case. 
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3.2 Experiment 4: The effect of similarity within stimulus sets on 
continuous recognition 
3.2.1 Introduction 
Experiment 3 found compelling evidence that loss of information 
regarding items in continuous recognition is largely determined by interference 
from other items. Increasing the number of items intervening between study and 
test had a robust effect of decreasing retention, independent of time delay, 
suggesting that retroactive interference from these items was responsible for the 
declining recognition accuracy. In addition, the increases in false alarm rates 
associated with serial position that occurred throughout Experiments 1, 2, and 3, 
have revealed the presence of proactive interference effects from items already 
seen. What factors determine how much interference is caused by the 
intervening items? Why do the items intervening between study and test of 
trigram stimuli have a greater interfering effect than a similar number of fractal 
items, for example? 
An important factor assumed to be involved in determining the level of 
retroactive interference by items intervening between study and test, is their 
similarity to the studied item. Short-term forgetting is increased by both semantic 
(Dale & Gregory, 1966) and phonological (Wickelgren, 1965) similarity between 
presented items and distracters. Proactive interference, from accumulated items 
that are no longer relevant, is also affected by similarity relations between stimuli 
in humans (Wickens, Born, & Allen, 1963), as well as in nonhuman primates 
(Reynolds & Medin, 1981). Reynolds and Medin found that a multiplicative model 
of overall similarity (combining dimensions of colour, form, and position of stimuli, 
regardless of their relevance to the memory task) gave a good account of 
between-trials proactive interference.  
155 
Traditionally, the study of interference effects has been carried out using 
word, letter, and number stimuli. Lists of phonologically similar items, be they 
words, letters, or pictures with similar names, are recalled with less accuracy than 
lists of dissimilar items (e.g. A. D. Baddeley, 1966; Schiano & Watkins, 1981), 
and this effect is suppressed by concurrent, irrelevant articulation (e.g. counting 
backwards from 100 in steps of 3) (D. J. Murray, 1968; Schiano & Watkins, 
1981). This phonological similarity effect has been demonstrated with the names 
of common objects at both short-term memory (STM) speeds (1 per second) and 
rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) speeds (8 per second) (Coltheart, 1999). 
However, presentation of the pictures themselves was only affected by 
phonological similarity at the slower speed. In the continuous recognition 
literature Raser (1972) reported that lures that were phonologically and/or 
orthographically similar to studied words were associated with higher false alarm 
rates than dissimilar stimuli, and that this effect occurred as a function of lag.  
Estes and Maddox (1995b) claimed that interitem similarity was the factor 
determining the increase in both false alarm and hit rates over trials in their 
continuous recognition study using word, letter, and number stimuli. The authors 
argued that there was a systematic increase in interitem similarity from their 
words stimulus set to the letter set to digits, and that this resulted in higher global 
similarities between items. They also noted that higher similarity would result in a 
greater retention loss between study and test. One of the problems of similarity 
research, touched upon by Estes and Maddox, is the definition of similarity itself. 
The authors defined similarity functionally as a measure of “confusability” 
between stimulus representations. One would certainly expect greater interitem 
similarity in sets composed of random strings of digits than in those composed of 
random strings of letters (there are only 10 possible digits, as opposed to 26 
letters in the English alphabet). Whether words were recognised with greater 
accuracy because they could be chunked into discrete units that were less 
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confusable than individual letters, or whether it was simply related to articulation 
time, was not explored. There is a further problem with this similarity-based 
definition, in that words are more familiar stimuli than nonwords, and the effects 
of familiarity cannot be separated from any putative effects of similarity. 
Whilst these results gave some indication of the effect of similarity within 
continuous recognition, a more systematic exploration of similarity is needed. For 
example, rather than contrasting stimuli drawn from different (albeit closely 
related) categories, it would make more sense to manipulate the similarity of 
items from within the same category. This would avoid the ambiguity of results in 
which the effect of similarity is confounded with the category of stimulus. Verbal 
stimuli are also not ideally suited to the study of similarity, because similarity 
relations at orthographic, phonological, and semantic levels must be accounted 
for in the construction of suitable lists. The advantage of exploring similarity 
effects with parametrically defined visual stimuli, is that similarity relations are 
easy to assess and quantify. 
Memory for complex visual stimuli has been investigated in a recent fMRI 
study in which participants were required to study particular works by famous 
painters with distinctive styles (Yago & Ishai, 2006). A subsequent recognition 
test, introducing novel paintings, found that novel paintings that were different to 
the prototypes studied were classified more rapidly than novel paintings that were 
similar to the prototypes. The behavioural effects of similarity were accompanied 
by effects on the activation of brain regions involved in memory, including the 
hippocampus, where responses to new exemplars were reduced with decreased 
similarity to the studied prototypes. Whilst this study provides compelling 
evidence that similarity has a key role in visual recognition, for a more detailed 
understanding of the relationship of similarity to recognition, quantifiable changes 
to the stimuli need to be examined. This is clearly not possible where the stimuli 
are not defined through the use of readily manipulable parameters. 
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The similarity of stimuli is intimately related to the concepts of typicality 
and distinctiveness. Distinctiveness can be thought of as the extent to which an 
item stands out within a set, whereas typical items are those which do not. In a 
set with high global similarity, there will be a preponderance of typical items and 
few distinctive ones. The distinctiveness of dissimilar stimuli is associated with a 
greater accuracy of recognition (e.g. Hunt, 1995; Lockhead, 1970).  
In terms of current models, Nosofsky’s generalised context model (GCM) 
of recognition (Nosofsky, 1988, 1991) assumes that individual exemplars of 
studied items are represented as points in multidimensional perceptual space, 
and that the similarity of exemplars is defined by their distance in that space. 
Items more distant from one another are assumed to be less similar. By summing 
the similarities between test items and the exemplars held in memory, information 
that forms the basis for recognition judgements is obtained. Whilst this model has 
proved to be a good predictor of how the similarity of stimuli affects false alarm 
rates, it also predicts that hit rates for typical stimuli should be higher than those 
for distinctive items. There is evidence from face-recognition literature that the 
opposite is often the case (Bartlett, Hurry, & Thorley, 1984; Light, Kayra-Stewart, 
& Hollander, 1979; Valentine & Ferrara, 1991; Vokey & Read, 1992). Indeed, a 
study by Busey and Tunnicliff (1999) found that faces determined as distinctive 
according to their co-ordinates in a multidimensional perceptual space were 
associated with greater hit rates than typical faces. This was perhaps a result of 
the presence of discrete, individuating features in these particular faces (e.g. 
beards, scars).  
Nosofksy and Zaki (2003) investigated the effectiveness of two different 
definitions of distinctiveness in predicting the results of experiments involving 
recognition of colour patches. When the parameters of stimuli were mapped in 
continuous-dimension similarity space, and distinctive items were defined as 
those lying in isolated regions of this space, the effects of distinctiveness were 
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weak. However, when distinctive items were defined as those containing certain 
discrete, individuating features, large old item distinctiveness effects were 
observed. By specifically including discrete, individuating properties in stimuli, a 
strong impact on hit rates was observed. These results suggest that when 
superior hit rates are associated with distinctive stimuli, it is because these stimuli 
contain individuating features, rather than because they lack perceptual similarity 
to other stimuli in a set. 
As well as the similarity between studied and target items, the similarity of 
items intervening between study and test affects recognition. This has been 
demonstrated systematically by Kahana and Sekuler (2002) using sinusoidal 
grating stimuli that varied in their spatial frequency. Recognition of items from 
short lists was successfully modelled with a noisy exemplar model (NEMO) of 
recognition, that assumes that memory is affected by the similarities among list 
items, as well as similarities between list items and the test probe. Earlier array 
models (Estes, 1986; Hintzman, 1986, 1988) and the exemplar-retrieval model 
GCM (Nosofsky, 1986, 1992) theorised that recognition decisions were made on 
the basis of summed pairwise similarity between the probe and each stimulus 
representation. Kahana and Sekuler’s model takes into account the similarity 
relationships between items in the list as well.  
Whilst the similarity relationships between items in list-based memory 
have been extensively explored (Kahana & Sekuler, 2002; Nosofsky & Zaki, 
2003; Zhou, Kahana, & Sekuler, 2004), the continuous recognition literature lacks 
a systematic examination of interitem similarity effects. Whilst Estes and Maddox 
(1995b) alluded to similarity in the explanation for the cross-category differences 
they observed, no parametrically-based examination of the effects of similarity 
within a category under conditions of continuous recognition has been reported. 
This experiment systematically varied the global similarity of stimuli within 
experimental blocks, during continuous recognition. 
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3.2.2 Methods 
3.2.2.1 Design 
The experiment had a three-way within subjects design. The independent 
variables were the type of stimulus tested, the global similarity, and the number of 
intervening trials (lag). Stimulus type had 2 levels: fractals and trigrams. Similarity 
had 3 levels: similar, medium, and dissimilar, reflecting the level of constraints on 
stimulus generation. Lag had 3 levels: 1, 4 and 9 intervening items. The 
dependent variables were the participants’ d’ scores, and reaction times for 
correct recognition. 
3.2.2.2 Participants 
A total of 19 participants were tested (15 female and 4 male). All were 
students at the University of Nottingham with a mean age of 20.5 ± 0.2 years. All 
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  
In order to exclude data from participants who ‘gave up’ on the tasks, 
during one or other of the relatively long 35 min sessions, criteria were set for 
inclusion of the data in analyses. Each participant’s data were entered into a one-
tailed chi square, to determine that the number of correct responses were 
significantly above that expected by chance.  
3.2.2.3 Stimuli 
Two different categories of stimulus were employed: fractals and trigrams. 
These stimuli were generated according to the rules described in the Methods 
section of Experiment 1, although constraints on variation were manipulated, in 
order to produce three sets of each stimulus type: similar, medium, and 
dissimilar. In addition, the routine producing ‘irregular’ fractals was removed. 
3.2.2.3.1 Fractals 
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The minimum and maximum limits for the following variables were 
manipulated: number of superpositions, number of sides of original polygon, 
depth of recursions, size of recursion. These were manipulated in such a manner 
that the mean value for each variable for each set remained the same, whilst the 
amount of variation from the mean varied according to ‘similarity’. The limits for 
each set are shown in Table 3.1. Examples of the stimuli produced are shown in 
Figure 3.8. 
Table 3.1: Limits for variation of variables for fractal generation, for sets of different global 
similarities 
 Number of 
super-
positions 
Number of 
sides of 
polygon 
Recursion 
depth 
Size of 
recursion 
Similar 5 6 6 0.3-0.7 
Medium 4-6 4-8 4-8 0.15-0.85 
Dissimilar 3-7 3-9 3-9 0-1 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8: Example fractal stimuli. Top row = similar, middle row = medium, bottom row 
= different. 
3.2.2.3.2 Trigrams 
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Trigrams were of a similar format to those used previously, in that they 
were digit-letter-digit. Numbers could vary from 1-9 in all conditions. Similarity 
was regulated by constraints on the letter. In the similar condition, letters could be 
any of the five letters allowed in previous experiments (K, V, W, Y, or Z), e.g. 
4V9, 2W2, 9Z1. In the medium similarity condition it could be any of the first 10 
letters of the alphabet, e.g. 3F7, 8A7, 5C8. In the dissimilar condition it could be 
any letter of the alphabet, e.g. 8J6, 3Y5, 1P7. 
3.2.2.4 Presentation 
All stimuli were presented using the same equipment described for 
Experiment 3. Stimuli were presented in the centre of the screen and subtended 
approximately 2° x 2° of visual angle.  
3.2.2.5 Procedure 
Each experiment took place in the form of two sessions, identical except 
for the type of stimuli (fractals and trigrams) and the order of similarity blocks. 
The order in which the participants carried out the fractals session and the 
trigrams session was counterbalanced across participants. 
For each session a pseudorandomly determined frame of 120 trials was 
generated, providing 16 study and 16 test trials at each of the 3 lags. Twelve 
study-test pairs of unscored filler trials made up the spaces in the frame.  
This frame, or block, was repeated three times, with novel stimuli each 
time. For each block the global stimulus similarity was different: either similar, 
medium, or dissimilar. The order in which these occurred was counterbalanced 
across participants. The experiment began with a buffer of 40 (medium similarity) 
unscored filler trial pairs to prevent the occurrence of primacy effects. This 
yielded a total of 400 trials. The order of stimuli within each block was always 
randomly determined. There were no breaks between blocks.  
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For each trial stimuli appeared on the screen for 2 sec. During this period 
participants were instructed to respond either ‘old’ or ‘new’ with the left or right 
mouse button respectively, ‘old’ to previously seen and ‘new’ to previously 
unseen items. The instructions stressed that, in order to be classified as old, 
items had to be identical to a previous item. In order that participants did not 
forget which button corresponded to which response during the long experiment, 
a label of which was which was placed in clear view of the participant. After 0.5 
sec the stimulus was replaced with a blank screen. One second later feedback 
was given for incorrect responses, or where no response was given. Feedback 
consisted of a low-pitched beep. No feedback was given if the response was 
correct. The screen remained blank for a further 1 sec, before the start of the next 
trial.  
3.2.2.6 Scoring 
Participants’ responses were only detected during the 2 sec presentation 
period of each stimulus. Once a response had been made it was final, and no 
opportunity for the correction of responses was allowed. Reaction time was 
measured as the latency from the start of the trial until the detection of the 
response. 
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3.2.3 Results 
From the results a one-tailed chi square test was conducted on each 
participant’s responses, to ensure that the number of ‘same’ responses to old 
stimuli was significantly above that expected by chance. This was the case for all 
of the participants, and all data was entered into subsequent analyses. 
3.2.3.1 D-prime scores 
The d’ values for fractals and trigrams are presented as a function of lag 
in Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.10. Mauchly’s test of sphericity was significant for the 
interactions of stimulus type x lag, similarity x lag, and stimulus type x similarity x 
lag. All reported results for these interactions are Greenhouse-Geisser epsilon 
corrected. A 2 (stimulus type) x 3 (similarity) x 3 (lag) repeated-measures ANOVA 
was performed on d’ data and revealed a significant main effect of stimulus type 
(F(1,18)=11.3, MSe=0.853, p<0.01). Fractal d’ scores were higher than those for 
trigrams. There was also a significant main effect of similarity (F(2,36)=12.5, 
MSe=0.588, p<0.001), and Tukey’s post-hoc tests revealed significantly higher 
scores for dissimilar blocks than both similar (p<0.001) and medium (p<0.01) 
blocks. Scores for high and medium similarity blocks were not significantly 
different. In addition, a significant main effect of lag was reported (F(2,36)=41.4, 
MSe=0.331, p<0.001), with significant differences between all lags. There was 
also a significant interaction between stimulus type and lag (F(1.48,26.7)=4.74, 
MSe=0.354, p<0.05). Post-hoc tests revealed significant differences between 
fractals and trigrams only at lags greater than 1. Also, whilst scores for trigrams 
at lags 1 and 4 were significantly different, they were not for fractals. Increasing 
the similarity between stimuli from medium to dissimilar made performance on 
the task less accurate.  
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Figure 3.9: d’ values for fractal recognition, as a function of lag. Data = Mean ± SEM. 
166 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
Similar
Medium
Dissimilar
 
Figure 3.10: d’ values for trigram recognition, as a function of lag. Data = Mean ± SEM. 
3.2.3.2 Reaction times 
The reaction time data for hits (correct recognition) is shown in Figure 
3.11 (fractals) and Figure 3.12 (trigrams). Mauchly’s test of sphericity was not 
significant for any of the measures reported. A similar 2 x 3 x 3 repeated 
measures ANOVA to that described for d’ results was carried out on these data, 
and no significant effect of either stimulus type or similarity was found. There was 
a significant main effect of lag on reaction times (F(2,36)=18.1, MSe=8370, 
p<0.001). No significant interactions were observed. 
In contrast to the effects on d’ scores, similarity between stimuli appeared 
to have little or no effect on reaction times for hits. 
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Figure 3.11: Reaction time values for correct recognition of fractals (ms). Data = Mean ± 
SEM. 
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Figure 3.12: Reaction time values for correct recognition of trigrams (ms). Data = Mean ± 
SEM. 
3.2.3.3 Hit and false alarm rates 
In a similar manner to that described in Experiment 3, trials were analysed 
in epochs of 10 subsequent trials, and hit (p(hit)) and false alarm (p(false)) rates 
were calculated for each epoch. Data were then reorganised according to the 
level of similarity of the block, such that the changes in p(hit) and p(false) during 
the course of blocks for each similarity level could be examined. 
Data for p(hit) can be seen in Figure 3.13 (fractals) and Figure 3.14 
(trigrams). The data were entered into a 2 (stimulus type) x 3 (level of similarity) x 
12 (epoch) repeated measures ANOVA. Mauchley’s test for sphericity was not 
significant for any of the variables studied. There were no significant effects of 
any of the variables tested, indicating that p(hit) was similar for both fractals and 
trigrams, was unaffected by the level of similarity, and remained constant with 
regards to serial position within blocks.  
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Figure 3.13: The effect of interitem similarity on hit rates for trigram recognition. Each 
epoch represents 10 consecutive trials. Data = mean ± SEM. 
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Figure 3.14: The effect of interitem similarity on hit rates for trigram recognition. Each 
epoch represents 10 consecutive trials. Data = mean ± SEM. 
Data for p(false) is shown in Figure 3.15 (fractals) and Figure 3.16 
(trigrams). The data were entered into a 2 (stimulus type) x 3 (level of similarity) x 
12 (epoch) repeated measures ANOVA. Mauchley’s test for sphericity was not 
significant for any of the variables studied. There was a significant main effect of 
stimulus type (F(1,17)=6.88; MSe=0.487, p<0.05), with p(false) for trigram 
recognition being significantly greater than p(false) for fractals. There was also a 
significant main effect of similarity (F(2,34)=23.6, MSe=0.820, p<0.001). Blocks 
of dissimilar stimuli were associated with lower p(false) than were both medium 
and similar stimuli (Tukeys, p<0.001). Epoch had a significant main effect 
(F(11,187)=4.52, MSe=0.0344, p<0.001). Post-hoc tests revealed significantly 
lower p(false) at epochs 1, 2, 3, and 4 than at lag 8 (p<0.05), and at epoch 1 than 
epoch 10 (p<0.05). No interactions were significant.  
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These results indicate that there was significant build-up of proactive 
interference, as observed in increased p(false), during experimental blocks of the 
same similarity level, and possibly the experiment as a whole. High and medium 
similarity blocks were associated with greater p(false) than dissimilar stimuli. The 
lack of any changes in p(hit) suggests that the differences in d’ reported for 
different similarity conditions are largely the result of variation in p(false). 
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Figure 3.15: The effect of interitem similarity on false alarm rates for fractal recognition. 
Each epoch represents 10 consecutive trials. Data = mean ± SEM. 
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Figure 3.16: The effect of interitem similarity on false alarm rates for trigram recognition. 
Each epoch represents 10 consecutive trials. Data = mean ± SEM. 
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3.2.4 Discussion 
The manipulation of interstimulus similarity within a continuous recognition 
experiment resulted in significant effects on measures of recognition accuracy. 
By constraining stimuli so that they were more similar to one another, recognition 
was poorer, and new stimuli were more frequently mistaken for old (increased 
false alarm rates), although hit rates appeared to remain constant. This result 
suggested that the effect of similarity only affected the correct discrimination of 
new trials from old, with performance on old trials unaffected.  
The results provide further evidence that retroactive interference between 
study items and items occurring between study and test, is a major factor in 
determining the effect of lag. If a simple decay of the studied stimulus’ memory 
trace was the sole cause of lag effects on recognition, manipulating the 
properties of intervening stimuli would not alter the lag function. This was clearly 
not the case. 
Constraints on similarity had comparable effects regardless of stimulus 
type, indicating that similarity has an equivalent effect on stimuli that are 
amenable to verbal labeling and those that are not. Further research is needed to 
determine whether this trend can be generalised from fractals and trigrams to 
other types of stimuli.  
A point of interest is the failure to observe any differences between 
recognition of high and medium similarity blocks. No differences were observed 
between the two similarity levels for either fractal or trigram recognition, whereas 
the transition from medium similarity to low similarity (dissimilar condition) was 
associated with much better recognition. There are a number of factors that may 
have contributed to this result.  
Firstly, the parametric similarity that was manipulated in the experiments 
did not necessarily correlate with the subjective experience of similarity (e.g. as 
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measured by similarity ratings), which may involve factors more complex than 
simple geometric coordinates (e.g. saliency of features). Also, it is important to 
note that the changes to constraints for both stimulus sets resulted in non-linear 
effects on the number of possible output stimuli. For fractals, changing the 
possible number of superpositions of fractal stimuli from 5 to 4-6 to 3-7 (for 
similar to medium to dissimilar stimuli) changes the number of possible values of 
number of superpositions from 1 to 3 to 5 (linear). However, when coupled with 
an increase of possible sides of polygons from 6 to 4-8 to 3-9, and an increase of 
possible recursion depths of 6 to 4-8 to 3-9, the number of possible combinations 
of these three variables increases from 1 to 75 to 245. There were over 3 times 
as many possible combinations of these variables at the dissimilar level (245) 
than there were at the medium level (75) of similarity, and these figures do not 
take size of recursion into account. For trigrams, again, the transition from one 
level of similarity to another was not linear in terms of the number of possible 
outputted stimuli. By changing the number of possible letters from 5 to 10 to 26, 
the number of possible trigrams was increased from 405 to 810 to 2106. Again, 
the number of possible stimuli increased exponentially.  
Perhaps parametric similarity only affected recognition performance when 
objects varied dramatically in terms of their parameters. Putative thresholds in the 
detection of variation, perhaps the boundaries of perceptual categories, might 
explain why similar and medium similarity fractals and trigrams interfere with one 
another in a comparable fashion, whereas the exponentially greater variation at 
dissimilar levels reduces this interference. 
When parameters are allowed to vary to a greater extent, it is more likely 
that distinctive stimuli that stand out from the others will be produced. This 
distinctiveness might form the basis for discrimination between items in memory. 
Whether distinctive items are better defined as those lying in isolated regions of 
parametric space, or those containing discrete, individuating features in 
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continuous recognition (see Nosofsky & Zaki, 2003), is a question for future 
investigations. This implies that distinctiveness and categorisation may be 
intimately connected, and that a distinctive item might be considered to be one 
which falls outside of existing categories, or falls into a separate category from 
the majority of stimuli. This might explain the finding of Nosofsky and Zaki (2003) 
that the presence of certain individuating features made items more distinctive 
and, easier to remember. Those features might form the basis for inclusion in a 
separate perceptual category to the majority of stimuli that do not contain the 
feature. Discrimination between items that fall into this smaller group of stimuli 
might be expected to be easier than discrimination between the larger number of 
items that do not contain the distinguishing feature. 
Surprisingly, the results for hit and false alarm rates revealed that the 
effect of similarity on overall recognition performance was mediated solely 
through changes in the false alarm rate. Hit rates did not vary greatly with the 
degree of similarity, suggesting that participants’ ability to correctly recognise old 
items was unaffected by the manipulation. This may explain why no significant 
effects on reaction times for hits were observed. False alarm rates rose 
significantly during each experimental block suggesting that changes to similarity 
disrupted the achievement of a steady state, although this could simply be 
because serial position was confounded with position within a block in this 
analysis. Comparison of these results with the serial position curve obtained for 
results from Experiment 3 (Figure 3.7) suggests that hit rates did not vary 
between fractals and trigrams for that experiment either. Again, the difference in 
discrimination can be ascribed to the false alarm rate.  
The results confirm the suggestions of Estes and Maddox (1995b) and 
Raser (1972) that interitem similarity is an important factor in determining 
recognition performance on the continuous recognition task. Through the use of 
verbal stimuli that varied only in one parameter of their construction (trigrams) the 
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role of similarity was examined in a manner that was more systematic than Estes 
and Maddox’s cross-category comparisons. The results also confirm that Kahana 
and Sekuler’s (2002) finding that recognition of probes is affected by similarity 
relations between items in a preceding list, applies to the more complex 
relationships between items in continuous recognition as well.  
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4.1 Experiment 5: Positional effects in the recognition of face-like 
stimuli 
4.1.1 Introduction 
One of the most important functions of object memory is the recognition of 
familiar objects regardless of transformations of size, viewpoint, location in the 
visual field, etc. Changes in the distance between an observer and an object 
change the size of the object on the retina. In a similar manner, the same object 
can be viewed from different 3D positions in space, or at different retinal locations 
due to either a change in the position of the object, or a change in the observer’s 
fixation. Whilst changes in these conditions may result in very different patterns of 
activation on the retina, it is necessary for the visual system to recognise that an 
object’s identity does not change in order to produce a coherent perceptual 
representation of objects in the observer’s environment. How this is achieved is a 
fundamentally important issue and the subject of much debate. For example, an 
object moving from one visual field location to another is thought to enable 
feature analysers at different stages of cortical processing to become associated 
with one another through the strengthening of mutual connections. How much 
experience, and of what kind, are important questions that remain to be 
answered. By investigating the conditions under which translation invariance is 
achieved, and when it breaks down, may reveal important information about how 
object identity is represented in memory. 
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An aspect of transformational invariance, about which there are conflicting 
reports, is translational invariance of retinal location. Evidence from both human 
psychophysical studies (Dill & Edelman, 2001; Dill & Fahle, 1997, 1998; Gratton, 
Corballis, & Jain, 1997; Hornak, Duncan, & Gaffan, 2002; Kahn & Foster, 1981; 
Nazir & O'Regan, 1990), and electrophysiological studies in monkeys (Chelazzi, 
Duncan, Miller, & Desimone, 1998; DiCarlo & Maunsell, 2003; Lueschow, Miller, 
& Desimone, 1994), have revealed that, under certain conditions, translation 
invariance breaks down, and previously learned objects are not recognised in 
their new locations. Much of the evidence is discussed in more depth in 0, but an 
outline of the most important findings is given below. 
Neuronal populations in inferior temporal (IT) cortex involved in object 
perception are thought to learn to produce translation invariant representations of 
objects (i.e. representations of objects that are not specific to a particular retinal 
location) by experience of objects changing within the visual field (Wallis & Rolls, 
1997). Stimulus-selectivity in IT neurones is often assumed to be constant 
throughout their receptive fields, and as these receptive fields are large, 
throughout the majority of the visual field (Desimone, Albright, Gross, & Bruce, 
1984). This view is supported by the finding that there was no decrement to the 
firing of IT neurones when an effective object was shifted up to 4º from fixation 
(Tovee, Rolls, & Azzopardi, 1994). However, in a study of object recognition in 
which monkeys were required to discriminate between target images and 
distracters, changes in the location of achromatic forms of 1.5° from fixation 
resulted in a mean 60% decrease in the responses of IT neurones responsive to 
the objects (DiCarlo & Maunsell, 2003). In a delayed-matching-to-sample (DMS) 
task involving shifts of 5°, Lueschow et al. (1994) found that, whilst the order of 
neurones’ stimulus preferences did not change, 69% of cells recorded preferred a 
given retinal location. Only 7% of cells showing repetition-sensitive responses 
were invariant for location. Interestingly, the nature of the result in these 
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experiments appears to be related to the nature of the task. Both Desimone et al. 
(1984) and Tovee et al. (1994) measured passive responses to stimuli that were 
not related to any task. In both Lueschow et al. (1994) and DiCarlo and 
Maunsell’s (2003) studies, animals were actively engaged in making responses 
based on the stimulus identity in either form recognition or DMS tasks. Also, the 
neuronal response did not always match the behavioural response. DiCarlo and 
Maunsell found that, whilst neuronal responses were decreased at 1.5°, 
behavioural measures of recognition were unaffected. 
Psychophysical studies demonstrate considerable invariance for 
recognition on certain tasks, with certain stimuli. Biederman and Cooper (1991) 
carried out an experiment in which pictures of readily nameable objects (e.g. 
pianos) were presented to participants twice in two separate blocks for 
identification by naming. The interval between study and test presentations was 
approximately 7 min. The first presentation had a priming effect on an object’s 
subsequent naming, measured as both a faster reaction time and a reduced error 
rate, and this effect was independent of changes in the object’s location. In 
different experiments items could occur in either the left or the right visual 
hemifields, or the upper and lower visual hemifields, but whether the object was 
in the same or a different location to the initial presentation, the effect of priming 
was the same. Likewise, Bricolo and Bülthoff (1993) found no effect of 2.5° shifts 
on the recognition of wire-like objects from their training positions.  
There is, however, plenty of evidence from pattern recognition literature 
demonstrating the breakdown of translation invariance. For example, Kahn and 
Foster’s (1981) study of participants’ ability to discriminate sequentially presented 
dot patterns found that d’ scores for recognition were highest at identical 
positions, and decreased with increasing distance from training position.  
Nazir and O’Regan (1990) trained participants to discriminate dot patterns 
at a fixed location to the left or right of fixation, from two non-target distracters. 
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Subsequent recognition rates dropped when stimuli were presented at novel 
positions, regardless of whether the retinal eccentricity was 2.4°, 0.86°, or 0.49°. 
Most recently, the experiments of Dill and Fahle (1997; , 1998) confirmed the 
findings of Nazir and O’Regan, that improvement in discrimination performance at 
one retinal location does not necessarily transfer to new locations. In addition, 
recognition of dot clouds and checkerboard stimuli were examined at a range of 
eccentricities up to 2° from an initial position, and recognition performance 
decreased with increasing distance from study position (Dill & Fahle, 1998). The 
positional specificity (lack of translation invariance) observed in these studies 
seems to be related to the use of novel patterns, and the difficulty of 
discriminations. However, as recognition accuracy following transfer from the 
learned to the unlearned position was significantly above chance in this study, 
positional specificity was incomplete. 
One limitation of several of these studies (Dill & Fahle, 1997; Kahn & 
Foster, 1981; Nazir & O'Regan, 1990) is that it is impossible to discern whether 
their results reflect a global positional specificity per se or whether this 
phenomenon is linked to the presentation of items at particular locations in the 
visual field (i.e. foveal vs. parafoveal/peripheral presentation, within- vs. between-
hemifield shifts). Some studies have suggested that recognition accuracy is 
related to whether the test presentation occurs within the same left/right hemifield 
as the studied item, regardless of the size of the shift (Gratton, Corballis, & Jain, 
1997; Hornak, Duncan, & Gaffan, 2002). Gratton and colleagues found 
significantly better recognition for symmetrical line patterns shifted vertically 
within the same visual hemifield, compared with recognition of stimuli shifted 
horizontally across the midline. Hornak et al. (2002) used a design in which 
stimuli could appear at any of the four corners of an imaginary square centred on 
the fixation point. Each point was equidistant from fixation, allowing the 
comparison of the effects of vertical and horizontal shifts at a constant retinal 
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eccentricity. During learning, stimuli (pictures of nameable objects, containing 
different exemplars of the same categories) were presented in pairs in 
diametrically opposite positions. In a later test phase, pairs contained either two 
novel pictures or one learned and one novel picture, and participants were 
required to discriminate between the two. The results showed a significant 
decrement to recognition caused by horizontal shifts, whereas vertical shifts were 
comparable to the no shift controls. Both studies were cited by their authors as 
evidence for the hemispheric organisation of visual memory. 
Table 4.1: Comparison of previous human studies of positional effects 
Study Task Stimuli Shift(s) Effect of 
translation? 
Kahn & 
Foster 
(1981) 
Same/different 
discrimination 
Dot patterns 0.5°, 1.0° 
Fixation, left and 
right 
Yes 
Nazir & 
O’Regan 
(1990) 
Training 
followed by 
recognition 
Dot patterns, 
Columns of 
grey squares 
Learned at +/-
2.4°/0.86°/0.49°, 
Tested at left, 
right, up and 
down from 
fixation 
Yes 
Biederman 
& Cooper 
(1991) 
Picture naming Line drawings 
of common 
objects 
2.4° to left and 
right of fixation 
No 
Bricolo & 
Bülthoff 
(1993) 
Training 
followed by 
recognition 
Wire-like 
objects 
2.5° left, right, 
up, and down 
from fixation 
No 
Dill & Fahle 
(1997) 
Training 
followed by 
recognition 
Checker-
boards 
2.4° to left and 
right of fixation 
Yes 
Gratton et 
al. (1997) 
Training 
followed by 
recogntion 
Line patterns Square around 
fixation: 8.4° 
vertical/horizont
al; 6° to left and 
right of fixation 
Yes; different 
hemifield > 
same 
hemifield 
Dill & Fahle 
(1998) 
Same/different 
discrimination 
Dot patterns 0°/0.5°/1°/1.5°/2 
left, right, above 
and below study 
Yes; for 
same trials 
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at 1° 
Dill & 
Edelman 
(2001) 
Same/different 
discrimination 
Animal-like 
shapes 
Square around 
fixation: 5.5° 
horizontal/vertic
al, 8° diagonal 
No; except 
when 
configuration 
scrambled 
Hornak et 
al. (2002) 
Recognition of 
objects in old-
new, and new-
new pairs 
Pictures of 
common 
objects 
Square around 
fixation: 6.7° 
horizontal/vertic
al 
Yes; different 
hemifield > 
same 
hemifield 
 
A comparison of the important psychophysical studies of stimulus 
translation (Table 4.1) reveals that an important factor in determining whether or 
not translation invariance is found seems to be the complexity of the stimuli used. 
When stimuli were objects with which participants had some prior familiarity (e.g. 
pictures of common objects), translation invariance was generally found, whereas 
studies using novel patterns with a complex configuration (e.g. dot clouds, 
checkerboards) found evidence of positional effects. This suggests that the cause 
of these effects may lie in the abstract and/or highly similar nature of the stimuli 
employed. Dot clouds and checkerboards are unlikely to have been seen by 
participants before engaging in the experiment, and participants are unlikely to 
have experience with similar objects. The patterns are also likely to be more 
similar to one another than items from a set of common objects, or geometric 
shapes. This suggests that it is necessary to have some experience with a 
category of objects before translation invariant representations of those objects 
can be formed.  
A study that sheds light on which properties of objects are important for 
translation invariance is that of Dill and Edelman (2001). In same/different 
experiments there was no effect of translation for their ‘animal-like’ stimuli, 
regardless of their interstimulus similarity. The animal-like stimuli were composed 
of a standard number of computer-generated features such as legs and heads, 
and different ‘animals’ were defined both by the identity of their component 
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features and the features’ positional configurations. Translation invariance of 
recognition was found for these stimuli, and was maintained when stimuli were 
‘scrambled’ by randomising the identity of the component features whilst 
maintaining the global configuration of the animal. However, when the stimuli 
were made to differ in the locations but not the shapes of corresponding parts an 
effect of position emerged. This suggests that the representation of the identity of 
an object’s features may be position invariant, although the representation of their 
configuration may be specific to the position in which it was learned. 
In an attempt to ascertain whether the incomplete translation invariance 
encountered in the Dill and Edelman (2001) study can be generalised to other 
complex stimuli, the present study examined the effect of positional shifts on 
same/different discrimination of face-like stimuli. The face-like stimuli (previously 
described in Chapter 2) were like the animal-like stimuli in that they were defined 
both by the identity and configuration of their features. In a departure from 
previous approaches to translation invariance, precise and consistent changes to 
certain parameters of the stimuli occurred between each new stimulus and the 
next, in an attempt to insure that interitem similarity was constant. The effects of 
changes of feature size and location were examined systematically.  
The purported hemispheric organisation of memories was also studied, by 
comparing the effects of horizontal and vertical shifts in a manner similar to 
Hornak et al. (2002). The previously reported poorer performance for trials in 
which the stimulus is shifted between visual hemifields has only been observed 
for abstract line-patterns (Gratton, Corballis, & Jain, 1997) and pictures for which 
naming is possible (Hornak, Duncan, & Gaffan, 2002). This experiment intended 
to determine the extent to which representations of complex visual stimuli that are 
not readily amenable to naming are translation invariant. 
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4.1.2 Methods 
4.1.2.1 Design 
The experiment had a two-way mixed measures design. The between-
subjects variable was the type of change between different stimuli, which had two 
levels: size of features only, or size and location of features. The within-subjects 
variable was the nature of the shift (or lack thereof) between stimulus location on 
initial viewing (study presentation) and subsequent viewing (test presentation). 
This factor had five levels: horizontal shift (a shift of 5.6° horizontally, between 
the right and left visual hemifields), vertical shift (a shift of 5.6° vertically, between 
the lower and upper visual fields), centre-periphery shift (a shift of 4.0°, from 
fixation to one of the four visual quadrants), and conditions in which the stimuli 
remained either at fixation (centre (no shift)) or in the same peripheral location 
(periphery (no shift)) (see Figure 4.1). The shift sizes were chosen to be 
consistent with those used by Dill and Edelman (2001). 
The dependent variables were the participants’ d’ score, reaction times for 
correct recognition, and hit and false alarm rates.  
185 
 
Figure 4.1: The five possible stimulus positions (top left, top right, centre, bottom left and 
bottom right) as well as examples of the three shift types (horizontal shift, vertical shift 
and centre-periphery shift). Actual stimuli were in full colour. 
4.1.2.2 Participants 
All of the 43 participants were students at the University of Nottingham 
(27 female, 16 male), taken from an opportunity sample. All participants were 
aged between 20-22 years, and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. None 
had previously been exposed to the stimuli. Of these participants, 21 were 
assigned to the size only change condition, and 22 were assigned to the size + 
location condition. 
4.1.2.3 Apparatus and materials 
The experiment was run using an Apple Macintosh G3 computer 
(300Mhz, 384Mb RAM) with an ATI Radeon 7000 (32Mb) graphics card, on a 21” 
Mitsubishi colour display monitor (size: 1024 x 768 pixels, resolution: 72 x 72 dpi, 
refresh rate: 75Hz). Stimuli were presented in the centre of the screen using 
Matlab v5.2.1 (Mathworks UK), running the psychophysics toolbox. All bitmap 
Horizontal (5.6°) 
Vertical (5.6°) 
Centre-Periphery 
(4.0°) 
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images were converted to a standard size of 59 x 59 pixels, and had an area of 2 
cm x 2 cm when displayed at the screen resolution described above. Participants 
were seated at a distance of 57.5 cm from the screen so individual stimuli 
subtended an area of approximately 2° x 2° of visual angle.  
4.1.2.4 Stimuli 
The stimuli used were two series of 253 abstract ‘faces’ composed of 
modified ellipses. The basic procedure for generating faces is described in the 
Methods section for Experiment 1.  
 
 
Figure 4.2: The seven steps of feature size. The top row shows faces from the size 
condition. Each face has features 20% larger than the face to its left. The bottom row 
shows faces from the size + location condition. Each face has features 20% larger than 
the face to its left and some features differ in location by 20% between subsequent faces. 
Actual stimuli in full colour. 
The two series differed slightly in the differences that occurred from item 
to item. In the “size” condition each new face in the series differed from the 
previous by a 20% increase or decrease in the size of certain features. In the 
“size + location” condition each face differed from the previous both in the size of 
those features and 20% changes in both their horizontal and vertical co-
ordinates. In addition, small changes to feature form and colour occurred at 
random throughout the series. Seven steps of feature size (and location) were 
permissible (see Figure 4.2). Apart from at the minimum and maximum feature 
sizes in the set, feature size would increase or decrease at random. Because the 
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faces were exemplars of the same category, the stimuli were considered to be 
resistant to verbal encoding.  
Of the 253 faces, 200 occurred twice forming shift pairs of study and test 
presentations. These 200 pairs were balanced for horizontal, vertical, centre-
periphery, centre (no shift), and periphery (no shift) conditions with 40 of each 
type. Within each shift type, pairs were balanced for the location of the shift. So, 
for example, of the 40 horizontal shift pairs, 10 were from top left to top right, 10 
from top right to top left, 10 from bottom left to bottom right, and 10 from bottom 
right to bottom left. This avoided the confounding of results for a particular shift 
type (e.g. horizontal) with the effects of shift direction and shift locations. 
In order to prevent the emergence of obvious patterns in presentation (i.e. 
‘different’-‘same’-‘different’-‘same’), two further conditions were included. There 
were 50 ‘foils’: faces that occurred once and did not recur (10 in each location), 
and 25 ‘repeats’: faces identical to the preceding pair (5 in each location). Both 
were balanced across all five locations, but the shift was not specified.  
The order of the 253 faces was always the same, but the order of the 
conditions within the sequence was always determined randomly. Together with 
an initial unscored buffer of 3 trials, the experiment comprised 478 trials. 
Faces were displayed in a continuous series. Participants were required 
to respond according to whether they thought each image was the same or 
different to the previously presented one, without distinct learning and test 
phases. This modification of the continuous recognition paradigm has a number 
of advantages over designs with distinct phases, minimising the opportunity for 
rehearsal and covert regrouping of stimuli (Shepard & Teghtsoonian, 1961).  
A grey cross was displayed in the centre of the screen as a fixation point. 
It was presented at low contrast in order to avoid after-images that might interfere 
with the processing of stimuli presented at the centre of the screen. The screen 
background was a mid-grey and remained the same throughout the experiment. 
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4.1.2.5 Procedure 
Instructions were presented to participants in written form. The 
instructions informed them that they would see a series of faces, and that for 
each they were required to make a response indicating whether they thought it 
was the same or different from the last image. The instructions stated that an old 
item was one that was identical to any previous item in all aspects except spatial 
location. As such, an item could be classed as ‘old’ even if it appeared in a 
different location to its previous appearance. Participants were instructed to fixate 
on the central cross throughout the experiment. The cross was present 
throughout except when a stimulus was presented in the central position. 
Participants carried out a 15-trial practice session, with face stimuli that 
were different to those used in the main experiment. If the experimenter was 
convinced that they had understood the instructions of the experiment the main 
task was begun. If the participant seemed unsure as to the correct procedure 
further verbal instruction was given before they commenced with the experiment.  
Stimuli were displayed in the appropriate position for 100 ms, a 
presentation time too short to allow the participant to fixate a peripherally-
presented stimulus via a saccade (Saslow, 1967). Following the presentation 
participants were required to make a response with the click of a mouse button. If 
they thought the stimulus was the ‘same’ as the previous stimulus, they were to 
click the left button. If they thought it was ‘different’ they were to press the right. 
The next trial would not start until both a response had been given, allowing 
participants to pace the experiment according to their own ability. There was a 
brief interval between the stimulus presentation and the next stimulus during 
which a feedback tone was played. A high-pitched tone indicated a correct 
response and a low-pitched tone indicated an incorrect response. This provided 
some motivation for participants to maintain attention throughout the duration of 
the experiment. 
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4.1.3 Results 
Hit rates were calculated for each shift type in both change conditions. A 
false alarm rate was also calculated for each change condition. It was clear that 
some participants’ found the task difficult and had performed very poorly. In order 
to exclude such data a one-tailed chi square was conducted on each participant’s 
responses, to determine that the number of ‘same’ responses to ‘old’ stimuli was 
significantly above that expected by chance. In two cases there was no 
significant difference, and those participants’ data were omitted from further 
analyses (both of these participants had taken part in the ‘size only’ change 
condition).  
The included data were converted into d’ scores according to both shift 
type (Figure 4.3) and by test location (Figure 4.4). 
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Figure 4.3: The effect of positional shift on d' scores. Data = mean ± SEM. 
4.1.3.1 D-prime scores 
Data were entered into a 2 (change conditions) x 5 (shift type) mixed 
ANOVA. Mauchley’s test of sphericity was significant and consequently 
Greenhouse-Geisser epsilon corrected degrees of freedom are quoted for shift 
type. There was a significant main effect of shift type (F(2.80,109)=34.2, 
MSe=0.137, p<0.001). Tukey’s post-hoc tests revealed that recognition in the 
centre (no shift) condition was significantly better than in all other conditions (all 
p<0.001). In addition, recognition in the periphery (no shift) condition was better 
than that associated with vertical (p<0.01) and centre-periphery (p<0.001) shifts. 
The main effect of change condition was not significant, and neither was the 
interaction between shift type and change type. 
Performance was also analysed by test location. Hit rates for each of the 
five stimulus positions were used to calculate d’ scores. A 2 (change condition) x 
5 (test position) ANOVA was performed on the data. Mauchley’s test of sphericity 
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was not significant. There was a significant main effect of location 
(F(4,156)=35.8, MSe=0.0619, p<0.001). Tukey’s post-hoc tests revealed 
recognition at the central position was significantly better than at all four 
peripheral locations (all p<0.001). Again, no significant main effect of change 
condition was found and there was no interaction between the two factors. 
Top left Top right Centre Bottom left Bottom right
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Size only
Size + Location
 
Figure 4.4: The effect of test position on d' scores. Data = mean ± SEM. 
4.1.3.2 Reaction times for correct recognition 
Reaction times were also measured for hits, and the mean and SEM 
values for hits of each shift type are shown in Figure 4.5. The data were also 
analysed by test position (Figure 4.6).  
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Figure 4.5: The effect of positional shift on reaction times for correct recognition (ms). 
Data = mean ± SEM. 
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Figure 4.6: The effect of test position on reaction times for correct recognition (ms). Data 
= mean ± SEM. 
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A similar 2 x 5 ANOVA as that detailed for the effect of positional shift on 
d’ scores was carried out for the reaction time data. There was a significant main 
effect of shift type (F(4,156)=26.0, MSe=7120, p<0.001). Tukey’s post-hoc tests 
revealed significantly faster reaction times associated with centre (no shift) than 
all other conditions (p<0.001), and faster reaction times for periphery (no shift) 
than for horizontal (p<0.05), vertical (p<0.01), and centre-periphery (p<0.001) 
shifts. Despite the fact that, for each shift condition, size only reaction times were 
faster than those for size + location, no significant effect of change condition was 
found. There was also no interaction between change condition and test position. 
The reaction time results for test position were also analysed with a 
similar 2 x 5 ANOVA as that described previously for d’ scores. Mauchley’s test of 
sphericity was not significant. A significant main effect of test position was found 
(F(4,156)=15.8, MSe=7440, p<0.001). Tukey’s post-hoc tests revealed 
significantly faster reaction times associated with recognition at the central 
position than at all peripheral locations (all p<0.001). Neither the main effect of 
change condition nor the interaction between change condition or test position 
reached significance. 
4.1.3.3 Serial position 
In order to compare this hybrid same/different-continuous recognition 
paradigm with the continuous recognition results obtained previously (see 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3), the hit (p(hit)) and false alarm (p(false)) rates were 
determined for 10 trial epochs that were plotted in sequence (Figure 4.7). Unlike 
the results described in Chapters 2 and 3, these data do not show any consistent 
trends of p(hit) or p(false) associated with serial position, suggesting that 
recognition was performed at a steady state. 
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Figure 4.7: The effect of serial position on hit and false alarm rates. Epoch = 10 trials. 
Data = mean ± SEM. 
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4.1.4 Discussion 
Positional translation impaired recognition accuracy and speed. Whilst, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, recognition was best when a stimulus was studied and 
tested at fixation, there was also an advantage for stimuli that remained in the 
same peripheral location compared to shifted stimuli. In the case of d’ scores this 
advantage was not complete. The periphery (no shift) condition was associated 
with higher scores than both vertical and centre-periphery shifts, but was not 
significantly different to horizontal shifts. However, reaction times were faster for 
the periphery (no shift) condition than all shift conditions.  
It is unsurprising that recognition was best at fixation, because one would 
expect the better acuity of foveal vision, compared with peripheral vision, to be 
more suited to the fine discrimination of features that the task required. 
Interestingly, however, this better acuity was of no help in forming an accurate 
representation of items subsequently tested in the periphery. When stimuli were 
studied centrally and then tested at a peripheral location (centre-periphery shift) 
d’ scores were lowest, and reaction times slowest.  
The results suggest that horizontal and vertical shifts were comparable in 
terms of their effects on recognition, in contrast to the findings of Gratton et al. 
(1997) and Hornak et al. (2002), but in agreement with those of Dill and Edelman 
(2001) who used a more similar stimulus set and task to the present study. 
Hornak et al.’s study presented stimuli in pairs on opposite sides of the fixation 
point, requiring the participant to make recognition judgements based on the 
identity of both stimuli. This task may have been more demanding than a 
same/different decision on a single stimulus (as in the current study), as it 
required division of visual attention across both left and right, or upper and lower, 
visual hemifields. This could conceivably have resulted in participants using 
verbal labels for the pictures of objects that were used as stimuli, as an 
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augmentation strategy for memorising items. Language abilities are, of course, to 
some degree hemispherically-organised, and the verbal labeling strategy might 
be expected to be disrupted more by horizontal shifts than vertical ones. The 
authors argue that, as they included multiple exemplars of each category of 
object used, naming would not have been an efficient strategy for object 
discrimination. However, as has been demonstrated in Chapter 2, this precaution 
is not sufficient to prevent a category-based advantage in recognition from 
occurring. Indeed, a recent study by Grill-Spector and Kanwisher (2005) found 
that participants presented with natural images performed as quickly and 
accurately on a categorisation task as they did on a task requiring object 
detection. This suggests that object categorisation is automatic and 
instantaneous with conscious realisation of an object’s presence and, as such, 
one might infer that object categorisation would have played a part in the Hornak 
et al. study.  
Such explanations, however, cannot account for the similar findings of 
Gratton et al. (1997) who used line patterns that were, presumably, not amenable 
to verbal labelling. However, the kind of discrimination required in Gratton and 
colleagues’ study was quite different to that required in the current experiment. In 
Gratton et al.’s experiment, stimuli were very similar to one another being 
composed of lines of a limited number of orientations (horizontal, vertical, 45º left 
and right), and also with the requirement that they be either horizontally or 
vertically symmetrical. Due to the limited number of component features (the 
lines) ‘new’ stimuli could conceivably be considered to be rearrangements of the 
preceding stimuli, thus making the changes between items similar to those 
encountered in the configurational ‘scrambling’ described by Dill and Edelman 
(2001). These authors found that when stimuli retained the same features but 
differed in their spatial configuration, they were discriminated in a manner 
different to that for stimuli whose configuration remained the same, but whose 
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features differed. Dill and Edelman did not, however, find any evidence of 
differences between vertical and horizontal shifts, suggesting that these 
differences may be specific to the type of stimuli being tested. 
Interestingly, the nature of variation in the stimuli (change condition) had 
no significant effect on any of the results of the current experiment. Whether the 
change between stimuli consisted of a simple change in the size of features, or in 
both their size and location, the effect was the same. However, as noted in the 
Results section, reaction times for size only were always faster than those for 
size + location, and d’ scores were almost always lower for this condition. Further 
research would be needed to establish the reliability of this finding. Based on the 
findings of Dill and Edelman, one might have expected to see a difference in the 
level of positional specificity of representations when the configuration of features 
was manipulated compared to when only the properties of the features 
themselves were altered. However, the configurational change in the current 
study was relatively mild compared to that employed by Dill and Edelman, where 
features could be present anywhere within the stimulus. In the current 
experiment, features retained the same basic relationship to one another, even if 
their proportional positions altered from item to item. 
The results can be interpreted as evidence that memory representations 
of complex novel visual stimuli have some positional specificity, as has previously 
been determined for simple patterns, but this specificity is not complete. This 
suggests that the dichotomy between total specificity and complete invariance 
may be false, and that the accuracy of perception of different objects under 
different conditions lies along a continuous dimension between these two 
extremes. Indeed, it might be more sensible to consider these results as 
evidence for same positional advantage rather than positional specificity, as the 
superiority of periphery (no shift) trials over trials shifted within the periphery was 
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not clear-cut. Future work is needed to determine whether this advantage is 
persistent or whether certain experimental conditions eradicate it. 
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4.2 Experiment 6: The putative effect of position on recognition is 
not observed when eye position is monitored 
4.2.1 Introduction 
The accuracy of results obtained in experiments examining the effects of 
retinal position on recognition, is crucially dependent on the assumption that 
participants are fixating where they should be. Whilst many studies rely on 
participants following instructions to maintain stable, voluntary fixation 
(Biederman & Cooper, 1991; Dill & Edelman, 2001; Dill & Fahle, 1997, 1998; 
Gratton, Corballis, & Jain, 1997; Hornak, Duncan, & Gaffan, 2002; Kahn & 
Foster, 1981), very few have verified fixation using eye-tracking equipment. One 
might expect that, as participants are normally unable to predict the location at 
which the next stimulus will appear, the central fixation point will be fixated. 
However, there is the possibility that fixation will tend towards the location of the 
last stimulus producing an advantage for discrimination at that location. For 
example, if a stimulus is presented to the left of fixation and subsequently a 
participant’s fixation tends towards the left, if the next stimulus is presented at 
that same location it will be experienced at a more central region of the retina 
than the experimenter assumes. If the next stimulus is presented to the right of 
fixation, it will be experienced more peripherally than assumed. If, as has been 
suggested in Experiment 5, there is a recognition advantage associated with 
central vision, the former case (when discrimination was between two 
presentations at the same location) might be expected to be associated with 
better recognition, and the latter (where the two presentations are at different 
locations) might be expected to be associated with poorer recognition. Unless 
eye position is monitored, fixation can only be assumed. 
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To the author’s knowledge eye-tracking has only been included in one 
previous study (Nazir & O'Regan, 1990). In their first experiment, a photoelectric 
device was used to measure eye movements, and if a participant’s gaze deviated 
more than 0.3° from fixation the target was immediately masked. There is, 
however, no data on the accuracy of the device used in the Nazir and O’Regan 
study, and no way of knowing how rapidly their apparatus could mask the stimuli 
once deviations from fixation had been detected. Given these potential sources of 
error it is possible that a participant’s eye movements could have taken their gaze 
considerably closer to the target than the reported methods describe.  
In order to address this issue, the current experiment replicated 
Experiment 5, with the addition of eye-tracking to verify fixation at the start of 
each trial. No trial would start until fixation of a cross at the central location was 
detected. Whilst this was often associated with longer intertrial intervals at the 
start of the experiment, the effect was one of training the participants to fixate the 
cross between trials, such that later trials were performed without delay. The use 
of eye-tracking ensured that stimuli were presented at their assumed retinal 
locations. 
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4.2.2 Methods 
4.2.2.1 Design 
The experiment had a one-way within subjects design. The independent 
variable was the nature of the positional shift (or lack thereof) between stimulus 
location on initial viewing (study presentation) and subsequent viewing (test 
presentation). The shift types studied were the same as those described for 
Experiment 5. The dependent variables were the participants’ d’ scores, reaction 
times, and hit and false alarm rates.  
4.2.2.2 Participants 
All of the participants were students at the University of Nottingham (10 
female, 10 male), taken from an opportunity sample. The mean age of 
participants was 20.4 (± 0.3) years of age. All participants had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. None had previously been exposed to the stimuli. 
4.2.2.3 Apparatus and materials 
The experiment was run using the same computer and software 
described for Experiment 5. The images were displayed at the same size 
(approximately 2° x 2° when viewed at a distance of 57.5 cm).  
Eye movements were monitored using an ISCAN Inc. RK-726PCI 
Pupil/Corneal reflection tracking system. The system divided the video signal into 
a 512H x 265V pixel matrix. Eye position data was refreshed every 16.7 ms with 
a resolution of approximately 0.3°.  
4.2.2.4 Stimuli 
The stimulus set employed was the “size only” set of face-like stimuli 
previously described for Experiment 5.  
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4.2.2.5 Procedure 
Instructions were presented to participants in written form. These were 
similar to those given for Experiment 5, with the additional information that each 
trial would only begin once participants were fixating on the cross at the centre of 
the screen. The low-contrast fixation cross (approximately 1° in each direction 
from the centre of the screen) was present throughout the experiment, except 
when a stimulus was presented in the central position. 
Participants were seated in front of the screen, and the eye-tracking 
apparatus was calibrated. Participants were asked to fixate each of 5 crosses, 
presented on the screen, in turn. One was in the centre, and then there was one 
in each corner of the screen. The information from each was used subsequently 
to estimate eye position. Participants’ fixation of each cross was tested a second 
time to determine whether the estimations were accurate, and the process was 
repeated until accuracy was achieved. Participants first participated in a 15-trial 
practice session, with similar but different stimuli to those used in the main 
experiment. If the experimenter was convinced that they understood the 
instructions of the experiment the main task was begun. If the participant seemed 
unsure as to the correct procedure further verbal instruction was given before 
they began the experiment.  
Before both the practice and main sequences the experimenter gave the 
instruction to fixate on the central cross. Once the participant was fixating, the 
experimenter pressed a key to set the current eye-tracker co-ordinates as those 
for future fixation assessments. Once this was done the participant was free to 
start the sequence with a mouse click.  
At the start of each trial the program waited until the participant was 
fixating within a 1° x 1° area around the centre of the fixation cross. Once correct 
fixation was detected the stimulus would be displayed in the appropriate position 
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for 100 ms. Following the presentation, participants were required to make a 
response with the click of a mouse button. If they thought the stimulus was the 
‘same’ as the previous stimulus, they were to click the left button. If they thought 
it was ‘different’ they were to press the right. The next trial would not start until a 
response had been given, allowing participants to pace the experiment according 
to their own ability. There was a brief interval between the stimulus presentation 
and the next stimulus in which a feedback tone was played. A high pitched tone 
indicated a correct response and a low pitched tone indicated an incorrect 
response. This provided some motivation for participants to maintain attention 
throughout the duration of the experiment. 
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4.2.3 Results 
Both hit rates and false alarm rates were calculated in a similar manner to 
that described for Experiment 5. In order to exclude data from participants who 
performed very poorly on the task, a one-tailed chi square was conducted on 
each participant’s responses, to determine that the number of ‘same’ responses 
to old stimuli was significantly above that expected at chance. In one case there 
was no significant difference, and that participant’s data was omitted from further 
analysis. The resulting data were converted into d’ scores (Figure 4.8). 
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Figure 4.8: The effect of shift type on d' scores. Data = mean ± SEM. 
4.2.3.1 D-prime scores 
Mauchley’s test of sphericity was not significant for these data. A one-way 
within subjects ANOVA with 5 levels was performed on the data with shift type as 
the within-groups factor. There was a significant main effect of shift type 
(F(4,72)=10.9, MSe=0.0994, p<0.001). Tukey’s post-hoc tests revealed that 
206 
scores for the centre (no shift) condition were significantly higher than those for 
all other conditions (at least p<0.01). In a departure from the results of 
Experiment 5, no differences between the periphery (no shift) condition and any 
of the shift conditions were found. 
Performance was also analysed by location. Hit rates and false alarm 
rates for each of the five stimulus positions were used to calculate d’ scores 
(Figure 4.9). 
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Figure 4.9: The effect of test position on d’ scores. Data = mean ± SEM. 
Mauchley’s test for sphericity was not significant. A one-way within 
subjects ANOVA with 5 levels was performed on the data with test position as the 
within-groups factor. There was a significant main effect of location 
(F(4,72)=11.1, MSe=0.0631, p<0.001). Tukey’s post-hoc tests revealed that 
scores for the central location were significantly higher than for all other locations 
(at least p<0.01). No other differences reached significance. 
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To summarise, d’ scores showed a recognition advantage when test 
occurred at fixation (i.e. the centre (no shift) condition). However, whether stimuli 
in the periphery were shifted or not made no difference to d’ scores. The addition 
of eye tracking to the experimental setup effectively eradicated the advantage for 
periphery (no shift) over some shift types that was observed in Experiment 5. 
4.2.3.2 Reaction times for correct recognition 
Reaction times for hits were also measured (Figure 4.10). Mauchley’s test 
of sphericity was not significant. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was 
carried out on the data for shift type. There was a significant main effect of shift 
type on reaction times for hits (F(4,72)=14.9, MSe=7040, p<0.001). Tukey’s post-
hoc tests revealed significantly faster reaction times for the centre (no shift) 
condition than horizontal, vertical, and centre-periphery shifts (p<0.001). In 
addition, the periphery (no shift) condition was associated with faster reaction 
times than both vertical (p<0.05) and centre-periphery (p<0.001) shift conditions. 
These results are important in demonstrating that the superior d’ scores for the 
centre (no shift) shift type were not the result of a speed-accuracy trade off. 
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Figure 4.10: The effect of shift type on reaction times for hits (ms). Data = mean ± SEM. 
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Figure 4.11: The effect of test position on reaction times for hits (ms). Data = mean ± 
SEM. 
Reaction times were also calculated by test position (Figure 4.11). A 
similar one-way ANOVA to that carried out for the shift type data was performed 
on test position data. Mauchley’s test of sphericity was not significant. There was 
a significant main effect of test position on reaction times for correct recognition 
(F(4,72)=10.3, MSe=6360, p<0.001). Reaction times were faster at the central 
position than top left, top right, bottom right (p<0.001) and bottom left (p<0.01), 
again demonstrating that the central advantage was not the product of a speed-
accuracy trade off. 
Interestingly, whilst the superior d’ scores associated with the periphery 
(no shift) condition in Experiment 5 were not replicated in the current experiment, 
faster reaction times for this condition were present.  
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4.2.3.3 Serial position 
The data for p(hit) and p(false) were calculated for epochs of 10 trials 
(Figure 4.12). The p(false) values decreased consistently throughout the 
experiment. This is in contrast to the effect of serial position on p(false) observed 
for the continuous recognition task, in Experiments 1-4. In these experiments, 
p(false) increased during the course of the experiment before reaching a steady 
state. In addition p(hit) values were approximately constant throughout this 
experiment. 
0 10 20 30 40
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
p(hit)
p(false0
 
Figure 4.12: The effect of serial position on p(hit) and p(false). Epoch = 10 trials. Data = 
mean ± SEM. 
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4.2.4 Discussion 
The results demonstrated that shifting a stimulus between study and test 
presentations had no significant effect on recognition accuracy when fixation was 
verified with an eye-tracker. A significant effect of ‘shift type’ was demonstrated 
but post-hoc analysis revealed that this was attributable to a difference between 
the centre (no shift) condition and all other conditions. In contrast to the findings 
of Experiment 5, recognition accuracy, as measured by d’ scores, was no better 
when study stimuli presented in the periphery were subsequently tested in the 
same location, compared to when they were shifted. It would seem that the 
apparent positional effects of Experiment 5 (i.e. some degree of positional 
specificity in the peripheral visual field) were artefacts of changes in fixation. 
When participants are trained to return their eyes to the central cross between 
trials, d’ scores for the periphery (no shift) condition were no different to the 
scores for horizontal, vertical, or centre-periphery shifts. The remaining valid 
differences between all four of these conditions and the centre (no shift) condition 
can be explained with reference to the better acuity of vision in the foveal region, 
which would be expected to produce more detailed mnemonic representations of 
stimuli, and facilitate discrimination. Also, whilst the 100 ms presentation time 
was too rapid for a saccade to peripherally presented items to be carried out, 
there is the possibility that the initial stages of saccade initiation may have begun 
during this time (e.g. Holt, 1903; Ross, Morrone, & Burr, 1997; Volkmann, 1962), 
and this may have disrupted perception of the stimulus. Obviously this would not 
have been the case for items presented at fixation.  
The most likely reason for the differences observed between Experiments 
5 and the current experiment, is that when fixation was not explicitly controlled, 
the gaze of participants remained directed closer to the location of the last 
stimulus observed than the central location (when presentation occurred in the 
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periphery). This would have meant that if such a stimulus was the study stimulus 
of a periphery (no shift) trial, the subsequent test, in the same location, would 
have been experienced more centrally. As vision has greater acuity nearer the 
central fovea, this might have aided discrimination in the manner suggested 
previously. Alternatively (regardless of acuity) position specificity may be a 
property of central vision not the periphery. Vertically or horizontally shifted 
presentations would likely have been further away from this putative drifted point 
of fixation, with a corresponding deficit to discrimination. Such advantages and 
disadvantages would have been eradicated by the task demand of training the 
gaze on the fixation cross at the start of each trial.  
Interestingly, whilst the discrimination advantage for periphery (no shift) 
was eradicated by the introduction of eye-tracking, the reaction time advantage 
for this condition over shift conditions was not entirely dissipated. Recognition 
was faster in the periphery (no shift) condition than in both the vertical and 
centre-periphery shift conditions, although it was no different to the horizontal 
shift condition (a difference that was present in the results of Experiment 5). This 
finding gives an indication that there remains some recognition advantage, in 
terms of speed of processing (but not necessarily accuracy), for items presented 
in the same location at study and test (albeit a weaker one than that found with 
free fixation).  
The demonstrated importance of verifying fixation location has far-
reaching implications for research in this field, which has largely neglected this 
precaution. None of the previous positional translation studies, with the exception 
of one of Nazir and O’Regan’s (1990) experiments, has measured the direction of 
the gaze, and merely assume that fixation remains at the designated marker. 
This casts previous findings of positional effects by a number of authors into 
serious doubt (Dill & Edelman, 2001; Dill & Fahle, 1997, 1998; Kahn & Foster, 
1981). However, Nazir and O’Regan’s (1990) Experiment 1 did find positional 
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effects, despite monitoring the direction of gaze. Could it be that differences of 
task and/or stimulus type were responsible for the breakdown of translation 
invariance in this case? A possible explanation for the discrepancy between the 
current results and those of Nazir and O’Regan, is that the two experiments 
followed very different procedures, used different stimuli at different retinal 
locations, and even reported a different measures of recognition. In Nazir and 
O’Regan’s study, participants were given unlimited time to familiarise themselves 
with targets at their ‘study’ location (±2.4° from fixation) and were then trained 
extensively in discrimination of targets from distracters at that location. This is a 
very different kind of learning to that involved in rapidly memorising an image 
seen only once. Also, the stimuli were dot patterns, so recognition could only be 
achieved through memorisation of their spatial configurations (as all dots were 
the same size, and all configurations consisted of the same number of dots). With 
many repetitions of stimuli at the same retinal location one might expect a certain 
degree of perceptual learning at that location that would aid subsequent 
recognition there. Indeed, Dill (2002) reviews evidence from a number of studies 
suggesting that position-specific perceptual learning of such patterns occurs over 
hundreds of trials.  
The findings of the current experiment make clear the importance of using 
eye-tracking equipment to objectively verify the fixation location, in order to 
ensure that participants are fixating where they are supposed to. Despite the 
methodology of this experiment differing from Experiment 5 only in the controlling 
of fixation, entirely different results were produced. They suggest that the finding 
of Experiment 5 that same-different discrimination of face-like stimuli is subject to 
positional specificity effects, is potentially erroneous, and that, in fact, such 
discriminative ability is translation invariant. Further experiments monitoring the 
direction of gaze without controlling it would be useful in determining whether the 
214 
advantages of discrimination accuracy are the product of drifting fixation, or 
whether other factors are involved.  
Future work is also required to determine whether this effect is specific to  
particular tasks and stimuli, or whether a reevaluation of the vast majority of 
positional translation literature is needed. Given the results of Nazir and O’Regan 
(1990), whose study did take into account the direction of gaze, further work 
needs to establish what features of stimuli, and what kinds of task, cause a 
breakdown of translation invariance. Are the effects of position related to 
configurational versus featural discrimination? Are they the product of perceptual 
learning at a single location as opposed to a single exposure? These are 
questions that will need to be answered in order to better understand how the 
translation invariance observed in the current experiment can, under certain 
circumstances, breakdown. 
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4.3 Experiment 7: Translation invariance for location transfers to 
fractal stimuli 
4.3.1 Introduction 
The results of Experiment 6 demonstrated that the sensitivity of 
same/different discrimination of face-like stimuli was invariant with regards to 
positional translation. However, what is unclear is whether this finding can be 
generalised to performance in this particular task, or whether it is specific to the 
recognition of the face-like stimuli employed.  
There is some evidence in the literature that the degree of positional 
specificity associated with object representations in memory is related to 
participants’ familiarity with those objects. For example, Biederman and Cooper 
(1991) found no evidence of positional specificity with their experiments using 
pictures of common objects, and neither did Dill and Edelman (2001; 
Experiments 1-3) with animal-like objects. However, experiments using abstract 
patterns (e.g. Dill & Fahle, 1997, 1998; Kahn & Foster, 1981; Nazir & O'Regan, 
1990) have found evidence of incomplete invariance. Indeed, perhaps most 
compelling are the findings of Dill and Edelman’s (2001) later experiments 
(Experiment 4) in which they scrambled the configuration of the component 
features of their animal-like objects to make unfamiliar constellations, resulting in 
the breakdown of translation invariance.  
It can be argued that, like the animal-like stimuli used by Dill and 
Edelman, the face-like stimuli employed in Experiments 5 and 6, whilst not 
particularly realistic, are familiar to participants to some extent. They emulate the 
basic configuration of human faces. Without examining the generality of the 
findings of Experiment 5 to other, more abstract/novel stimuli, it is impossible to 
tell whether the positional translation observed is common to the recognition of 
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other objects in this task. In order to test, in a limited way, the generality of the 
findings the same experiment was carried out using abstract fractal patterns, that 
differed from one another by regular changes to their features in a manner similar 
to that employed in Experiment 5. 
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4.3.2 Methods 
4.3.2.1 Design 
The design of the experiment replicated that described for Experiment 6. 
4.3.2.2 Participants 
All of the participants were students at the University of Nottingham (11 
female, 9 male), taken from an opportunity sample. The mean age of participants 
was 21.0 (± 0.9) years of age. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. None had previously been exposed to the stimuli. 
4.3.2.3 Stimuli 
The stimuli used were a series of 254 fractals, the basic construction of 
which is given in the Methods section of Experiment 1. In order that this series 
was in some way comparable to the series of face stimuli used previously (i.e. 
that measured changes took place between subsequent stimuli) 254 fractals 
were generated, each differing from the previous by measured changes in each 
superposition of the stimulus. For each superposition the variable GA, specifying 
the depth of deflection, was either increased or decreased by 30% at random. 
Also for each superposition a randomly selected value from the RGB value was 
either increased or decreased by 0.08 (within the minimum and maximum limits). 
An example of a series of different stimuli generated in this way can be seen in 
Figure 4.13. 
 
Figure 4.13: An example of seven subsequent fractals. Each fractal varies in the depth of 
deflection for each superposition, and in changes to variables defining their colours. 
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4.3.2.4 Procedure 
The procedure was the same as Experiment 6, and again, eye-tracking 
equipment was used to monitor the location of fixation. 
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4.3.3 Results 
A similar preliminary one-tailed chi-square test to that carried out for 
Experiment 5 was carried out on the results, and all participants were shown to 
have performed better than chance. Consequently, all participants’ data were 
entered into subsequent analyses. D-prime scores were calculated from the hit 
and false alarm rates in the manner previously described for Experiment 5. 
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Figure 4.14: The effect of shift type on d' scores for face (replotted from Experiment 6 for 
comparison) and fractal recognition. Data = mean ± SEM. 
4.3.3.1 D-prime 
D-prime scores were calculated for shift type and test position, separately, 
as described for Experiment 5. The scores from the current experiment, and 
those from Experiment 6 were compared (Figure 4.14). The data were entered 
into a 2 (stimulus type) x 5 (shift condition) mixed ANOVA. Mauchley’s test for 
sphericity was significant for shift type, and Greenhouse-Geisser epsilon 
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corrected values are quoted for these results. There was a significant main effect 
of stimulus type (F(1,37)=21.0, MSe=0.950, p<0.001). Fractals were recognised 
with more accuracy than were faces. There was also a significant main effect of 
shift condition (F(2.51,93.0)=8.60, MSe=0.144, p<0.001). Tukey’s post-hoc tests 
revealed that the centre (no shift) condition was associated with significantly 
higher scores than horizontal, vertical, and centre-periphery shifts (all p<0.001). 
In additon, the periphery (no shift) condition was associated with higher scores 
than the centre-periphery shift (p<0.01). A significant interaction between 
stimulus type and shift condition was detected (F(2.51,93.0)=6.32, MSe=0.144, 
p<0.01). Post-hoc tests revealed that for horizontal, vertical, and centre-periphery 
shifts, and periphery (no shift), recognition of fractals was significantly better than 
that of faces (all p<0.05), but in the centre (no shift) condition there was no 
difference. In addition, for face recognition there were significant advantages for 
centre (no shift) over horizontal, vertical and centre-periphery shifts (p<0.001) 
and periphery (no shift) (p<0.01). Recognition of fractals was associated with only 
one significant difference: periphery (no shift) was associated with higher scores 
than centre-periphery shift (p<0.05). 
These results appear to show some effect of position, as there was an 
advantage of the periphery (no shift) condition over one shift condition (centre-
periphery shift). Interestingly, the otherwise consistent advantage of fractal over 
face recognition was not replicated for the centre (no shift) condition, perhaps 
suggesting a ceiling effect, or a loss of central advantage for fractal recognition.  
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Figure 4.15: The effect of test location on d' scores for fractal and face recognition. Data 
= mean ± SEM. 
D-prime data was also analysed by test location (Figure 4.15) in a 2 
(stimulus type) x 5 (test location) ANOVA. Mauchley’s test of sphericity was not 
significant and sphericity was assumed. The data showed a significant main 
effect of stimulus type (F(1,37)=23.1, MSe=0.940, p<0.001) (fractals associated 
with higher scores than faces). There was also a significant main effect of test 
location (F(4,148)=7.71, MSe=0.0835, p<0.001). Post-hoc tests revealed a 
significant advantage for discrimination at the central location over top left and 
top right (p<0.001), as well as bottom left (p<0.01) locations. No significant 
interactions were detected.  
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Figure 4.16: The effect of shift type on reaction times for hits (ms) for fractal and face 
recognition. Data = mean ± SEM. 
4.3.3.2 Reaction times for correct recognition 
Reaction time data for hits was also analysed by shift type (Figure 4.16) 
and test location (Figure 4.17). Data analysed by shift type were entered into a 2 
(stimulus type) x 5 (shift condition) ANOVA. Mauchley’s test of sphericity was not 
significant. Stimulus type was not significant, but there was a significant main 
effect of shift (F(4,148)=8.45, MSe=5490, p<0.001). Tukey’s post-hoc tests 
revealed significantly faster reaction times for the centre (no shift) condition than 
horizontal, vertical, and centre-periphery shifts (p<0.001), and also the periphery 
(no shift) condition (p<0.01). The periphery (no shift) condition was associated 
with faster reaction times than centre-periphery (p<0.001) and vertical (p<0.01) 
shifts. The horizontal shift condition was associated with faster reaction times 
than centre-periphery shift (p<0.01). Furthermore, there was a significant 
interaction between stimulus type and shift type (F(4,148)=15.0, MSe=5490, 
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p<0.001). Fractal recognition was associated with faster reaction times for centre 
(no shift) compared with both centre-periphery (p<0.01) and vertical shifts 
(p<0.05). Face recognition was associated with significantly faster reaction times 
for centre (no shift) compared with horizontal, vertical, and centre-periphery shifts 
(p<0.001) and periphery (no shift) (p<0.05), as well as advantages for periphery 
(no shift) over centre-periphery (p<0.001) and vertical (p<0.01) shifts, and for 
horizontal shift over centre-periphery shift (p<0.05). 
These results suggest that the effect of translation on reaction times is 
more moderate for fractal recognition than it is for recognition of faces, although 
the rank order of the shift conditions (centre (no shift) < periphery (no shift) < 
horizontal shift < vertical shift < centre-periphery shift) remains the same for both 
stimulus types. 
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Figure 4.17: The effect of test location on reaction times for hits (ms) for fractal and face 
recognition. Data = mean ± SEM. 
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Reaction time data were also analysed by test location in a 2 (stimulus 
type) x 5 (test location) ANOVA. Mauchley’s test of sphericity was not significant. 
There was no main effect of stimulus type, although a significant main effect of 
test location was revealed (F(4,148)=9.66, MSe=5970, p<0.001). The central 
location was associated with significantly faster reaction times than were any of 
the four peripheral locations (p<0.001). There was a significant interaction 
between stimulus type and test position (F(4,148)=3.46, MSe=5970, p<0.05). 
Whilst there was a significant reaction time advantage for discrimination of faces 
in the central location, no significant differences between reaction times for 
recognition of fractals by location were identified. This is further evidence that the 
central advantage observed for face recognition is not as pronounced in the 
recognition of fractals. 
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Figure 4.18: The effect of serial position on p(hit) and p(false) for recognition of fractals 
and faces. Epoch = 10 trials. Data = mean ± SEM. 
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4.3.3.3 Serial position 
Data were divided into 10 trial epochs based on the serial position of trials 
within the experiment. For each epoch p(hit) and p(false) were calculated and 
compared with data from Experiment 6 (Figure 4.18). The effect of serial position 
on p(false) for fractal recognition was similar to that observed for faces, 
decreasing throughout the course of the experiment. Furthermore, p(hit) values 
were approximately constant throughout the course of the experiment for both 
types of stimuli. 
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4.3.4 Discussion 
Importantly, the results demonstrate that the pattern of results observed 
for face-like stimuli in Experiment 6 is largely replicated for fractals. Fractals were 
recognised with greater ease than were the faces, perhaps indicating that the 
changes from stimulus to stimulus were easier to detect than were the changes 
between faces, but there were few indicators that recognition was more accurate 
when study and test stimuli were in the same location. The only evidence to 
suggest any effect of translation was the finding that the periphery (no shift) 
condition was associated with higher d’ scores than was the centre-periphery 
shift for the fractal stimuli. This was, perhaps, a result of the fact that stimuli were 
shifting from a retinal location where acuity was high to a test location where it 
was lower, in the centre-periphery shift. Features encoded at high resolution may 
have been more difficult to recognise at low resolution in peripheral vision. 
Certainly, the centre-periphery shift condition was associated with the lowest d’ 
scores and slowest reaction times for recognition in both Experiment 6 and the 
current experiment. The speed of recognition for fractal recognition also 
demonstrated translation invariance, displaying no central test location 
advantage, unlike the results for faces. Nonetheless, the overall pattern of results 
for fractal recognition were remarkably similar to those for face recognition, albeit 
with fewer significant differences between conditions. 
These results provide support for the idea that the modified same/different 
task, in which there is no training at given retinal locations, is not sensitive to the 
location of stimuli. This is true whether the stimuli are naturalistic face-like images 
with a familiar configuration, or whether they are abstract fractal patterns. The 
translation invariance, therefore, does not appear to be limited to ‘familiar’ 
configurations (faces), as it is also found for novel abstract patterns (fractals). 
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This finding supports the finding of Dill and Edelman (2001) that animal-
like stimuli are similarly unaffected by translation, unless the configuration of their 
parts is scrambled. However, it contrasts with the findings of Dill and Fahle 
(1998) in which same/different discrimination of dot patterns was shown to be 
linearly affected by shifts in position. This may have been due to the fact that the 
shifts they used were not controlled for eccentricity. Shifts could occur 
horizontally or vertically from a study position 1º from fixation. Therefore, a variety 
of eccentricities of stimulus were compared in the results. As is shown in the 
results of this chapter, shifts between locations of different eccentricities (and, 
hence, retinal acuity) are associated with poorer recognition. However, the 
differences between Dill and Fahle’s results and those of the experiments in this 
chapter may also be the result of radically different stimuli. Dill and Fahle’s dot 
patterns are considerably less visually rich than the stimuli used in these 
experiments, and their recognition relies on the accurate encoding of their spatial 
configuration, rather than on component features. The same is true of the 
scrambled animals of Dill and Edelman. On the other hand, both faces and 
fractals could be discriminated from one another on the basis of changes to their 
component features. The evidence seems to suggest that different processes are 
involved in the encoding and recognition of configural and featural information, 
and that the latter is more resistant to changes of location than the former. 
An important question for future experiments is whether other changes to 
stimuli, barring the previously explored avenue of scrambling the configuration of 
object features, can cause a breakdown of invariance with respect to object 
location. For example, do additional translations, such as rotation, cause a deficit 
in the recognition of objects that have been shifted from one position to another? 
Indeed, are the mnemonic representations of objects that can be discriminated 
on the basis of their component features invariant with respect to rotation, in the 
same way that they are with respect to their location? 
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5.1 Experiment 8: Rotation has no effect on translation invariance 
of same/different recognition 
5.1.1 Introduction 
The experiments in Chapter 4 demonstrated that same/different 
recognition of complex visual objects was relatively invariant with regards to 
positional translation. Whether this was the case because adult visual memory is 
capable of instantly recognising novel objects at novel locations in the visual field, 
or whether it was the result of learning during the course of the experiment was 
not determined. It is conceivable that the visual system readily achieves 
invariance with regard to translation along a single dimension, but that this might 
break down when the task becomes more difficult, e.g. with additional 
transformations of the stimulus. It would also be of interest to determine whether 
the visual system is invariant with regards to different types of transformation 
(e.g. object rotation) in their own right.  
Recognition of familiar items (e.g. letters, digits) (Corballis, Zbrodoff, 
Shetzer, & Butler, 1978; Simion, Bagnara, Roncato, & Umilta, 1982) and items 
with pronounced diagnostic features (e.g. line drawings of objects) (Eley, 1982; 
Jolicoeur, 1985) rotated in the image plane are associated with relatively small 
error rate and reaction time costs. These costs are usually eliminated with 
practice (Jolicoeur, 1985). However, if the objects are novel (e.g. letter-like 
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shapes) greater costs are incurred (Tarr & Pinker, 1989), and practice does not 
eliminate these effects. This finding was not replicated in a study of macaque 
monkey recognition, where an initial orientation dependency in the identification 
of novel objects gave way to an ability to generalise across rotations (Logothetis, 
Pauls, & Poggio, 1995). The effect of familiarity on invariance with regards to 
rotation appears to depend on the nature of the stimuli employed, and the nature 
of the task. 
There is other evidence to suggest that the effects of rotation on 
recognition are different for different classes of objects. Cooper and Brooks 
(2004) found that reaction times for the recognition of animals, as a function of 
angle of rotation, formed an inverted-U shaped curve (i.e. that reaction times 
were slowest for recognition at 180º). The curve for recognition of objects at the 
basic-level (e.g. piano, phone, tricycle) was M-shaped, similar to the inverted-U 
but with faster reaction times at 180º. This finding is similar to that of a number of 
psychophysical studies of pattern recognition, which have shown that angles 
close to 90º reduce accuracy more than rotations of 180º (Dearborn, 1899; 
Foster, 1978; Rock, 1973). Cooper and Brooks also found a right hemisphere 
advantage for the recognition of animals but none for other objects.  
The differences described by Cooper and Brooks have been ascribed to 
the involvement of different brain regions operating on different spatial relations. 
The right fusiform gyrus is a region involved in face recognition, and may also be 
involved in the recognition of other biological forms. The homologous region in 
the left hemisphere is suggested to be involved in more general, bilateral object 
recognition (Rossion et al., 2000). The system mediating face recognition codes 
coordinate spatial relations specified relative to a fixed location, whereas that 
mediating basic level object recognition codes categorical spatial relations 
(Cooper & Wojan, 2000). It could be the case that these differences are also 
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responsible for the different effects of rotation on familiar and novel objects, 
especially when rotations of 180º are used. 
There is considerable evidence that faces are recognised by different 
mechanisms to most other object classes, and the effects of rotation on the 
recognition of faces are quite different to its effects on recognition of other 
objects. One effect that seems to be unique to faces is the disproportionate 
disruption to recognition caused by inversion, or 180º rotation. Inversion of faces 
causes a disruption of the normal pattern of facial features, also known as facial 
syntax (Ellis, 1986). When recognition of upright and inverted objects from a 
range of classes was compared, upright faces were the easiest to recognise, 
whereas inverted faces were the most difficult (Yin, 1969). Diamond and Carey 
(1986) explained the effect with reference to expertise, as a similar inversion 
effect was found for dog experts’ recognition of the faces of dogs. However, the 
finding of a right hemisphere advantage for recognition of unfamiliar faces (i.e. 
those seen only once previously) (Bruyer, 1986; Ellis, 1983; Rhodes, 1985), 
coupled with no lateralisation for inverted faces, is evidence that differential 
processing of faces occurs. Indeed, more recently Kanwisher et al. (1997) have 
found evidence for the involvement of the right fusiform gyrus in the recognition of 
faces.  
The finding of an ‘inversion effect’ for faces begs the question of why this 
is the case. Facial identification relies predominantly on configural information, 
such as the spatial relations between different parts of the face, due to the 
unusual homogeneity of faces as a visual stimulus class. The configurational 
cues that aid identification of an individual face are disrupted more by inversion 
than isolated feature cues (Rhodes, 1993). This may explain why recognition of 
other objects is affected less by inversion than the recognition of faces, because 
their discrimination is more often carried out on the basis of featural information. 
Collishaw and Hole (2002) used blurring to disrupt the featural processing in the 
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recognition of both upright and rotated faces. Whilst upright blurred faces were 
recognised well above chance, blurred inverted faces were not recognised above 
chance. The authors ascribed the difference to the ability to process configural 
information in upright and inverted faces, suggesting a linear relationship 
between the degree of rotation and the degree of disruption to configural cues. At 
180º configural cues were assumed to have been totally disrupted hence the 
chance level of performance.  
Further to the reliance on configural cues in the processing of faces, it has 
been suggested that upright faces are processed in a holistic, global manner, 
whereas the recognition of inverted faces relies on the recognition of isolated 
features. Robbins and McKone (2003) trained participants extensively in the 
discrimination of faces of identical twins, at both upright and inverted orientations, 
and from multiple views. They found that upright discrimination was supported by 
holistic processing whereas in the inverted orientation discrimination was 
dependent on the learning of local feature differences specific to certain images 
of the faces. Participants did not learn to holistically process the faces, 
suggesting that the advantage for upright faces is not related to expertise. This 
supports the theory of an innately driven component in face recognition (de 
Gelder & Rouw, 2000; Farah, Rabinowitz, Quinn, & Liu, 2000; Morton & Johnson, 
1991) perhaps involving a critical period in infancy for the development of holistic 
processing (Le Grand, Mondloch, Maurer, & Brent, 2001). 
Electrophysiological study of IT neurones in monkeys demonstrates that 
they are more sensitive to changes in nonaccidental properties (NAPs) than 
changes in metric properties (MPs) (Vogels, Biederman, Bar, & Lorincz, 2001). 
Whilst MPs, such as the degree of curvature of a contour, are view-dependent, 
NAPs, such as the linearity of a contour or the coterminal of pairs of contours, are 
relatively invariant over rotations in depth. The relative sensitivity of IT neurones 
to these properties, in spite of the fact that the image variation produced by 
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changes in MPs is greater than that produced by changes in NAPs, suggest that 
IT is more sensitive to the transformation invariant properties of objects than 
view-dependent properties. Vogels and colleagues suggest that this may enable 
the immediate recognition of novel objects at new views. Whilst these results are 
more pertinent to the study of 3D rotations, rotation in the image plane might be 
expected to be even more dependent on NAPs as there is less view-dependent 
variation in the image. Visual areas dedicated to extracting NAPs from visual 
information would be essential for achieving invariance of recognition for objects 
rotated in 2D. Given the theory that IT is organised according to experience (C. 
A. Erickson, Jagadeesh, & Desimone, 2000), it can be predicted that invariance 
with regards to rotation may be dependent on how familiar objects and their 
components are. 
In addition to the effects of rotation per se, one might expect this 
transformation to effect positional translation. A number of studies have 
combined the two transformations in the investigation of pattern matching. Kahn 
and Foster’s (1981) same/different experiments with random dot patterns 
employed both rotations of 90º and 180º, as well as positional shifts of 0.5º and 
1.0º of visual angle. The results indicated that rotation had a lesser effect on 
recognition accuracy than the distance between study and test locations. Whilst a 
significant effect of positional shift was found for objects rotated 90º (performance 
was lower for objects shifted between the left and right peripheral locations than 
other conditions) the effect of shift was not significant for point inversion (180º 
rotation). Dill and Fahle’s (1998) very similar study also found an effect of 
translation for shifts of up to 2º. Recognition accuracy was inversely related to the 
distance of the shift, but again this effect was eradicated after 180º rotation of the 
pattern. The authors argued that this indicated that positional specificity occurred 
at relatively low levels of processing. When the ‘higher’ levels of cognitive 
processing needed to mentally rotate an object were required in the task, the 
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displacement effect vanished. Patterns rotated as well as displaced showed no 
variation in accuracy or speed of recognition. 
These results are similar to those of Larsen and Bundesen (1998) who 
studied same/different discrimination of simultaneously presented patterns, 
located on the periphery of a circle with a radius of approximately 3º, centred on 
fixation. They found no effect of spatial separation on d’ scores in the absence of 
rotation, but when patterns forming a ‘same’ pair could differ from one another by 
both a positional translation and a rotation, a different effect emerged. When 
these task demands were in place, but the rotational component of a ‘same’ pair 
was 0º, d’ was a decreasing function of the distance between the two patterns. 
The effect of spatial separation was less pronounced at rotations of 10º, 20º and 
30º. The authors explained this result by proposing that ‘same’ judgements were 
made by the mental translation of one pattern to the location and orientation of 
the other, and testing for a match. When a rotation was required, reaction times 
were a function of the angle of rotation.  
Having previously discovered that same/different discrimination of face-
like stimuli differs from that of patterns when stimuli were translated between 
locations in the visual field, it was of interest to determine whether this effect 
would change when the requirement of mental rotation was added to the task. In 
the current experiment the positional translations were accompanied by rotations 
of some stimuli by 180º. It has been suggested by Dill and Edelman (2001) that 
translation invariance breaks down when the configuration of the stimuli is 
disrupted by scrambling. The current experiment aimed at determining whether 
this was the case when the configuration of face-like stimuli was disrupted by 
inversion.  
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5.1.2 Methods 
5.1.2.1 Design 
The experiment had a two-way within subjects design. The independent 
variables were the shift type, and the rotation type of the stimuli. Three positional 
shift types were studied (see Figure 5.1): periphery-periphery (a shift of 5.6°, 
between the right and left peripheral positions), centre-periphery (a shift of 2.8°, 
between the central position and either right or left position), and periphery-centre 
(a shift of 2.8°, from either left or right to centre). In addition, conditions in which 
the stimuli remained either at fixation (centre (no shift)) or in the same peripheral 
location (periphery (no shift)) were studied. Four rotation types were studied 
across two consecutive blocks (see Figure 5.2): upright-upright, inverted-inverted, 
normal-inverted and inverted-normal. Inverted stimuli differed from upright stimuli 
by a 180° rotation.  
The dependent variables were the participants’ d’ scores, and the reaction 
times for correct recognition (hits).  
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Figure 5.1: The three possible stimulus positions (left, centre, right) as well as the three 
shift types (P-P = periphery-periphery shift, C-P = centre-periphery shift, and P-C = 
periphery-centre shift). Actual stimuli were in full colour.  
    
Figure 5.2: The four rotation types for a 'same' study-test pair: a) upright-upright, b) 
inverted-inverted, c) upright-inverted, and d) inverted-upright. Actual stimuli were in full 
colour. 
5.1.2.2 Participants 
The 24 participants (15 female, 9 male), were students of Nottingham 
University, taken from an opportunity sample. The mean age of participants was 
24.9 (±0.8) years of age. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. None had previously been exposed to the stimuli. 
5.1.2.3 Apparatus and materials 
The apparatus and experimental set-up were the same as those 
described for Experiment 6. 
b) c) d) 
C-P (2.8°) P-C (2.8°) 
P-P (5.6°) 
a) 
237 
5.1.2.4 Stimuli 
The stimuli were generated in a similar manner to the series used in 
Experiment 6. Two sets of 253 faces were generated: one for each experimental 
block. When an inverted face was specified by the program, the stimulus’ co-
ordinates were rotated 180° before display. Participants were required to respond 
according to whether they thought each image was the same or different to the 
previous one, regardless of whether the image was in a different location or 
orientation to the previous image. 
Within each series of 253 faces, 200 occurred twice forming shift pairs of 
study and test presentations. These 200 pairs were balanced for periphery-
periphery, centre-periphery, periphery-centre, centre (no shift), and periphery (no 
shift) conditions with 40 of each type. Within each shift type, pairs were balanced 
for the location of the shift. So, for example, of the 40 horizontal shift pairs, 20 
were from left to right and 20 from right to left. This avoided the confounding of 
results for a particular shift type with the effects of shift direction and shift 
locations. 
In order to prevent the emergence of obvious patterns in presentation (i.e. 
‘different’-‘same’-‘different’-‘same’), two further conditions were included. There 
were 50 ‘foils’: faces that occurred once and did not recur (10 in each location), 
and 25 ‘repeats’: faces identical to the preceding pair (5 in each location). These 
were balanced such that 20 of the foils and 10 of the repeats occurred on both 
the left and the right, and that 10 of the foils and 5 of the repeats were in the 
centre.  
The order of each set of 253 faces was always the same, but the order of 
the conditions within the sequence was always determined randomly for each 
participant. Together with an initial unscored buffer of 3 trials, the experiment 
comprised 478 trials. 
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In block A trials were subdivided into two sections of 100 study-test pairs. 
Section a was composed entirely of upright stimuli and section b entirely of 
inverted stimuli. The order of these sections was counterbalanced across 
participants. The buffer trials were composed of stimuli of the orientation of 
whichever section occurred first. The reason for this division was to prevent the 
ease with which upright orientation study-test pairs could be discriminated from 
inverted pairs, were the two to be intermixed. In block B 100 study-test pairs were 
upright-inverted and 100 were inverted-upright. Foils were of the opposite 
orientation to the preceding trial and repeats were of the same orientation. In this 
block the two orientation types were intermixed, as the distinction between 
different pairs was harder to detect.  
5.1.2.5 Procedure 
The procedure was largely same as for Experiment 5, and was repeated 
so that each participant completed both blocks. The order of blocks A and B was 
counterbalanced. The only other difference in the procedure was that, in addition 
to stressing that items differing from a previous item in their spatial location but 
being identical in all other respects would be classified as old, the instructions for 
the current experiment specified that items differing by a rotation of 180º, but 
otherwise identical, should also be classified as ‘old’.  
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5.1.3 Results 
All trials in which participants took longer than 3 sec to respond were 
rejected. From the remaining trials hit rates were calculated from test trial 
accuracy data for each shift type and rotation type. False alarm rates were 
calculated for each rotation type. In order to exclude data from any participants 
who performed exceptionally poorly, a one-tailed chi square was conducted on 
each participant’s responses, to determine that the number of ‘same’ responses 
to old stimuli was significantly above that expected by chance. In one case there 
was no significant difference, and that participant’s data were omitted from further 
analysis.  
5.1.3.1 D-prime scores 
The resulting data were converted into d’ scores, to give a measure of 
discrimination (Figure 5.3). 
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Figure 5.3: The effect of rotation type and shift type on d' scores. U-U = upright-upright, I-
I = inverted-inverted, U-I = upright-inverted, I-U = inverted-upright. Data = mean ± SEM. 
A two-way within subjects ANOVA with 4 (rotation type) x 5 (shift type) 
levels was performed on the data. Mauchley’s test of sphericity was not 
significant for rotation type or shift type. There was no significant main effect of 
rotation type, but there was a significant main effect of shift type (F(4,92)=9.77, 
MSe=0.275, p<0.001). Tukey’s post-hoc tests revealed significantly higher scores 
for the centre (no shift) condition than all shift types (at least p<0.05). In addition, 
periphery (no shift) was associated with higher scores than periphery-centre shift 
(p<0.05). The interaction between rotation type and shift type was not significant. 
The manipulation of rotating stimuli had no effect on d’ scores. There was 
evidence of a positional effect in the data (centre (no shift) advantage, periphery 
(no shift) recognition better than periphery-centre), but as in Experiment 7, it was 
limited to circumstances in which stimuli shifted between central vision and the 
visual periphery.  
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Figure 5.4: The effect of test position on d' scores. Data = mean ± SEM. 
D-prime scores were also analysed by test position (Figure 5.4) in a 4 
(rotation type) x 3 (test position) ANOVA. Mauchley’s test of sphericity was not 
significant for any of the results. No significant effects of either rotation type or 
test position were found. 
In order to determine whether the orientation of either the study or test 
stimuli were significant in affecting the results, d’ scores were calculated for shift 
type for both of these factors (Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6). The study orientation 
scores were entered into a 2 (study orientation) x 5 (shift type) repeated 
measures ANOVA. There was no significant main effect of either study 
orientation or shift type, and the interaction between the two factors was not 
significant. 
Test orientation scores were entered into a 2 (test orientation) x 5 (shift 
type) ANOVA. Again, no significant effect of orientation on d’ scores was found, 
and neither the main effect of shift type nor the interaction was significant. 
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Figure 5.5: The effect of study orientation on d' scores. Data = mean ± SEM. 
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Figure 5.6: The effect of test orientation on d' scores. Data = mean ± SEM. 
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Figure 5.7: The effect of rotation type and shift type on reaction times for hits (ms). Data 
= mean ± SEM. 
5.1.3.2 Reaction times for correct recognition 
A similar two-way repeated measures ANOVA to that previously 
described for d’ scores was carried out on reaction time data. Mauchley’s test of 
sphericity was significant for both rotation type and the rotation type x shift type 
interaction, although neither of these were significant. There was a significant 
main effect of shift type (F(4,92)=4.25, MSe=10500, p<0.01). Tukey’s post-hoc 
tests revealed significantly faster reaction times for the centre (no shift) condition 
than the centre-periphery shift (p<0.01), periphery-periphery shift, and periphery 
(no shift) (p<0.05). 
Rotation had no effect on the speed of recognition. There was a centre 
(no shift) advantage for the speed of recognition, but no other differences were 
observed. 
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Figure 5.8: The effect of test location on reaction times for hits (ms). Data = mean ± 
SEM. 
Reaction time data were also analysed according to test location with a 
similar ANOVA to that previously described for the analysis of d’ scores. 
Mauchley’s test of sphericity was significant for rotation type. Rotation type was 
not significant, but there was a significant effect of test position (F(2,46)=6.55, 
MSe=6670, p<0.01). Post-hoc tests revealed significantly faster recognition of 
items tested at the central location in comparison to on the right (p<0.01). The 
interaction between rotation type and test position was not significant. 
Reaction time data were also calculated for study orientation (Figure 5.9) 
and test orientation (Figure 5.10). The data for study orientation were entered into 
a 2 (study orientation) x 5 (shift type) ANOVA. Mauchley’s test of sphericity was 
not significant for any of these data. There was a significant main effect of study 
orientation (F(1,23)=4.25, MSe=21600, p<0.01): items studied in the upright 
orientation were recognised significantly faster than those studied in an inverted 
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orientation. The main effect of shift type was not significant, and there was no 
significant interaction between study orientation and shift type. 
The test orientation results were analysed in a 2 (test orientation) x 5 (shift 
type) ANOVA which revealed no significant main effects, and no interaction 
between the two factors. 
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Figure 5.9: The effect of study orientation on reaction times for correct recognition. Data 
= mean ± SEM. 
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Figure 5.10: The effect of test orientation on reaction times for correct recognition. Data = 
mean ± SEM. 
 
247 
A1 A2 A3 A4 B2 B3 B4
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
C-P
P-C
P-P
C
P
 
Figure 5.11: The effect of learning throughout the course of the experiment for each shift 
type. Epoch = 121 trials. A = first block, B = second block. C-P = centre-periphery shift, P-
C = periphery-centre shift, P-P = periphery-periphery shift, C = centre (no shift), P = 
periphery (no shift). Data = mean ± SEM.  
5.1.3.3 Serial position 
In order to assess the effect of learning throughout the experiment, trials 
from both experimental blocks were divided into four parts. The three buffer trials 
from each block were discarded and then the remaining 484 trials were divided in 
four such that an epoch consisted of data from 121 trials. Blocks were then 
arranged in the order that participants carried them out, such that data from 8 
consecutive epochs could be compared. For each epoch p(hit) and p(false) were 
used to calculate d’ scores for each shift type (Figure 5.11). These scores were 
then analysed in a 5 (shift type) x 8 (epoch) repeated-measures ANOVA. 
Mauchley’s test of sphericity was significant for both shift type and epoch, and the 
results for these factors are Greenhouse-Geisser epsilon corrected. There was a 
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significant main effect of shift type (F(2.82,64,8)=7.63, MSe=1.12, p<0.001) and 
of epoch (F(3.31,76.2)=4.51, MSe=4.67 p<0.01). Tukey post-hoc tests revealed 
significantly lower scores at epoch 1 compared to those at epochs 5, 6 and 8 (all 
p<0.05), and lower scores at epoch 2 than at epoch 8 (p<0.05). There was no 
significant interaction between shift type and epoch. 
What these results reveal is a significant learning effect resulting in 
improvement of performance over the course of the experiment. The lack of 
interaction between shift type and epoch, however, suggests that the learning is 
not dependent on positional shift, but occurs across all trials. 
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Figure 5.12: The effect of learning throughout the course of the experiment for each 
rotation type. A = first block, B = second block. Data = mean ± SEM. 
In addition to analysing the effect of learning by shift type, the data were 
also analysed by rotation type. Because only two rotation types were present in 
each experimental block (upright-upright and inverted-inverted in the separated 
block, and upright-inverted and inverted-upright in the mixed block) it seemed 
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that comparing the performance of those participants who carried out that block 
first (A) should be compared with that of those who carried it out second (B), 
rather than attempting to break the results down further by epoch. D-prime scores 
for each rotation type and each block were calculated and organised in order that 
this comparison could be made (Figure 5.12). The data were subsequently 
analysed in two ANOVAs. The first compared the performance of participants 
who performed the separated block first with those who participated in it second. 
The ANOVA was a 2 (order) x 2 (rotation type) mixed measures design. Neither 
factor was significant and there was no interaction between the two. The second 
ANOVA was similar but compared performance on the mixed block by the order 
of the experiment. Again, there was no effect of rotation type, but there was a 
significant main effect of order (F(1,22)=7.55, MSe=0.473, p<0.05). Participants 
who performed the mixed block as the second experimental block performed 
better than those who carried it out as the first block. 
Again, these results demonstrate an effect of learning and, interestingly, 
also suggest a difference between conditions. It seems that participants’ prior 
experience of the separated block improved their performance on the mixed 
block, although the opposite effect did not occur. This can be tentatively assumed 
to suggest that familiarity with the stimuli facilitated participants’ subsequent 
ability to recognise rotated stimuli, but that performance for unrotated stimuli 
remained constant. 
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5.1.4 Discussion 
Rotation of the stimuli had no effect on recognition. Rotation type had no 
effect on either the accuracy or the speed of recognition, although there was 
evidence that upright studied items were recognised faster than those studied in 
the inverted orientation. The disruption of the configuration of face-like stimuli by 
180° did not appear to have any major effect on the participants’ ability to 
recognise the stimuli, providing further evidence that these stimuli may not be 
recognised in the same manner as real faces. No ‘inversion effect’ was observed. 
The finding of slower reaction times associated with recognition of stimuli initially 
viewed in the inverted orientation, suggests that representations of inverted 
configurations were more difficult to retrieve than those for upright configurations, 
even though their accuracy was unaffected by orientation. Studies using items 
both studied and tested in the upright orientation or studied and tested in the 
inverted orientation, have previously found evidence for an orientation effect (e.g. 
Yin, 1969), but the current experiment extends that finding further to suggest that 
it is the study orientation that is critical.  
Previous studies also indicate a right hemisphere advantage for 
recognition of unfamiliar faces (Bruyer, 1986; Ellis, 1983; Rhodes, 1985), for 
which there is some evidence in the present study. Face-like stimuli tested in the 
right visual field (processed in the left hemisphere) were recognised significantly 
more slowly than those tested at the central location, whereas those tested in the 
left visual field (right hemisphere) were not. Previous comparisons of upright and 
inverted faces, however, have found that this lateralisation breaks down when the 
face is inverted (Rapaczynski & Ehrlichman, 1979; Yin, 1970; Young & Bion, 
1980), whereas the current results show a left visual-field (right hemisphere) 
advantage for stimuli irrespective of the orientation. Indeed, the involvement of 
the right fusiform gyrus in recognition of these stimuli seems unlikely, given the 
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relative ineffectiveness of rotation at impairing recognition of the face-like images. 
This pattern is more suggestive of recognition on the basis of categorical spatial 
relations, as is found in basic level object recognition, which is impaired more by 
rotation of 90º than 180º (e.g. Foster, 1978). This would suggest that the face-like 
stimuli are recognised in a manner more similar to that of patterns than that of 
real faces.  
The effect of positional translation was similar to that seen in Experiments 
6 and 7. There was a recognition advantage in terms of both speed and 
discriminative ability for items that were studied and tested at fixation, although in 
a departure from previous experiments, the central test location was not 
associated with more sensitive discrimination than left and right locations. This 
was likely because of the inclusion of a periphery-centre shift in the current 
experiment, associated with much lower d’ scores for items tested in the central 
location. Previously only centre (no shift) trials were tested in the central location, 
and this condition was associated with high d’ scores. The results also showed 
higher d’ scores associated with recognition of periphery (no shift) trials than with 
the periphery-centre shift – the condition in which performance was poorest 
overall. The inclusion of this positional shift demonstrated that study in the 
periphery and test at the central location was as effective as, if not better than, 
the opposite pattern of locations in disrupting recognition. The shift of objects’ 
positions between retinal locations of different visual acuity seemed to be the 
cause of the positional effect, as changes between peripheral locations of similar 
acuity (periphery-periphery shift) did not have the same deleterious effect on 
recognition. As in Experiments 6 and 7 there were effects of translation, although 
these can be more readily explained with reference to retinal acuity changes than 
as a function of spatial separation per se. 
Interestingly, given the previous results in studies combining positional 
translation and rotation (Dill & Fahle, 1998; Kahn & Foster, 1981; Larsen & 
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Bundesen, 1998), rotation of stimuli had no effect on the effect of positional 
translation. In previous studies, the differences of recognition performance 
associated with retinal translation in the upright orientation were eradicated by 
180° rotation. In the current experiment, a comparison of the d’ scores for both 
the upright-upright and upright-inverted conditions does show some evidence of 
this. Figure 5.3 shows considerable differences between the mean scores for 
different shift types in the upright-upright condition, whereas the results for 
upright-inverted are remarkably similar across all shift conditions. However, this 
interaction was not statistically significant, so it is necessary to be cautious in 
making any inferences based on it. Indeed, there were no significant interactions 
between shift type and rotation type or orientation in any of the statistical 
analyses, suggesting that the two transformations are processed independently.  
As the current experiment was longer than previous experiments in this 
thesis examining translation alone, it was possible to divide trials into large 
epochs, for which it was possible to obtain d’ scores for each positional shift type, 
and examine learning of each independently. From these results it was possible 
to determine a clear effect of learning over the course of the experiment, resulting 
in better performance on the second experimental block than in the first. The 
effect was not related to shift type, indicating a general increase in discriminative 
ability affecting all locations equally. However, an examination of changes based 
on rotation type revealed a differential effect of experience on discrimination of 
rotated and unrotated stimuli. Performing the experimental block containing 
unrotated stimuli before that containing rotated stimuli significantly improved 
performance on the latter, but the same was not true in the opposite order of 
testing. Whilst the mean scores for performance of the unrotated block were 
slightly greater if it was carried out second, this was not significant. These results 
suggest that discrimination of unrotated stimuli was not affected by the additional 
familiarity with the stimuli gained by carrying out a previous block of trials. 
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However, prior experience with the block of unrotated stimuli did aid subsequent 
discrimination of rotated ‘same’ stimulus pairs. This suggests that transformations 
of rotation and positional shift are processed separately, as learning appeared to 
be unaffected by shift, or lack thereof, whereas the effect of learning seems to 
differ according to whether or not stimuli were rotated. Due to the low number of 
participants in each group for these analyses (N=12), however, the reliability of 
this finding needs to be confirmed in future work. 
The current experiment provides further evidence that the face-like stimuli 
are, paradoxically, not that much like faces, in terms of participants’ recognition 
performance with these stimuli. There was little effect of 180º rotation on 
recognition of these stimuli. Even though stimuli studied in the upright orientation 
were marginally better recognised than those studied in the inverted orientation, 
those studied and tested in the inverted orientation were associated with higher 
scores than those studied and tested in the upright orientation, in marked 
contrast to the pattern with photographs of faces (Moscovitch, Winocur, & 
Behrmann, 1997; Rhodes, Brake, & Atkinson, 1993; Valentine, 1988; Yin, 1969). 
Indeed, the results suggest that these stimuli are recognised in a manner more 
similar to that of basic-level objects and patterns. As such, inversion of the stimuli 
did not greatly impair participants’ perception of their spatial configuration, and 
consequently did not breakdown translation invariance in the manner described 
by Dill and Edelman (2001) for configurally ‘scrambled’ objects.  
The addition of a periphery-centre shift condition added to the existing 
information from Experiments 6 and 7 about the nature of positional effects 
observed in recognition. The eradication of the central test location advantage 
when stimuli have been studied in the periphery makes it clear that better spatial 
acuity at the central location cannot be the sole cause of the differences 
observed between shift conditions. Rather, this finding makes it clear that 
detrimental effects to recognition are caused by shifts between retinal regions 
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with different acuities. Further experiments employing spatial blurring of different 
levels, to control for the greater acuity of central vision, must be carried out in 
order to determine whether this hypothesis is tenable. If recognition of stimuli 
shifted between areas of different eccentricity is impaired by different spatial 
acuities at those eccentricities, one might expect blurring at areas of greater 
acuity to reduce this deficit. 
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6.1 Experiment 9: Intervening stimuli induce an effect of 
translation on recognition 
6.1.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapters have examined the effects of both temporal 
separation (in the case of continuous recognition experiments) and spatial 
separation (in the case of positional translation experiments) between study and 
test stimuli, in isolation from one another. The current experiment combined 
variation in both dimensions.  
The results of previous continuous recognition experiments (e.g. Rubin, 
Hinton, & Wenzel, 1999; see also Chapters 1 and 2; Shepard & Teghtsoonian, 
1961) have demonstrated that the presence of other items between study and 
test presentations is detrimental to recognition, and that this detriment increases 
as a function of the number of items that intervene. In particular, there is a 
marked difference between a lag of 0, when there are no items between study 
and test, and a lag of just 1 intervening item. This effect appears to be 
independent of the type of stimuli employed, e.g. 3-digit numbers (Estes & 
Maddox, 1995b; Shepard & Teghtsoonian, 1961), words (Hintzman, 1969; 
Hockley, 1982; Okada, 1971; Reder et al., 2000), photographs (Nickerson, 1965), 
pictures of common objects (current thesis, Experiment 1), or abstract pictures 
(Doty & Savakis, 1997; current thesis, Experiment 1). Experiments 3 and 4 
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demonstrated that the effect is primarily one of retroactive interference, as it was 
found to be unaffected by study-test interval, but was related to the level of 
interstimulus similarity.  
The effects of spatial shifts between study and test presentation are less 
clear, especially considering certain methodological deficiencies of past 
experiments (i.e. the lack of fixation verification with eye-tracking equipment), but 
may differ according to the type of information encoded. For example, Dill and 
Edelman (2001) suggest that recognition of objects is normally invariant with 
respect to translation in the visual field, but that positional changes are 
detrimental when configural cues for recognition are disrupted. The former finding 
is consistent with the findings of Chapters 4 and 5, which did not show any effect 
of translation per se on same/different discrimination of face-like stimuli and 
fractals, although disruption of the configural cues of face-like stimuli by their 
inversion did not breakdown translation invariance. The pattern of results for the 
recognition of objects is not replicated in studies of pattern recognition, which is 
sensitive to positional changes in the absence of the disruption of configural cues 
(Dill & Fahle, 1998; Kahn & Foster, 1981; Nazir & O'Regan, 1990). This may be 
because when recognising patterns one cannot make use of the translation 
invariant configural information that aids the recognition of natural objects, but 
instead one must rely on other (perhaps feature-based) information that is 
sensitive to position. However, there is also the possibility that discrimination of 
very similar abstract patterns is more difficult to achieve than that of objects, and 
that positional translation exerts greater cognitive costs as a result. Indeed, whilst 
there were no significant effects of translation per se in Experiments 6, 7 and 8, 
the mean d’ values for unshifted peripheral stimuli were greater than those for 
peripherally-shifted stimuli (horizontal, vertical, or periphery-periphery shift 
conditions). It is possible that experiments of these sizes (N=19-24) had 
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insufficient statistical power to reveal small but consistent differences between 
performance in these conditions.  
The effects of interference from intervening trials on recognition of 
translated stimuli have not been systematically examined. Some experiments 
have tested recognition of translated stimuli after intervening stimuli, despite that 
not being the aim of those experiments. For example, Biederman and Cooper 
(1991) carried out an experiment in which participants named 48 objects in a 
‘priming’ phase, and then the same objects again in a ‘primed’ phase, with an 
average 7 min between presentations. Objects could occur to the left or right of 
fixation, and half of the primed items were presented in the same location, and 
half in a different location, to the initial priming position. Biederman and Cooper 
did not find significant effects of translation on priming effects. However, the 
measure they used, priming of the latency of object naming, is quite different to 
recognition. Recognition requires more than simply giving a basic-level name to 
an object, including the accurate identification of the object as one that has been 
seen previously. 
Nazir and O’Regan’s (1990) study of pattern recognition included 
presentation, learning, and test phases. In the presentation phase, the 
participants passively viewed a target stimulus at a peripheral location. The 
learning phase required the participants to discriminate the target from distracters 
at the same location in blocks of 90, until a criterion of 95% accuracy was 
reached. There then followed a 3-block test phase, in which participants were 
required to discriminate target stimuli from distracters at the trained location (to 
the left or right of fixation), at the opposite location, and at fixation. The error rate 
was significantly higher for both non-trained locations in comparison with that for 
the trained location. In this experiment, however, whilst there were stimuli 
intervening between the study and test presentations of stimuli, the fact that there 
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were multiple repetitions of the same stimuli served to reinforce learning of the 
discrimination, not to interfere with it.  
Whilst there is little evidence in the literature to guide theories about what 
effect interference by intervening stimuli might have on translated stimuli, there is 
evidence concerning the effects of increasing interference by increasing 
interstimulus similarity. Dill and Fahle (1998) specifically manipulated the 
‘difficulty’ of their same/different task by introducing dot cloud stimuli that differed 
from same trials only in the position of 1 of 6 dots. The dot in question was 
always displaced horizontally by 80% of the stimulus size. This condition was 
compared with a ‘horizontal’ condition, in which stimuli varied randomly. The 
effect of the manipulation was to greatly increase the similarity between stimuli 
and, thus, the level of interference between such stimuli. The ‘difficult’ condition 
was associated with a larger detrimental effect of positional translation on 
recognition accuracy (p<0.001) than the ‘horizontal’ condition (p<0.05). In another 
experiment (Dill & Fahle, 1998, Experiment 6), the authors compared randomly 
varying but horizontally symmetrical checkerboard patterns with those that were 
different only by one square. In this experiment there was a significant difference 
between d’ scores for the more difficult than the easier condition, but positional 
translation had a similar effect on both. A similar effect was found in Dill and 
Edelman’s (2001) Experiment 2, in which they manipulated the interstimulus 
similarity of animal-like stimuli. Again, there was an overall effect of increased 
similarity on d’ scores, but no interaction with positional translation. The effect of 
increasing similarity and interference between stimuli seems to differ according to 
the stimuli employed.  
In the absence of any previous studies, the current experiment was an 
attempt to systematically study the effects of ‘lag’ on the recognition of items 
subject to positional translation. A continuous recognition design was used to 
examine the effects of a number of different ‘lags’ (numbers of intervening stimuli) 
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in combination with the effects of the positional translation of items. Fractal stimuli 
were used in the current experiment, as previous experiments had determined 
the effects of interference and similarity (Experiments 3 and 4), as well as those 
of positional translation (Experiment 7), on their recognition. The position of the 
stimuli intervening between study and test was also manipulated, to determine 
whether their location with reference to study and test affected the level of 
interference observed. It was hypothesised that, with the increased cognitive 
demands required of participants during continuous recognition, stimulus position 
would have a greater effect on recognition. As such, it was predicted that longer 
lags would be associated with a breakdown of translation invariance.  
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6.1.2 Methods 
6.1.2.1 Design 
The experiment had a three-way within subjects design. The independent 
variables were lag, shift type, and the position of intervening stimuli. Four lags 
were used: 0, 1, 4, and 8 intervening stimuli. Stimuli were either shifted (5.6º 
between left and right visual field locations, see Figure 6.1) or not shifted. Stimuli 
intervening between study and test (at lags greater than 0) were either all in the 
‘same’ position as the study trial, all in the ‘different’ position to the study trial, or 
(for lags greater than 1) ‘half’ were in the same location and half were in the 
different location (Figure 6.2).  
The dependent variables were the participants’ d’ scores, and the reaction 
times for correct recognition (hits).  
Figure 6.1: The two possible stimulus locations (left and right) and the size of the shift 
between the locations (5.6º). The cross denotes the point for fixation. Actual stimuli were 
in full colour. 
5.6
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Figure 6.2: Examples of the different intervening items conditions. Left and Right denote 
the left and right visual field positions. The example given is a sequence of trials forming 
a shifted study-test pair, with a lag of 4. The locations of intervening stimuli are given for 
a) the ‘same’ condition b) the the ‘different’ condition and c) an example of locations for 
the ‘half’ condition (half of intervening trials on one side and half on the other). Actual 
stimuli were in full colour. 
6.1.2.2 Participants 
The 20 participants (13 female, 7 male), were students of Nottingham 
University, taken from an opportunity sample. The mean age of participants was 
19.7 (±0.5) years of age. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. None had previously been exposed to the stimuli. 
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6.1.2.3 Apparatus and materials 
The apparatus and experimental set-up were the same as those 
described for Experiment 6. Fixation was measured throughout the experiment 
with an eye-tracker. 
6.1.2.4 Stimuli 
The stimuli were a series of 340 fractals generated using the ‘medium’ 
similarity rules described in the Methods section for Experiment 4.  
6.1.2.5 Session design 
A pseudorandomly determined frame of 650 trials was generated for each 
participant, providing 10 study and 10 test trials for each lag, shift, and position of 
intervening stimuli combination (e.g. there were 10 study-test pairs for lag 8, no 
shift, intervening stimuli in the ‘same’ position). There were 60 study-test pairs 
each for lag 8 and lag 4 (shifted and no shift x same, half and different 
intervening stimuli), 40 for lag 1 (shifted and no shift x same and different 
intervening stimuli), and 20 for lag 0 combinations (shifted and no shift). Each 
subset of 10 study-test pairs consisted of 5 pairs with the study location in the left 
position and 5 pairs with the study location in the right position. Study-test pairs 
comprised 360 of the trials. The remaining spaces in the 650 trial frame were 
composed of 145 study-test pairs of unscored filler trials. In addition, the 
experiment began with a buffer of 30 unscored filler trial pairs to prevent the 
occurrence of primacy effects, yielding a total of 680 trials. Once the order of 
trials for the entirety of a session had been generated, the 340 stimuli were 
randomly assigned to the 340 pairs of trials, so that each participant experienced 
the stimuli in a different order. 
Instructions were presented to participants in written form. The 
instructions informed them that they would see a series of fractals, and that for 
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each they were required to make a response indicating whether they thought it 
was completely novel (‘new’) or had been seen previously (‘old’). They were 
informed that items differing from one another in spatial location but identical in 
all other aspects should be classified as ‘old’. Participants were instructed to 
fixate on a central, mid-grey cross which was present throughout the experiment.  
Stimuli were displayed in the appropriate position for 100 ms. Following 
the presentation, participants were required to make a response with the click of 
a mouse button. If they thought the stimulus was ‘new’, they were to click the left 
button. If they thought it was ‘old’ they were to press the right. The next trial 
would not start until both a response had been given, and fixation on the central 
cross was detected, allowing participants to pace the experiment according to 
their own ability. There was a brief interval between the stimulus presentation and 
the next stimulus during which a low feedback tone was played if the previous 
response was incorrect. This provided some motivation for participants to 
maintain attention throughout the duration of the experiment. 
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6.1.3 Results 
All trials in which participants took longer than 3 sec to respond, or those 
in which it took longer than 5 sec to achieve fixation on the central location, were 
discarded. From the remaining trials hit rates were calculated from test trial 
accuracy data for each shift type. A single false alarm rate was calculated for the 
entire experiment.  
In order to exclude data from participants who performed particularly 
poorly, a one-tailed chi square was conducted on each participant’s responses, to 
determine whether the number of ‘old’ responses to repeated stimuli was 
significantly above that expected by chance. This was the case for all of the 
participants, and consequently all data were included in subsequent analyses.  
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Figure 6.3: The effect of lag on d' scores. Data = mean ± SEM. 
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6.1.3.1 D-prime scores 
Hit and false alarm rates were used to calculate d’ scores at each of the 
four lags used in the experiment (Figure 6.3). There was a clear decline in d’ with 
increasing lag, similar to that found in Chapters 2 and 3. 
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Figure 6.4: The effect of shift and same vs. different position of intervening stimuli, at 
lags 1-8. Data = mean ± SEM. 
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Figure 6.5: The effect of shift type and intervening stimuli position on d' scores, at lags 4 
and 8. Data = mean ± SEM. 
In order to determine the effects of the three manipulated variables, d’ 
scores were calculated by lag, shift type, and position of intervening stimuli, using 
hit rates for each condition and false alarm rates calculated according to shift 
type. From these scores two comparisons were made: the effects of lag, shift 
type, and same vs. different position of intervening stimuli for lags 1-8 (Figure 
6.4), and the effect of lag, shift type, and same vs. half vs. different position of 
intervening stimuli for lags 4 and 8 (Figure 6.5).  
The data from the first comparison were entered into a 3 (lag) x 2 (shift 
type) x 2 (intervening stimuli position) repeated measures ANOVA. Mauchley’s 
test of sphericity was significant for lag and the interaction between lag and shift 
type, and these results are quoted with Greenhouse-Geisser epsilon corrected 
degrees of freedom. There was a significant main effect of lag 
(F(1.55,29.5)=30.3, MSe=0.272, p<0.001). Post-hoc analyses revealed 
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significantly better scores for lag 1 than lags 4 and 8 (p<0.001), and better scores 
for lag 4 than lag 8 (p<0.05). There was also a significant main effect of shift type 
(F(1,19)=8.62, MSe=0.309, p<0.01). Stimuli that were not shifted between study 
and test presentations were recognised significantly better than those that were 
shifted (i.e. changed location in the visual field). The main effect of intervening 
stimuli position was not significant and neither were any of the interactions 
between the factors.  
The effects of lag are similar to those encountered in previous 
experiments (Experiments 1, 2, 3 and 4), but, interestingly, there was an effect of 
translation between regions of the same retinal acuity. This was different to the 
results found for previous positional translation experiments in which no stimuli 
intervened between study and test (Experiments 6, 7 and 8). 
The second comparison was analysed with a 2 (lag) x 2 (shift type) x 3 
(intervening stimuli position) repeated measures ANOVA. Mauchley’s test of 
sphericity was not significant for any of the factors. Again, there was a significant 
main effect of lag (F(1,19)=13.0, MSe=0.180, p<0.01), with d’ scores significantly 
higher at lag 4 than lag 8. There were no main effects of either shift type or 
intervening stimuli position. The only significant interaction was that between lag 
and shift type (F(1,19)=7.68, MSe=0.0821, p<0.05). Post-hoc analyses revealed 
significantly better recognition at lag 4 than lag 8 when stimuli were shifted, but 
no difference when there was no shift.  
From the graphs (Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.5), it would appear that the 
superiority for non-shifted stimuli over shifted stimuli at lags 1 and 8 is less 
marked at lag 4. Perhaps this fact, in combination with additional data from the 
‘half’ intervening stimuli position conditions, meant that there was no overall effect 
of shift in the second analysis. Indeed, the interaction demonstrated an effect of 
shift at lag 8, but not at lag 4.  
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Figure 6.6: The effect of shift on d' scores at lag 0. Data = mean ± SEM. 
The previous results demonstrate a partial effect of shift at lags greater 
than 0. In order to determine whether this was the case at lag 0 as well, d’ scores 
were calculated for shift and no shift conditions at lag 0 (Figure 6.6). These data 
were entered into a paired t-test and no significant difference between the two 
conditions was found. This is consistent with the results of Experiment 8, in which 
the periphery (no shift) condition was not associated with significantly different 
scores to those in the periphery-periphery shift condition (equivalent to the no 
shift and shift conditions of the present experiment). It is also consistent with the 
results of Experiments 6 and 7, which did not find any advantages of same 
peripheral location over different peripheral locations of the same eccentricity. It 
appears to demonstrate that the effects of shift differ when stimuli intervene 
between study and test, as effects of shift were only found for lags greater than 0. 
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Figure 6.7: The effect of lag on reaction times for hits (ms). Data = mean ± SEM. 
6.1.3.2 Reaction times for correct recognition 
Reaction time (RT) data for correctly recognised stimuli were analysed by 
lag (Figure 6.7). A similar pattern of results to those of Chapters 2 and 3 was 
found, with RTs increasing with increasing lag.  
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Figure 6.8: The effect of shift type and same vs. different intervening stimuli positions on 
reaction time data for correct recognition (ms) at lags 1-8. Data = mean ± SEM. 
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Figure 6.9: The effect of shift type and intervening stimuli position on reaction times for 
correct recognition (ms) at lags 4 and 8. Data = mean ± SEM. 
The effects of lag, shift type, and intervening stimuli position on RT data 
for hits are illustrated in Figure 6.8 and Figure 6.9. Two ANOVAs, similar to those 
carried out for d’ data, were carried out on the RT data. An ANOVA examined the 
effects of lag, shift type, and intervening stimuli position at lags 1-8. Mauchley’s 
test of sphericity was significant for lag and Greenhouse-Geisser epsilon 
corrected degrees of freedom are quoted. There was a significant main effect of 
lag (F(1.35,25.7)=8.52, MSe=54300, p<0.01) and post-hoc tests revealed faster 
RTs at lag 1 than lag 8 (p<0.001). There were no significant main effects of shift 
type or intervening stimuli position, and none of the interactions reached 
significance. The ANOVA examining data for lags 4 and 8 found no significant 
main effects and no significant interactions. 
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Figure 6.10: The effect of shift on reaction times for hits (ms) at lag 0. Data = mean ± 
SEM. 
The RT data for lag 0 were divided into shifted and unshifted conditions 
(Figure 6.10) and compared with a paired t-test. Again, there was no significant 
effect of shift type. RTs did not appear to be affected by shift in this experiment. 
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Figure 6.11: The effect of study-test interval (sec) and number of intervening items 
between study and test on d' scores. Data = mean ± SEM. 
274 
<3 3-7.9 8-12.9 13-17.9 18-22.9 23-27.9 28+
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
0 intervening items
1 intervening item
4 intervening items
8 intervening items
 
Figure 6.12: The effect of study-test interval (sec) and number of intervening items 
between study and test on RTs for hits (ms). Data = mean ± SEM. 
6.1.3.3 Lag vs. study-test interval 
In contrast to previous continuous recognition experiments in this thesis 
(Chapters 2 and 3), the current experiment was self-paced. Consequently it was 
possible to analyse the results by both number of intervening items and study-
test interval. As has been discussed previously in greater depth (Experiment 3), 
continuous recognition normally confounds the number of intervening items with 
the study-test interval in the single variable, lag. Because the design of the 
current experiment did not impose a fixed relationship between the number of 
intervening items and time elapsed between study and test, the data were 
analysed by both factors in order to determine their relative importance.  
Various preliminary analyses were used to determine appropriate study-
test interval time bins for the final analyses. On the basis of these analyses it was 
decided that 5 sec intervals, starting from 3 sec and going up to 28 sec, would 
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capture the majority of the data. Study-test intervals below 3 sec and over 28 sec 
were included in separate bins. Data were assigned to the appropriate time bin 
for which d’ scores and RTs for hits were calculated for each number of 
intervening items. 
The d’ data (Figure 6.11) show that, overall, the effect of increasing study-
test interval was to decrease d’ scores. Indeed, this was also the case when the 
number of intervening items remained constant. However, examination of time 
bins for which there was data from more than one number of intervening items 
demonstrates that this factor stratifies the data. For example, for the 3-7.9 sec 
study-test interval data point, the differences between 0, 1, and 4 intervening 
items is large. This effect seems to be lessened with increasing study-test 
interval. It would appear that study-test interval and the number of intervening 
items affect the sensitivity of participants’ discriminations. 
The results for RTs for hits appear to show a stronger effect of study-test 
interval (Figure 6.12). The recognition latency increases with increasing study-
test interval overall and for each number of intervening items. Again, though, 
there does appear to be a stratification between data points for different numbers 
of intervening items at the same point, e.g. between 8 and 4 intervening items in 
the 13-17.9 sec time bin.  
In conclusion, both study-test interval and number of intervening items 
seem to be important in determining recognition performance, under the 
conditions of this experiment. However, the current experiment was not explicitly 
designed to separate out these two factors, and it is quite possible that individual 
differences may be at the root of the differences observed. Furthermore, the data 
are potentially confounded because the longest lags (e.g. 8 intervening items) are 
necessarily correlated with the longest study-test intervals so the pattern of 
results should be viewed tentatively. Further research is needed to confirm the 
reliability of these findings. 
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Figure 6.13: The effect of serial position on p(hit) and p(false). Epoch = 20 trials. Data = 
mean ± SEM. 
6.1.3.4 Serial position 
As the current experiment combined aspects of both timed continuous 
recognition (for which an increase in p(false) over the course of the experiment 
has previously been found), and self-paced positional shift experiments (for which 
a decrease in p(false) over the course of the experiment has previously been 
found) it was of interest to determine the effect of serial position on both p(hit) 
and p(false) over the course of the current experiment.  
The data were divided into 20 trial epochs and p(hit) and p(false) were 
calculated for each epoch (Figure 6.13). Interestingly, p(false) remained 
comparatively constant over the course of the experiment, presumably neither 
increasing as a result of proactive interference nor decreasing as a result of a 
learnt improvement in discrimination. It is possible that participants’ ability to set 
the pace of the experiment diminished the effects of proactive interference on 
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their ability to correctly recognise novel stimuli. As in previous experiments, p(hit) 
remained relatively constant for the duration of the experiment.  
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6.1.4 Discussion 
The results of the current experiment confirm the hypothesis that the 
effects of object position are more pronounced when items intervene between the 
study and test presentations. d’ scores were significantly higher for unshifted 
items than shifted items at lags 1-8, regardless of the position of the intervening 
trials. This difference was not present between scores for shifted and non-shifted 
trials when no trials intervened between study and test (lag 0), consistent with the 
results of previous studies (Experiments 6, 7 and 8). It is already well established 
that memory for items in continuous recognition decreases as a function of the 
number of items intervening between study and test, and Experiment 3 suggests 
that this is principally due to interference from the intervening items rather than 
decay of the memory trace. Presumably, with the increased demands on memory 
imposed by having to retain information over as many as 9 trials, the ability of 
visual memory to transfer information across retinal locations is impaired, 
resulting in the positional effect (i.e. a failure of translation invariance).  
This qualitative change in the effect of translation does not appear to be 
caused by an increased difficulty in the task per se. Both Dill and Fahle (1998; 
Experiment 6, checkerboard stimuli) and Dill and Edelman (2001) found that 
increasing the difficulty of discrimination by increasing the similarity of stimuli 
resulted in an overall reduction of performance, but no change in the effect of 
positional translation. Indeed, in the Dill and Edelman study the global similarity 
between stimuli was increased, which would have been expected to increase 
retroactive interference between stimuli in a similar matter to that demonstrated in 
Experiment 4. However, to appreciate the effect of this change, one must take 
into account the different pattern of false alarm rates encountered by Dill and 
Edelman. In a similar manner to the current study, different false alarm rates for 
different shift conditions of study stimuli were used to calculate d’. They found 
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that false alarm rates differed among shift conditions in a similar manner to the hit 
rates, such that shifted stimuli were associated with lower hit rates and lower 
false alarm rates. As such, overall, there was no change in d’ by shift condition, in 
spite of the significantly different hit rates. Essentially, shifting stimuli made them 
more likely to be judged as novel. This effect was greater when the similarity of 
the stimuli was increased. The current experiment found the opposite effect on 
false alarm rates – recognition of shifted stimuli were associated with lower hit 
rates and higher false alarm rates. Shifting the stimuli decreased sensitivity 
without altering response bias. Evidently the effect of increasing interference by 
increasing the global similarity of items is different to that of increasing 
interference by presenting items between study and test. Increases in global 
similarity decrease the overall sensitivity of recognition with a decrease in hit rate 
and a decrease in false alarm rate. They also change the response bias for 
shifted stimuli towards ‘new’. Increasing the number of items intervening between 
study and test decreases overall sensitivity by a decrease in hit rate. It also 
results in reduced recognition sensitivity to shifted stimuli.  
Surprisingly, the position of the intervening items between study and test 
had no effect on recognition. It was expected that, given previous evidence that 
memory is lost primarily through retroactive interference in this paradigm, if the 
intervening stimuli appeared in the same location as the studied item, they would 
have a greater interfering effect on memory for that item. The finding that this is 
not the case indicates that information about the spatial location of items is 
relatively unimportant in terms of interference. The fact that subsequent items 
were present was sufficient to interfere with memory for the study stimulus. It 
would seem that the task of retaining information about several similar stimuli in 
memory becomes more difficult solely as a function of the number of additional 
items, regardless of where that item appears. Interestingly, this suggests a 
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position invariant process of interference, even though recognition may have 
some dependency on stimulus position under these conditions.  
An important difference between the current results and those of 
Experiment 3, was that the link between intervening items and accuracy was less 
marked in the current experiment. Due to the fact that the current experiment was 
self-paced, there was considerable variation in the study-test interval between 
trials of the same lag, both within and between participants. As such, it was 
possible to plot d’ and RT data for each lag (number of intervening items) against 
study-test interval. From this it was possible to infer that, whilst there was a clear 
effect of lag on d’ at lower study-test intervals, the data for different lags became 
indistinguishable at intervals of 8 sec and greater. D-prime values for lags 4 and 
8 also showed a downward trend at longer study-test intervals. This might be 
because the experiment was self-paced, and did not proceed at a constant and, 
from the participants’ perspective, uncontrollable rate. Perhaps when participants 
had control over the rate of presentation they could adapt it in some manner that 
minimised interference, making the effects of decay more prominent. Speed of 
recognition showed a much clearer sensitivity to study-test interval, with RTs for 
each lag increasing as a function of time elapsed. This effect was consistent with 
the findings of Experiment 3. These results suggest that, in addition to the effects 
of interference, there may be variation in the decay of memory traces. Perhaps 
memory traces decay slowest in visual regions associated with a stimulus’ 
location, resulting in an increased positional specificity of recognition as time 
passes. Of course, these effects may not necessarily indicate a spontaneous 
decay in the memory trace, but may be the result of interference from sources 
other than intervening stimuli (e.g. conscious efforts to maintain fixation during 
periods of tiredness, which would also contribute to longer trial durations).  
The current results add to the existing literature on positional translation 
by demonstrating that the intervention of similar but different stimuli between 
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study and test produces an effect of shift on recognition. Recognition where there 
are no intervening items between study and test is not affected by positional 
shifts. This is not the same pattern of results as might be expected based on 
other manipulations of task difficulty, such as the manipulation of similarity 
between stimuli, which have found no change in the effects of translation. An 
interesting future experiment to determine how these factors interact, if at all, 
would be a comparison of different levels of global stimulus similarity on the 
effects of positional translation in continuous recognition. These results also 
suggest that interference from intervening stimuli may be less important than the 
passage of time per se in determining information retention at longer lags. In 
order to examine this phenomenon more systematically further work should be 
done using timed, rather than self-paced, experiments, which vary the speed of 
presentation. With the aid of such future experiments, the factors causing the 
breakdown of translation invariance observed in the current experiment will be 
further elucidated. 
 
282 
*+ 4 '#-
7.1 Summary 
The current thesis investigated the effects of a variety of spatial and 
temporal factors on visual recognition memory in human adults. Temporal factors 
examined included the presence of variable numbers of stimuli intervening 
between the study and test presentations of a novel stimulus, and the amount of 
time elapsed between study and test. These factors were studied using 
continuous recognition, a paradigm that interleaves study-test pairs in such a 
manner that memory performance reaches a relatively steady state, and is 
affected to a much lesser degree by serial position effects than list-based tests of 
memory. The spatial factors that were examined included the composition of the 
stimulus set (i.e. whether stimuli were drawn from a single category or many 
different categories, and the nature of the categories), the similarity between 
items, changes in the spatial location of items between study and test, and 
rotations of items between study and test. Whilst the effects of all of these 
temporal and spatial factors on recognition have been examined before in 
isolation, the current thesis has refined and extended previous findings with the 
use of parametrically defined stimuli that could be quantifiably manipulated. For 
example, the effects of interitem similarity in continuous recognition had 
previously only been determined non-systematically with the use of different 
classes of verbal stimuli (Estes & Maddox, 1995b). Experiment 4 extended these 
findings to readily quantifiable changes in the parameters used to define fractal 
and trigram stimuli. The use of stimuli that were both unfamiliar and not amenable 
to verbal labelling has also extended some of the findings of the extensive body 
of work concerning the recognition of words and other verbally encoded materials 
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into the study of perceptually-based recognition e.g. the well-characterised 
effects of decay and interference on the recognition of words were investigated in 
the recognition of fractals (Experiment 3). In addition, the interrelations of various 
combinations of factors that have hitherto only been examined in isolation have 
been studied systematically in the experiments described here. Whilst both the 
effects of items intervening between study and test and of positional translations 
between study and test have been studied extensively previously, Experiment 9 
found evidence of an important relationship between the two factors. In addition 
to these empirical advances, the work contained within this thesis has made 
possible an important discovery with methodological implications for the study of 
positional translation. Experiment 6 found that fixation verification with eye-
tracking apparatus in a common positional translation experiment design resulted 
in a very different pattern of results to that found in its absence (e.g. Experiment 
5). This has far-reaching implications for the existing body of literature on 
positional translation, most of which is based on studies that do not objectively 
verify fixation.  
Experiments 1 and 2 used continuous recognition to investigated the 
effect of lag (the number of items intervening between study and test) on 
recognition of a variety of stimulus sets (face-like stimuli = ‘faces’, fractals, 
pictures of common objects = ‘pictures’, and digit-letter-digit trigrams) with large 
numbers of participants (50 per group). This was done in order to obtain a 
relatively precise comparison of the recognition profiles for these different classes 
of stimulus. Recognition of stimuli amenable to verbal encoding in terms of both 
simple basic-level object names (pictures), and more complex labels (trigrams), 
could be compared with those for which verbal recoding was a less useful 
strategy (faces, fractals). The experiment determined that recognition of pictures 
was superior to that of all other stimulus types. Recognition of this set was 
associated with significantly greater d’ scores and faster recognition latencies. In 
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addition, trigram recognition was associated with poorer d’ scores than all other 
stimulus sets. These changes were associated with lower false alarm rates 
(p(false)) for pictures and greater p(false) for trigrams. There were also 
interactions between stimulus type and lag. For pictures, d’ scores and reaction 
times indicated significantly better recognition at a lag of 0 than at all other lags, 
but after this stage their values remained relatively constant. Recognition of other 
stimulus sets were associated with a more gradual decline of performance with 
increasing lag. Significant increases in both hit rate (p(hit)) and p(false) during the 
first ten 10-trial epochs of the experiment were found for all stimulus types except 
the pictures.  
Continuous recognition confounds the number of intervening items 
between study and test presentations of a stimulus with the time elapsed. In 
order to probe further how these factors affect recognition under conditions of 
continuous recognition they were separated in an experiment comparing 
recognition performance for stimuli presented at different rates (Experiment 3). 
Both trigrams and fractals were studied with a number of different numbers of 
intervening items, and at three different presentation rates. The study-test interval 
had no effect on d’ scores for both fractal and trigram stimuli, which were affected 
solely by the number of intervening items.  
The role of interference was investigated further in Experiment 4, which 
examined the effect of interitem similarity on recognition. Interitem similarity had 
previously been assumed to affect continuous recognition (Estes and Maddox, 
1995), but no systematic tests of this hypothesis had been carried out. The global 
similarities of blocks of fractals and trigrams were controlled through constraints 
on the variability of certain stimulus parameters. These affected the range of 
letters that could be present in a trigram, or the variability of a number of 
parameters involved in the generation of fractals. The lowest level of global 
similarity amongst stimuli (‘dissimilar’) was associated with lower p(false) and 
285 
higher d’ scores than both ‘medium’ and ‘similar’ stimuli. Hit rates were not 
significantly changed by the manipulation. Similarity had no effect on reaction 
times.  
Experiment 5 studied the effects of spatial separation between study and 
test using same/different recognition of face-like stimuli. Different stimuli differed 
from one another by standard changes of 20% in either the size of certain 
features, or both the size and location of those features. Horizontal, vertical and 
centre-periphery positional shifts between study and test were compared with 
control conditions in which the stimuli remained at the same location. The study 
found a recognition advantage, in d’ and reaction time data, for stimuli that were 
studied and tested in the central location over all other conditions. There was also 
an advantage in both measures for stimuli that were studied and tested in the 
same peripheral location compared with those that were shifted. These effects 
occurred whether the changes were of feature size only or both feature size and 
location, with no significant differences between the two conditions.  
As most previous studies of positional translation had made unverified 
assumptions about participants’ fixation, Experiment 6 used eye-tracking to 
objectively verify central fixation with a similar design to Experiment 5. In this 
version, the next trial would only commence once the participant’s fixation was 
detected in a small area around the fixation cross. The result was that the 
previously observed recognition advantage in d’ scores for peripheral unshifted 
stimuli was eradicated. The advantage in reaction times was also reduced.  
In order to determine whether the findings of Experiment 6 were 
applicable to other complex, abstract stimuli, or whether they were limited to the 
perception of face-like configurations, Experiment 7 replicated the former 
experiment using fractals. When the data from the two experiments were 
compared a familiar pattern of results emerged. The centre (no shift) condition 
was associated with greater d’ scores than all other conditions, and the periphery 
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(no shift) condition was associated with higher scores than the centre-periphery 
shift condition. The interaction results revealed that the former effect was limited 
to recognition of faces whilst the latter was limited to recognition of fractals. 
However, the relative ordering of mean values for recognition of both sets was 
largely unchanged. It was possible that the much better recognition of fractals 
than faces had resulted in a ceiling effect, such that recognition of fractals in the 
centre (no shift) condition did not significantly differ from that of peripheral stimuli. 
Reaction time data revealed a greater effect of shift on recognition latency for 
faces than that for fractals, but the ranking of conditions remained the same. 
Serial position analyses demonstrated decreases in p(false) for both sets 
throughout the duration of the experiment.  
It was hypothesised that the translation invariance of recognition might 
breakdown when recognition was made more difficult by the addition of rotational 
transformations, especially given the well-described effects of inversion on 
recognition of faces (Yin, 1969). In Experiment 8, upright and inverted stimuli 
were tested in both rotated and unrotated conditions, and with and without 
positional translations. Rotation was found to have no effect on recognition, but 
stimuli studied in the upright orientation were recognised faster than those 
studied in the inverted orientation. The effect of shift was similar to that observed 
in Experiments 6 and 7, with a centre (no shift) advantage in d’ scores and 
recognition latencies, and a periphery (no shift) advantage over periphery-centre 
shift in d’. The reaction time results also demonstrated a central test position 
advantage. Serial position data were analysed in epochs of 100 and revealed 
significantly more sensitive discrimination in the second experimental block (of 2) 
than the first. This effect was similar for all shift types. 
In the final experiment (Experiment 9) spatial and temporal factors were 
combined in a continuous recognition experiment with positional shifts. It was 
thought that interference from items intervening between study and test 
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presentations of stimuli would increase the difficulty of the task sufficiently that 
translation invariance would breakdown. The results revealed that the presence 
of items intervening between study and test did indeed induce an effect of shift on 
d’ scores. Items shifted at a constant eccentricity were associated with 
significantly poorer recognition than those that remained in the same location. No 
effect of translation on reaction times was found for this experiment. The position 
of the intervening items was manipulated so that they could occur on the same 
side as the study presentation, the opposite side, or (for longer lags) half on the 
same side and half on the other. However, the position of intervening items had 
no effect on measures of recognition. Post-hoc analysis of the results by both 
number of intervening items and by study-test interval showed an effect of both 
factors.  
7.2 Categorisation vs. recognition 
Whilst it has been documented that the discrimination of visual stimuli on 
the basis of their inclusion in different categories is superior to that of recognition 
of individual exemplars from the same category (e.g. Roberson & Davidoff, 
2000), Experiment 1 further characterised the superiority of categorisation as a 
function of lag, and of serial position. The superiority of recognition of the pictures 
set was assumed to be largely the result of its composition. As it was composed 
of items from many different categories it was highly probable that most 
discriminations could be achieved on the basis of simple categorisation as 
opposed to ‘true’ recognition (Goldstein & Chance, 1970). Discrimination of items 
within this set was associated with a very shallow memory retention curve, and 
no learning effects during the course of the experiment. Compared to other 
stimulus sets, for which discrimination relied on the identification of individual 
exemplars from a single category, discrimination based on categorisation showed 
only a very small decline in sensitivity as a function of lag, and performance did 
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not change significantly during the course of the experiment. Discrimination 
based on recognition from a single category was much more adversely affected 
by items intervening between study and test, and showed improvement during 
the early stages of the experiment.  
A previous study comparing cross-category and within-category 
recognition has suggested that the recognition advantage for cross-category 
decisions is eliminated by verbal interference, suggesting that the advantage is 
based on verbal labels (Roberson & Davidoff, 2000). The use of verbal labels is 
associated with efficient recognition of familiar items, whereas visual 
discrimination is employed for less familiar stimuli (Simons, Graham, Owen, 
Patterson, & Hodges, 2001). The use of basic-level object names to label stimuli 
would have been sufficient for a high discriminative sensitivity for the pictures set. 
This interpretation is supported by the finding that there was no increase in p(hit) 
or decrease in p(false) during the course of the experiment, indicating that 
discrimination of the stimuli was already optimal. As the familiarity of participants’ 
with basic-level object names was assumed to be high at the start of the 
experiment one would not expect any change in participants’ ability to use them 
as the experiment progressed.  
An alternative explanation for good performance with the pictures is that, 
as they were not drawn from a homogeneous category, they were more likely to 
be visually distinct from one another, and that this relative distinctiveness was 
sufficient to improve recognition performance. However, a study of 
distinctiveness effects in face recognition has demonstrated that faces that are 
highly distinct in terms of their spatial characteristics are likely to have certain 
individuating features (e.g. beards) that make them amenable to categorisation 
(i.e. with verbal labels) (Busey & Tunnicliff, 1999). The implicit naming that was 
assumed to be involved in the recognition of pictures is also highly likely to have 
been employed in the recognition of trigrams. However, because these items 
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were highly similar to one another they were assumed to form a homogeneous 
category, and their recognition was correspondingly poorer than more 
heterogeneous stimuli.  
7.3 Changes in recognition with experience 
Through the use of both novel and familiar stimuli (e.g. those that 
participants were likely to already have some experience with, such as pictures of 
common objects) it was possible to determine that recognition changed as a 
result of increased familiarity with stimuli. A comparison of the results of 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 revealed an advantage in discriminative ability 
for the birds set over that of similarly composed sets of abstract, computer-
generated stimuli. This was thought to be the result of a greater initial familiarity 
with birds, a suggestion supported by the lack of subsequent improvement in 
discriminatory ability for these stimuli throughout the duration of the experiment. It 
was assumed that, as participants were already highly familiar with the bird 
configuration, little further learning of this category was possible. However, it was 
possible that subordinate level categorisation (e.g. using subcategories of birds 
such as blackbird, pigeon, etc.) would have been sufficient to increase 
recognition accuracy for this set. It can certainly be concluded that recognition 
was better for natural classes of objects, with which participants may have had 
prior experience, than for artificial categories created for the purposes of the 
experiment (e.g. face-like stimuli, fractals). Indeed, it is perhaps nonsensical to 
attempt to distinguish between perceptual familiarity and the ability to categorise 
at the subordinate level, as the two may develop simultaneously, as a result of 
expertise.  
In addition to finding that classes of stimuli already familiar to participants 
were recognised better than novel stimuli, there was evidence from serial position 
analyses of the data that recognition performance with previously novel stimuli 
290 
improved throughout the duration of experiments. In the case of continuous 
recognition experiments this entailed an increase in p(hit) (e.g. Experiments 1, 2, 
and 3). This indicated that participants were improving their ability to detect ‘old’ 
stimuli. However, this was often accompanied by an increase in p(false) 
suggesting that the improvement in p(hit) may simply have been a change in 
response bias towards responding ‘old’. In the same/different experiments, 
p(false) often decreased during the course of the experiment (Experiment 6, 7, 
8), whilst p(hit) remained relatively constant, indicating an improvement in 
participants’ ability to detect novelty in stimuli irrespective of bias. This was most 
pronounced in the longest experiment, Experiment 8 (956 trials), for which there 
was a clear and significant increase in d’ during the course of the experiment, 
although significant changes occurred in the first 100 trials in several 
experiments. It would seem that relatively little experience is required to improve 
discriminative ability, and that this improvement is immediate.  
There was also evidence from Experiment 8 that the type of experience is 
important in determining the extent of learning. This experiment was divided into 
two blocks of stimuli, stimuli that were rotated between study and test, and those 
that were not. The order in which participants carried out the two blocks was 
counterbalanced, and post-hoc analyses revealed that performance on the 
rotated block was improved significantly if preceded by the unrotated block, 
whereas the reverse effect was not significant. It would seem that the ability to 
mentally rotate stimuli was improved by prior experience of discrimination of 
upright and inverted stimuli, whereas the ability to discriminate the stimuli without 
rotation was unaffected by experience. This analysis is to be validated by future 
experiments. 
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7.4 The importance of interference in continuous recognition 
Considerable evidence for the involvement of both proactive interference 
(PI) and retroactive interference (RI) in affecting continuous recognition memory 
performance was found. With the exception of highly familiar stimulus sets 
(pictures, birds) increases in p(false) during the early stages of Experiments 1-4 
were found. This effect suggested that participants’ ability to detect novel stimuli 
was initially good, but was impaired as the number of previously seen stimuli 
increased. This was presumably because novel arrangements of features 
became increasingly hard to distinguish from the enlarging array of previous 
stimuli. This effect occurred only up to a point as p(false) did reach an 
approximate steady state for each stimulus type in each experiment, in a 
departure from the results of Shepard and Teghtsoonian (1961). The number of 
trials taken to achieve the steady state appears to be linked to the difficulty of 
stimulus discrimination, as p(false) for the hardest stimuli to discriminate (e.g. 
digit-letter-digit trigrams in Experiment 1, and Shepard and Teghtsoonian’s more 
difficult three digit numbers) reached asymptote over the longest numbers of 
trials.  
The effect of lag was shown to be a function of the number of stimuli 
intervening between study and test, rather than the time elapsed, in Experiment 
3. This finding supports an interference-based explanation for the effect of lag i.e. 
that memory for items remains relatively intact unless further different items must 
be remembered before test. Retroactive interference, interference with a memory 
trace by items occurring after participants’ experience of the remembered item, 
would appear to be the most important factor determining d’ with this task. This 
contradicts theories based on a decay over time, in which visual memory is 
thought to be maintained through a process of ‘visual rehearsal’ (A. Baddeley, 
2000; A. D. Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Cowan, 2005). It is also inconsistent with the 
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functional decay theory of Altmann and Gray (2002), which would suggest a 
decline in p(false) during the course of experimental blocks with different rates of 
presentation, as the decay rate adapted to the rate of interference. No evidence 
for such a change was found.  
Interestingly, the recognition latency was affected by the time elapsed 
between study and test, but not by the number of intervening items – the opposite 
pattern to these factors’ effects on d’. This implied that the speed of recognition 
was a function of the speed of presentation, and was not affected by lag. 
However, the results of Experiments 1 and 4 did demonstrate an effect of lag on 
recognition latency when the rate of presentation was held constant. It would 
seem that, when the rate of presentation is allowed to vary, the speed of 
recognition adapts to this rate, in a manner that greatly weakens the effect of lag.  
Experiment 4 provided further evidence that interference between stimuli 
is the primary cause of memory deterioration in continuous recognition, by 
determining that parametric similarity between stimuli within a set affected 
recognition performance. Stimulus sets that were composed of stimuli that could 
vary widely in their defining parameters were recognised considerably better than 
those with parameters that were relatively constrained. Importantly, this effect 
was similar for stimuli that were amenable to verbal labelling (trigrams) and those 
that were not (fractals), supporting the theory that perceptual and verbal 
memories are processed similarly (e.g. Doty & Savakis, 1997; Ward, Avons, & 
Melling, 2005). The lack of difference between high and medium similarity levels 
suggests that there may be perceptual thresholds for the detection of difference. 
Indeed, these thresholds may map onto category boundaries and change with 
experience. There is evidence in the neurophysiological literature that monkey 
perirhinal cortex neurones involved in recognition are organised according to 
sensory experience (C. A. Erickson, Jagadeesh, & Desimone, 2000), suggesting 
a possible neural substrate for altered sensitivity to perceptual similarity. If the 
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detection of similarity is stratified rather than continuous, parametric similarity 
may not directly correlate with participants’ subjective experience of similarity. It 
may, however, explain why certain stimuli are perceived as being more distinctive 
than others. 
7.5 Translation invariance and positional effects in recognition 
The experiments in which positional translation was examined determined 
that recognition memory for stimuli was translation invariant under some 
conditions, but that there was an effect of shift in others. When stimuli were 
examined under conditions of same/different recognition, in both upright and 
inverted orientations, and in both rotated and unrotated conditions (Experiments 
6, 7, and 8), recognition was invariant with regards to translation, at a constant 
eccentricity. However, d’ scores were decreased by shifts between fixation and 
peripheral locations. Recognition performance was also better when stimuli were 
both studied and tested at fixation than when study and test were both at the 
same peripheral location. It was hypothesised that the central advantage in 
recognition was the product of better visual spatial acuity at that region, allowing 
finer discrimination of features at that location than that possible in peripheral 
vision. This factor alone, however, would suggest that stimuli that were 
experienced at fixation for either study (centre-periphery shift) or test (periphery-
centre shift) should be recognised better than stimuli that were both studied and 
tested in the periphery. In fact, the opposite effect occurred. This demonstrates 
that a constant eccentricity, and, therefore, acuity of vision, is important for the 
detection of sameness. Presumably representations of the same stimulus at 
different spatial scales are more likely to be judged as representing different 
objects, than representations of the same object at the same spatial scale.  
The hypothesis that changes in eccentricity, rather than positional shift 
per se, are responsible for some of the translational effects previously reported, is 
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supported to a certain degree by Dill and Fahle’s (1998) study of pattern 
recognition. That study found that pattern recognition performance decreased as 
a function of increasing spatial separation. However, the studied patterns were 
located at an eccentricity of 1° in the periphery and were then shifted horizontally 
or vertically by multiples of 0.5°. Whilst the effect of translation was to decrease 
performance, the effect of translation was lesser at 2°, when half of the trials 
would have been at the same eccentricity as the study trial (e.g. when a pattern 
presented at 1° to the right of fixation was shifted 2° to the left, to a location 1° to 
the left of fixation). 
The results were at variance with those of Gratton et al. (1997) and 
Hornak et al. (2002) who had used similar positional shifts and found evidence 
that horizontal between-hemifield shifts affected recognition more adversely than 
equivalent vertical within-hemifield shifts. There were no significant differences 
between the two conditions in the experiments reported in this thesis, suggesting 
that reported hemispheric differences in recognition may be dependent on the 
type of stimuli used (Gratton et al.: symmetric patterns, Hornak et al.: common 
objects), or the experimental design. Hornak et al. used a design in which pairs of 
objects were presented in which either one or neither of the stimuli had been 
seen previously. This required the division of attention across visual hemifields 
which may have revealed biases in attention not present in the experiments of 
this thesis. 
In Experiment 8 stimuli were presented in two different orientations: 
upright, or inverted (rotated 180°), and ‘same’ stimulus pairs could differ in a 
rotation as well as a positional translation. Despite the very weak inversion effect 
observed (that ‘faces’ studied in the upright orientation were recognised better 
than those studied in the inverted orientation), and a slight right hemisphere 
advantage (‘faces’ were recognised more slowly in the right visual hemifield than 
at centre, whereas this was not the case for those recognised in the left 
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hemifield), the face-like stimuli were not recognised in a similar manner to 
photographs of real faces. The pattern (e.g. that recognition was unimpaired by 
180° rotation) suggested that the spatial relations of the face-like stimuli were 
likely to have been encoded categorically, in a manner similar to that for 
memorisation of common objects and patterns. As such, there was little 
disruption to perception of the stimuli’s configuration, and the hypothesis of Dill 
and Edelman (2001) that such disruption causes a breakdown of translation 
invariance, could not be validated. 
Whilst there was no effect of shift per se, items shifted between visual 
field locations of different eccentricities were associated with poorer recognition 
than those at a constant eccentricity, in a similar manner to that observed in 
Experiment 7. In a contrast to the findings of previous experiments (Dill & Fahle, 
1998; Kahn & Foster, 1981; Larsen & Bundesen, 1998), there was no clear 
evidence that 180° rotation eradicated the effect of position on recognition, 
although mean d’ scores for recognition of rotated stimuli appeared to be more 
similar than those for unrotated stimuli.  
Serial position analyses revealed a clear learning effect over the course of 
the experiment, resulting in better discrimination at later epochs than earlier ones. 
This effect was independent of shift type, suggesting that an increased familiarity 
with the stimuli improved overall performance, but did not improve the ability to 
mentally rotate or recognise shifted stimuli. However, these analyses relied on a 
reduced sample size, and their reliability must be ascertained with future work.  
Interestingly, a rather different pattern of results to those in which fixation 
was objectively verified was obtained in an experiment (Experiment 5) that, like 
many previous experiments in the positional translation literature, did not verify 
fixation. The results indicated that there was a same location advantage for 
recognition, resulting in partial position specificity. These results suggested that 
the face-like stimuli were recognised in a manner more similar to that of abstract 
296 
dot-cloud and checkerboard patterns (Dill & Fahle, 1998) than that of animal-like 
stimuli (Dill & Edelman, 2001). Dill and Fahle (1998) had previously found 
evidence for positional effects in same/different pattern recognition, whereas 
recognition of animal-like stimuli was demonstrated to be invariant with regards to 
position (Dill & Edelman, 2001).  
It was suggested that the important differences between Experiment 5 
and Experiment 6 were caused by drifts in fixation when fixation was not 
controlled. If eye position drifted towards the location of the last stimulus then 
subsequent stimuli occurring at the same location would be perceived more 
centrally than was assumed, whereas subsequent stimuli occurring at different 
locations would be perceived more peripherally than was assumed. Given the 
hypothesis that the central advantage in recognition was the product of better 
spatial acuity at that region, one would expect the better acuity with which stimuli 
in the same location were perceived to result in better recognition than that for 
more peripheral stimuli at other locations. These findings pose important 
questions about the validity of the many past studies of positional effects in 
recognition, hat have made similar assumptions about fixation to those of 
Experiment 5. These previous findings may, perhaps, be similarly misleading in 
suggesting effects of translation that are mere artefacts of drifting fixation.  
Experiment 9 demonstrated that a genuine breakdown of the ‘translation 
invariance’ (i.e. translation invariance at a constant eccentricity), observed in 
Experiments 6, 7, and 8, was possible. Recognition of items shifted between 
visual field locations of a constant eccentricity was impaired relative to those that 
stayed at a constant location. It is likely that the greater demands imposed on 
visual memory by continuous recognition meant that the ability to translate 
information between different retinal locations was impaired, resulting in the effect 
of shift at lags greater than 0. This was not assumed to be a general effect of task 
difficulty per se, as previous experimenters found no effects of increased 
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interstimulus similarity on positional translation (Dill & Edelman, 2001; Dill & 
Fahle, 1998), but was thought to be specific to the presence of items intervening 
between study and test.  
Whilst the effect of increasing similarity was to decrease both p(hit) and 
p(false) resulting in no overall change in d’, the effect of interference from 
intervening items was to decrease p(hit) and increase p(false) with a 
corresponding decrease in d’. The interfering effect of these intervening items 
was not dependent on their occurrence in the same location as either study or 
test. This suggests that the effects of interference are invariant across retinal 
locations, but increase the participants’ reliance on positional information when 
making recognition judgements.  
The analysis of recognition by both the number of intervening items and 
the time elapsed between study and test suggested that there was a greater 
‘decay’ effect in Experiment 9 than that observed without positional shifts in 
Experiment 3. However, this analysis was carried out post-hoc, and attempted to 
address questions that the experiment was not specifically designed to address. 
Individual differences between participants and the effects of fatigue are just two 
factors that could have confounded this analysis. Only future experiments 
specifically designed to examine this issue will determine the reliability of this 
finding.  
7.6 Neural mechanisms 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the repetition suppression (RS) responses of 
IT neurones to effective stimuli are considered to be of primary important in visual 
recognition. Studies of the perirhinal cortex have identified certain subtypes of 
cells exhibiting such responses, including familiarity cells that encode the 
absolute novelty of a stimulus, and recency cells that encode the relative recency 
of exposure to a stimulus (Xiang & Brown, 1998). These responses persist when 
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stimuli intervene between study and test (E. K. Miller, Li, & Desimone, 1993) 
although the robustness of this persistence is variable, with fewer cells 
demonstrating RS as time and the number of intervening items increase (Fahy, 
Riches, & Brown, 1993). What is not clear from previous studies is whether the 
effects of time and intervening items on the number of cells exhibiting RS can be 
dissociated. The results of Experiment 3 demonstrating that, on behavioural 
measures, intervening items are more important than time per se, suggest that 
such an effect may exist at the neural level also. Certainly experiments designed 
specifically to disentangle these two factors at a neural level would be useful in 
determining how closely behavioural measures of recognition are associated with 
RS at the neuronal level.  
The responses of IT neurones have previously been described as 
invariant with respect to transformations of the stimulus dimensions, such as the 
size and position within the receptive field, of an object (Desimone, Albright, 
Gross, & Bruce, 1984). However, more recent studies of RS have found large 
changes to the response for items moved only 1.5º (DiCarlo & Maunsell, 2003), 
and cell ‘preferences’ for certain retinal locations (Lueschow, Miller, & Desimone, 
1994). Lueschow and colleagues suggest that location is treated like an object 
feature for the purposes of recognition. It is interesting to note that 
neurophysiological studies of positional translation, like their human 
psychophysical counterparts, refer to shifts in terms of their distance in degrees 
of visual angle, rather than in terms of eccentricity. The findings of Experiments 6, 
7, and 8 suggest that eccentricity is more important than spatial separation in 
determining the effects of positional translation. Future studies are required to 
determine whether eccentricity and spatial separation can be disentangled at the 
neuronal level. It would also be of interest to determine whether RS becomes 
more sensitive to shifts of the stimulus under conditions of continuous 
recognition, in the manner predicted by behavioural data in Experiment 9. 
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7.7 Future experiments 
The work reported within this thesis has answered important experimental 
questions regarding human visual recognition. However, in the course of these 
experiments, many new questions have arisen that may provide impetus for 
future research. This section details some of those questions, and the further 
work that is required to address them. 
The findings of Chapter 2 demonstrated that stimulus sets composed of 
items from different categories were recognised better than those drawn from just 
one of those categories. Whilst it was speculated that the primary mechanism for 
this advantage was verbal labelling (naming), there also exists the possibility that 
visual discrimination between members of different perceptual categories was 
responsible. In order to determine the extent to which verbal labels were 
important future experiments could be carried out in which verbal interference, 
e.g. the visual presentation of words likely to interfere with labelling, could be 
used in the intertrial period to interfere with any verbal labels generated in 
connection with the pictures. Whilst it was demonstrated that testing picture 
stimuli from only one category greatly reduced recognition performance, it would 
be of interest to determine whether the reverse effect is possible, with other types 
of stimuli. For example, what would the recognition profile be like for a stimulus 
set composed of 10 exemplars from each of 20 categories (the same numbers as 
those for the mixed pictures set) of complex abstract stimuli, e.g. fractals, face-
like stimuli, Gauthier and Tarr’s (1997) Greebles? A third method for determining 
the nature of the difference between discrimination of pictures and birds, is the 
use of neuroimaging. Through the use of fMRI or other neuroimaging methods, it 
would be possible to compare the activation of different brain regions during 
recognition of both sets. This would give a clear indication of whether areas 
primarily involved in verbal processing or visual processing were involved in the 
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different types of recognition, and how these areas interacted. In addition, ERP 
studies might be able to examine the timing of the evoked potentials in these 
brain regions, and thus provide more information regarding differences in 
recognition latencies, and the temporal sequencing of recognition strategies.  
The finding that the birds stimulus set was still associated with a 
recognition advantage over comparable sets of abstract stimuli suggested that 
prior familiarity with natural classes of stimuli was important in determining 
recognition performance. Whilst it would be difficult to mimic the level of exposure 
participants have over the course of their lives with these naturally occurring 
objects, it would be interesting to discover what the effects of greater exposure to 
previously novel stimuli would have in this paradigm. Would extensive training in 
the discrimination of different items from the same novel classes (e.g. face-like 
stimuli, fractals), perhaps over several days or weeks prior to continuous 
recognition, improve subsequent recognition performance?  
Chapter 3 demonstrated the importance of interference from stimuli 
intervening between study and test in continuous recognition, and suggested that 
it was dependent on both physical and phonological similarity between items. 
However, the exact relationship between stimulus properties and the level of 
interference remains unknown. Certainly the number of stimuli is important, as is 
their parametric similarity to a certain degree. However, Experiment 9 
demonstrated that the spatial location of an intervening stimulus is irrelevant to its 
interfering effect. The definition of ‘similarity’, as regards interference, must be 
expanded from one based on geometric parameters defining a stimulus’ makeup, 
to an understanding of the subjective experience of similarity. For example, 
Experiment 4 used three arbitrary levels of interstimulus ‘similarity’, based on the 
variability of parameters used to define the properties of fractal and trigram 
stimuli. In both cases only the most dissimilar stimuli were recognised in a 
significantly different manner to the most similar stimuli. Stimuli of an intermediate 
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level of global similarity were associated with the same pattern of recognition as 
that for similar stimuli. Why did the one change (from ‘medium’ to ‘dissimilar’ 
stimuli) create a significant change in recognition, whereas the other (from 
‘similar’ to ‘medium’) did not? It was hypothesised that certain “thresholds” exist 
in the perception of difference, perhaps marking the boundaries of learnt 
perceptual categories. Further research is required to determine how changes to 
different stimulus features and properties are perceived, and what determines 
sensitivity for the detection of these changes. Whilst there is a significant body of 
literature elucidating such detection thresholds for simple stimuli, e.g. sinusoidal 
gratings, colour patches, etc., this research needs to be extended to more 
complex stimuli, as the basic properties of objects interact in combination to 
produce features and whole objects. It would be of interest to learn how robust 
memory for the perception of these changes is, e.g. whether the changes 
detectable in same/different recognition are also detectable after interference 
from other stimuli. Another interesting avenue that could be pursued is the 
investigation of how experience with artificial categories alters their perception. 
Do subcategories emerge with extensive experience of a set of stimuli, for 
example, ‘sad’ vs. ‘happy’ face-like stimuli? And are these differences reliant on 
perceptual discrimination or verbal labellling? Also, what kind of experience is 
necessary for such learning? Does it occur spontaneously through passive 
observation of stimuli or is active engagement in a relevant task (e.g. one 
involving perceptual discrimination) required? It is only through answering these 
questions with carefully designed recognition and perceptual learning 
experiments that a better understanding of ‘similarity’ can be achieved. 
The finding that the use of eye-tracking to verify fixation in positional 
translation studies significantly altered the findings of those studies must cast 
serious doubt on the validity of previous work on positional translation that had 
neglected to verify fixation (e.g. Dill & Edelman, 2001; Dill & Fahle, 1998; Gratton, 
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Corballis, & Jain, 1997; Hornak, Duncan, & Gaffan, 2002; Kahn & Foster, 1981). 
Considering that these studies form the vast majority of previous work in this 
field, future re-evaluation of these previously accepted findings may radically alter 
knowledge about the effects of translation. The major areas that must be re-
examined are whether the breakdown of translation invariance for simple patterns 
is genuine, whether training participants with stimuli at fixed locations still 
produces positional learning, and whether the apparent breakdown of translation 
invariance when stimuli are configurally scrambled is still the case.  
In relation to the stimuli used in Experiment 5, the apparently consistent 
but non-significant differences between faces that changed only in the size of 
features, and faces whose features changed in both size and location, should be 
examined in more depth. Would exaggerating the location changes (e.g. by 
making them larger) make the differences easier to detect? The intriguing finding 
of Dill and Edelman (2001) that the disruption of the learned spatial configuration 
of stimuli, but not the replacement of learned features with novel features, causes 
a breakdown of translation invariance in recognition, should be extended in order 
to ascertain what kind of disruption to the configuration is required. Experiments 
contained within this thesis have disrupted the configuration of stimuli through 
both featural size and location changes, and through rotation, without producing 
such an effect. Is the effect limited to well-learned stimuli or is a more radical 
disruption of configural cues required to breakdown translation invariance? 
It is also important that the hypothesis proposed here, that differences in 
recognition performance evoked by positional shifts are the result of changes in 
eccentricity, and therefore visual acuity, and do not normally occur at a constant 
eccentricity, should be tested by subsequent work. One experiment that would be 
useful in testing the validity of this hypothesis would be to apply variable amounts 
of spatial blurring to stimuli, in order to disrupt any advantage due to the greater 
acuity of central vision. If pairs of stimuli are more likely to be considered to be 
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different when they are processed with different levels of acuity, then this effect 
should be eradicated by sufficient blurring to equalise acuity at the different 
regions. In addition to trying to understand this phenomenon in more depth with 
the stimuli used in this thesis, it would be of value to determine whether it can 
account for some of the purported effects of positional shift described previously 
for simpler patterns (e.g. Dill & Fahle, 1998). 
The results of Experiment 8 suggested that the face-like stimuli were not 
recognised in a similar manner to that of actual faces, in terms of not producing 
an ‘inversion effect’ or a strong right hemisphere advantage of recognition, in 
spite of containing a similar arrangement of simplified features. This begs the 
question, what properties of a stimulus make it face-like for the purposes of 
recognition? This is of particular importance considering the assumptions of 
previous investigators that face-like stimuli are a close approximation of actual 
faces (e.g. Goren, Sarty, & Wu, 1975; Lewis & Johnston, 1998). 
There were no obvious effects of rotation on recognition in Experiment 8. 
However, previous experiments have suggested that 180º rotation eradicates 
positional shift-induced differences in recognition performance (Dill & Fahle, 
1998; Kahn & Foster, 1981; Larsen & Bundesen, 1998). This effect might 
become more evident in an experiment like Experiment 9 where there is a clearer 
effect of shift. In addition, future work should address the effects of other degrees 
of rotation on positional shifts, especially those in the region of 90º that are more 
deleterious to accurate recognition. It would also be of interest to determine the 
effects of rotation of specific features in conjunction with positional changes, 
given evidence from the study of photographs of faces with rotated features that 
this manipulation severely disrupts configural cues for recognition (e.g. Robbins & 
McKone, 2003). 
When the effects of positional translation were examined under conditions 
of continuous recognition, the previously reported translation invariance at 
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constant retinal eccentricity broke down. This was only examined for only one 
type of stimulus: fractals. It would be useful to determine whether this result can 
be replicated for other types of stimuli, including stimuli amenable to verbal 
labelling, and of different levels of familiarity. It may be the case that phonological 
encoded or well-known stimuli are resistant to this positional effect, and are 
recognised by different processes to the fractals. In addition, whilst manipulations 
of global similarity have previously been documented to have no differential effect 
on shifted and unshifted stimuli (Dill & Edelman, 2001; Dill & Fahle, 1998), their 
effect may be different in continuous recognition. As the demands of continuous 
recognition are theorised to have impeded the ability to translate information 
about objects across the visual field, increasing the interference by increasing 
interstimulus similarity might be expected to further impair translation. A detailed 
analysis of how these different factors interact is needed to establish whether this 
is the case. 
The current thesis has contributed to the understanding of human visual 
recognition memory through important and novel findings regarding the nature of 
interference in recognition and the processing of object location. It is hoped that 
the work reported here will not only add to the literature on these factors, but will 
also provide impetus for further research in this area. 
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